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PREFACE1 
On April 7, 2009, the Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme 
Court handed down a historic unanimous judgment convicting 
former dictator Alberto Fujimori on four charges of human rights 
violations: the multiple murders of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, and 
the kidnappings of Samuel Dyer and journalist Gustavo Gorriti.  
The Court, which conducted proceedings that were exemplary in 
their meticulousness and impartiality, held that the crimes committed 
by Fujimori were proven “beyond all reasonable doubt,” and 
therefore convicted him as an autor mediato [indirect perpetrator or 
perpetrator by means] within the framework of an organized 
apparatus of power. The Court also found that the cases of Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta were crimes against humanity.  
The judgment establishes clearly the decade-long criminal 
relationship between Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos, and 
Fujimori’s relationship with the high commanders of the Armed 
Forces as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of 
State, which facilitated the implementation of a systematic policy of 
human rights violations that included at least 50 other documented 
cases perpetrated by the Colina group.  
One enormously important aspect of this judgment is that it 
vindicates the dignity of the victims of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, 
as it was recognized officially for the first time in that they did not 
belong to a terrorist organization and, therefore, were not terrorists.   
For all of this, the Court has sentenced Fujimori to 25 years in 
prison. It is our opinion that this is a fair sentence, consistent with the 
law and proportional to the aberrant nature of the crimes perpetrated.  
Before the eyes of the world, Peru has rendered justice on behalf 
of the victims who clamored for it without being heard for 17 years. 
This event represents a milestone in the struggle for justice and 
respect for human dignity.  
The conviction of the former dictator sets a historic precedent with 
regard to crimes against humanity perpetrated from the highest 
 
 1.  Ronald Gamarra Herrera, Address at the Press Conference Announcing 
Judgment Convicting Former President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori (Apr. 7, 2009). 
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spheres of power, which are most often met with impunity. The 
relatives of the victims and the human rights organizations commend 
the Court’s decision to set an example in its punishment of Fujimori, 
who committed crimes in complicity with Vladimiro Montesinos in 
this and in many other cases of human rights violations, as well as in 
multimillion-dollar crimes involving corruption and the theft of State 
resources that are still pending judgment.  
The National Coordinator of Human Rights underscores the 
integrity of the Justices who sat on the Special Criminal Court. 
Throughout the trial they demonstrated impartiality, transparency 
and objectivity, ensuring fairness and due process in the case, in 
which Fujimori enjoyed the greatest latitude and guarantees to assert 
his defense.  
This case sets a historic precedent that vindicates the Peruvian 
Judiciary due to the moral reserve embodied by few judges such as 
those who made up the Special Criminal Court. The same can be said 
for the representatives of the Office of the Attorney General. 
We hope that this historic judgment will serve as an example for 
other cases of human rights violations that are currently pending. In 
the interest of the truth and justice to which the victims, their 
relatives and all of society are entitled, such violations must not be 
met with impunity. 
This year, 2009, will be remembered as the year in which justice 
was served upon a former president who symbolizes much of the 
worst that our society has been capable of expressing in recent 
decades. Let us not rejoice in the conviction of a man and the sorrow 
of his family. Let us rather take comfort in what it represents in terms 
of the message of equality before the law, of consolation for the 
thousands of victims he created without remorse, and of legitimacy 
for our democracy that is so fragile, and which he set out to destroy.   
On this day, I want to pay homage to the perseverance and 
courage of the relatives of the victims of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta, who never gave up and were not intimidated in the face of 
corrupt and homicidal power, and who persisted until justice was 
served. This well-deserved triumph is theirs. To them, to these 
mothers and sisters, belongs this vindication that justice has 
delivered today with regard to their loved ones, murdered by the 
person who has been found guilty and sentenced today. To you, 
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mothers of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, and on your behalf, to all 
of the relatives of the victims of all of the cases of human rights 
violations that cry out for justice in our country, our deepest 
embrace.  
 
Ronald Gamarra Herrera  
Executive Secretary 
National Coordinator of Human Rights  
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INTRODUCTION2 
As part of its legal dissemination and promotion activities 
surrounding the trial and the judgment in the Fujimori case, the 
National Coordinator of Human Rights presents to the legal 
community in particular, and to the public in general, a selection of 
paragraphs from the judgment handed down last April 7, 2009 by the 
Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, which sentenced 
former president Alberto Fujimori Fujimori to 25 years in prison 
(hereinafter “judgment”).3 The selection, it should be noted, has been 
made bearing in mind the objective public for which this publication 
is intended, that is to say, legal practitioners: judges, prosecutors, 
attorneys and law students, among others. Given the undeniable 
value of the legal contributions of the judgment, we think it is 
extremely important for it to be disseminated promptly with a view 
to the effective litigation of cases involving serious human rights 
violations. This will enable national legal practitioners to contribute, 
from their respective occupations, to the strengthening of the Rule of 
Law in Peru, based on their full understanding and subsequent 
implementation of the different substantive and procedural legal 
points developed in the judgment. Likewise, because of its use of 
international and comparative law sources, the judgment 
undoubtedly can be used as a point of reference in societies 
undertaking similar processes to fight against impunity, not only 
regionally but also worldwide. 
This introduction makes reference to four points that, in our 
opinion, are worth  highlighting because of their practical application 
in previous criminal cases—in the prosecution of state agents as well 
as of members of the terrorist organization Shining Path—and in the 
unquestionable practical effects they will have on future cases.  
 
 2.  Introduction by Juan Pablo Pérez-León Acevedo, Legal Advisor to the 
National Coordinator of Human Rights. 
 3.  Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special Criminal 
Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
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1. EVIDENCE  
The Court asserts that in a “free evidence” system like Peru’s, no 
special or exclusive means of proof are required to prove a particular 
fact; rather, the criteria that must be followed in the weighing of 
evidence are materiality and relevance.4 Examining the different 
categories of evidence, the Court arrives, inter alia, at the following 
conclusions:  
• Pretrial investigations may be accorded weight as evidence or 
may form part of the weighing of the evidence.5 
• The statement given by a witness in another, allegedly related, 
criminal proceeding cannot be used if the person was not 
offered as a witness in the current oral proceedings and no 
irreparable reason for his absence has been proven (principle 
of immediacy and confrontation).6 
• By its nature, witness testimony is reproducible at trial so that 
it can be contested.7  
• Newspaper articles may be a sufficient means of proving and 
verifying the alleged criminal conduct. In particular, the 
existence of news items in the newspapers is evidence of the 
public repercussion of a specific act or event. They reflect 
incontrovertible facts or statements from public figures or 
government employees, and have not been refuted or subject to 
questioning. It is an objective news item, and therefore the 
concept of the hearsay witness does not apply.8 
• The information or statements contained in a book are public 
and voluntary and, at the same time, involve the expression of 
some knowledge before society.9  
• Although the absence of uniformity in the totality of a 
witness’s statements (including statements made by the 
 
      4.   Id. ¶ 57. 
 5. Id. ¶ 65. 
 6. Id. ¶ 71. This differs from the case of statements made in Congress, which 
are not recognized as evidence. 
 7. Id. ¶ 72. 
 8. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 73, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Session of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 9. Id. ¶ 74. 
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accused or an expert witness) does not favor an initial opinion 
of merit, it is absolutely possible for there to be a retraction or 
change to one’s version of the events. In this case, the totality 
of witness statements must be examined internally as well as in 
relation to the other evidence in the case, to determine which 
of the versions is the most consistent with the events. It is not 
necessary for there to be effective confrontation at the time the 
pretrial statement is given; only the opportunity for 
confrontation is  required.10 
• With respect to the book of transcriptions of the 
“Vladivideos”: i) the subject matter does not fall within the 
personal realm that is typically private or subject to express 
legal protection, due to the fact that the statements were not 
made under duress and the issues discussed were of public 
importance; ii) because they are written transcripts of 
conversations contained in audio recordings or videos, they are 
copies. This does not prevent them from being examined as 
documents, as they reflect the idea set forth in an original 
document—the audio recordings or videos.11  
• The statements of Vladimiro Montesinos made before other 
authorities (congressional, prosecution and judicial) can be 
used and are fully admissible, on the exceptional and 
irreparable grounds arising from Montesinos’s refusal to 
testify in spite of having been summonsed and made to appear 
at the hearing.12 
• The Record of Congressional Debates is the source of the 
evidence that, at the same time, contains specific information 
that was provided by a specific person. These records are 
instruments that contain statements, and are viewed as such.13  
• Army Manual ME 38-20 existed and was implemented, having 
been officially approved, and therefore, was the official Army 
doctrine.14 Manual ME 38-23, in turn, described the mission of 
 
 10. Id. ¶ 75. 
 11. Id. ¶ 77. 
 12. Id. ¶ 83. 
 13. Id. ¶ 84. 
 14. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 88, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
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the countersubversion teams.15 Manual ME 41-7, 
“Unconventional Countersubversive War,” outlines a rigorous 
doctrine to confront armed subversion, in which part of the 
strategy aims to eliminate the leaders of the armed insurgent 
organization, and relaxes and softens the mechanisms of 
control with respect to international humanitarian law, 
constitutional government and human rights.16 
• The law does not prohibit in general the submission or use of 
documents in ongoing proceedings prior to the conclusion of 
the original proceeding in which they were initially offered.17 
• The existence of the so-called Plan Cipango, which led to the 
formation of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment, was 
proven.18  
• The speech of Army General Hermoza Ríos highlights the 
qualities of the Colina group when it had already committed 
various crimes, which demonstrates actual and institutional 
support.19 
• The declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State 
are admissible as evidence in a limited or referential sense.20 
• The Court acknowledges the intrinsic value of the decisions of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR] in 
general, and of the judgments in the Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta cases in particular. Without prejudice to the facts 
proven,21 it specifies that the relevance of those facts in terms 
 
Criminal Session of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 15. Id. ¶ 91. 
 16. Id. ¶ 114. 
 17. Id. ¶ 95. 
 18. Id. ¶ 96. 
 19. Id. ¶ 98. 
 20. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 102, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 21. Basically: i) the existence of the Colina group; ii) that the serious acts 
committed by this group fall within the framework of systematic repression, to 
which certain sectors of the population were subjected with the full knowledge of, 
and even orders from, the highest-ranking leaders of the Armed Forces, the 
intelligence services and the Executive Branch and; iii) that the crimes committed 
could not have been committed without the knowledge of, and superior orders 
from, the highest levels of the Executive Branch, including the President of the 
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of the criminal law, the application and interpretation of the 
relevant criminal provisions and, if appropriate, the 
determination of the sentence, are the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the criminal court. It further adds that the criminal court is 
where the evidence necessary for a conclusive ruling as to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused will be examined.22 
• The same reasoning should be applied with regard to the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court handed down in the 
respective amparo [appeal for relief under the Constitution for 
a case of violation of civil rights] or habeas corpus cases.23 
• The probative value of the Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission [TRC] lies in the so-called 
contextual facts, referring to the existence of numerous forced 
disappearances and arbitrary executions attributed to State 
agents, as part of a widespread and systematic practice.24  
• The reports from the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and Amnesty International convey the human rights 
situation in a country.25  
• There is no reason to exclude the effective cooperation 
judgments from the body of the evidence. The position of the 
arrepentidos [cooperating witnesses under the Repentance 
Act] with respect to their prior statements goes to the weight of 
the witness testimony, not of the legality of hearing it.26 With 
respect to documentary evidence, it must be recalled that the 
IACtHR has established that although items published in the 
print media are not documentary evidence per se,27 newspaper 
articles may be important if they corroborate other evidence or 
confirm the public nature and general knowledge of the 
 
Republic. See id. ¶ 105. 
 22. Id. ¶ 106. 
 23. Id. ¶ 107. 
 24. Id. ¶ 123. 
 25. Id. ¶ 131. 
 26. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 142, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 27. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras Case, Merits, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 146 (July 29, 1988). 
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pertinent facts.28 In addition, the IACtHR has established that 
some journalistic articles have probative value when they print 
the text of public statements made by high-ranking 
government employees or when they corroborate testimony.29 
In cases of forced disappearances, the IACtHR has granted 
special relevance to circumstantial evidence (for example, 
police reports)30 and presumptions.31 Due to the fact that, by 
nature, forced disappearances seek to erase all traces of 
evidence, the IACtHR has held that it is possible to conclude 
that a person has disappeared if the plaintiff: i) demonstrates 
the existence of an official practice of disappearances, or at 
least the State’s tolerance of such a practice; and ii) establishes 
a link between the specific disappearance and the State 
practice.32 Turning to the text of the ICC Statute,33 we find that 
it establishes that the ICC shall determine the relevance or 
admissibility of any evidence considering, inter alia,34 the 
following: i) its probative value, ii) its relevance to the case;35 
and iii) any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair 
trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness. The 
foregoing is covered in greater detail in the ICC’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence36 and, essentially, also reflects the 
practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
 
 28. Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 
70 (Feb. 6, 2001). 
 29. Velásquez-Rodríguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 146. 
 30. Blake v. Guatemala Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, ¶ 49 
(Jan. 24, 1998). 
 31. “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala Case, 1999 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 63 (Nov. 19, 1999). 
 32. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 4, ¶ 125 (July 29, 1988). 
 33. Adopted by Legislative Resolution No. 27517 of September 16, 2001, 
which adopts the ICC Statute. The Rome Statute of the ICC was ratified pursuant 
to Article One of One of Supreme Decree No. 079-2001-RE, published on 10-09-
2001. The ICC Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. 
 34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 69(3), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 35. Id. art. 69(4). 
 36. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, ICC-ASP/1/3, rules 63-75 
[hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure]. 
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Yugoslavia and Rwanda37 and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.38  
2.  AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, MURDER, GRIEVOUS BODILY 
HARM, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: BARRIOS ALTOS AND LA 
CANTUTA  
It should be specified that, because of the date of the events at 
issue in the case and the still nascent state of the adaptation of our 
domestic laws to the different international instruments that define 
acts classified as crimes against humanity when committed in a 
widespread or systematic manner, the Court determines the 
defendant’s individual criminal responsibility based on the crimes 
defined in our code. It thus abides by an unconditional observance of 
the principle of legality. With respect to kidnapping, the Court finds 
that the offense of aggravated kidnapping, with the aggravating 
circumstance of cruel treatment, has been committed against Gustavo 
Gorriti and Samuel Dyer.39 
The Court additionally finds, consistent with the execution of the 
act and the motives for the deaths that occurred at the tenement 
house in Barrios Altos (Barrios Altos Case) and on Avenida Ramiro 
Prialé (La Cantuta Case), that: i) the commission of the crime was 
prepared in advance, which assumes the existence of a preconceived 
plan, at least in the guidelines for its execution; ii) for that purpose, a 
special intelligence detachment was formed, whose missions 
included killing those it believed to be linked to the political or 
military apparatus of the terrorist organization “Shining Path.” The 
Court adds that the individuals who carried out these acts did so with 
complete coldness and determination, with the understanding that 
 
 37. With respect to requirements and examples of relevant evidence and the 
exclusion of evidence, see Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 
95-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 129 (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, Decision on Evidence of the Good Character of the Accused and the 
Defence of Tu Quoque (Feb 17, 1999); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-
T, Decision on the Defence of “Objection to Intercept Evidence”, ¶ 53 (Oct. 3, 
2003). 
 38. With respect to the production of evidence based on the action of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leona, see Prosecutor v. Norman, Case 
No. SCSL-04-14-AR73, Decision on Appeal Against “Decision on Prosecution's 
Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence”, ¶ 26  (May 16, 2005). 
 39. Judgment, ¶¶ 678 et seq., 823. 
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they were taking part in a military operation to eliminate members of 
the Shining Path, which resulted in 25 deaths between the two cases. 
The above was confirmed by their advantageous use of special 
circumstances of time and place, the unexpected nature of the attack 
and the defenseless state of the victims. Therefore, the accused was 
convicted of the offense of aggravated murder, the aggravating 
circumstance being malice aforethought.40 In the case of the four 
victims of the offense of bodily harm, the Court considered the 
aggravated definition, given the establishment of: i) the basis of 
“imminent danger to the life of the victim” or ii) the basis of 
“injuries that cause permanent disability.” Added to this is the 
subjective element, in this case the animus vulnerandi or laedendi to 
cause the serious injury to the victim.41  
With respect to the classification of the crimes of murder and 
grievous bodily harm as crimes against humanity, due to the context 
in which they were committed, the Court begins by making reference 
to the different international legal instruments in which crimes 
against humanity are defined, including the ICC Statute.42 It is well 
established that crimes against humanity go beyond the scope of 
conventions (treaties) or written texts, as their commission is also 
prohibited by customary norms; however, the Court, as previously 
indicated, recognizes that the definition of the offense from the ICC 
has still not been incorporated into our laws, and therefore the 
principle of legality is respected unconditionally.43 
The definition the Court provides, based on the respective 
customary rule, is consistent with Article 7 of the ICC Statute in 
stating that the attacks must take place during the course of a 
widespread (number of victims or scale of the attack) or systematic 
 
 40. Id. ¶¶ 700, 823. 
 41. Id. ¶¶ 702-09. 
 42. The following are among those mentioned: i) Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg art. 6.c, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 
279; ii) Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5, Jan. 
19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589; iii) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) (May 25, 
1993); and iv) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, 
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 6, 1994). 
 43. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 711, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
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(existence of a policy or preconceived plan) attack against the 
civilian population (objective element), and that the agent or actual 
perpetrator must have knowledge of the broad and general context in 
which the acts take place; that is, that such conduct is part of an 
attack with the specified characteristics (subjective element).44 Such 
elements have been developed extensively in the case law of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia45 and 
Rwanda46 and by the ICC itself in the affirmation of the charges in 
the case of Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui47 as well as in the recent 
arrest warrant against Sudanese President Al Bashir.48  
Next, the Court notes that the term murder, as it is phrased in the 
Statute and as recognized in the case law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“kill or cause death”),49 is not the 
same as Article 108 of the Peruvian Criminal Code, which sets forth 
the elements of the offense of murder.50 Finally, the Court does not 
 
 44. Id. ¶¶ 714-16. 
 45. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, ¶ 206 (Mar. 3, 2000) 
(regarding widespread nature); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 35 (Nov. 29, 2002) (regarding systematic nature); Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 659 (May 7, 1997) (regarding knowledge). 
 46. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Sep. 2, 
1998) (regarding widespread nature); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-
95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 123 (May 21, 1999) (regarding systematic nature); Prosecutor 
v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 71 (Dec. 6, 1999) (regarding 
knowledge). 
 47. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 389-402 (Sep. 30, 
2008). 
 48. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, ¶¶ 81-89 (Mar. 4, 2009). Available (in English) at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf [last visited May 25, 2009]. 
 49. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 598. 
 50. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 713, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). Although the Court 
does not make reference to the text of the Elements of Crimes set forth in the ICC 
Statute, the Court’s conclusion essentially goes in the same direction, insoafar as 
the text states: “That the perpetrator has killed one or more persons, including 
through the imposition of conditions of existence aimed deliberately at causing the 
destruction of part of the population,” and it further specifies in a footnote that the 
phrase “killed” is interchangeable with the phrase “caused death.” Elements of 
Crimes, Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1)(b); Crime against humanity of 
extermination and footnote No. 8, respectively, available at http://www.icc-
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address the issue of whether grievous bodily harm can, based on the 
conditions under which it was inflicted, be categorized as a crime 
against humanity. It is our opinion that such classification is possible 
within the residual category of conduct involving inhumane acts, 
included in Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute (which does not 
include expressly the act of causing bodily harm) based on the 
content of that international instrument itself, as well as on relevant 
international case law, provided that it is proven that the offense was 
committed with the intent to inflict serious physical or mental injury 
to the victim. Basically, the (failed) intent to kill cannot be 
transformed into intent to cause serious physical or mental injury.51  
3. PERPETRATION BY MEANS OF CONTROL OVER AN ORGANIZED 
APPARATUS OF POWER 
The Court begins with a general reference to autoría mediata 
[perpetration by means or indirect perpetration], identifying three 
types: i) control by error (control over the action of the person who 
executes the crime by means of deception); ii) control by coercion 
(control over the action of the person who executes the crime by 
means of threat or intimidation); and iii) perpetration by means of 
control over an organized apparatus of power.52 It then refers to 
Article 23 of the Criminal Code of Peru, which addresses 
perpetration by means in the following language: “Any person who 
carries out the punishable act, by himself or through another, and 
those who commit it jointly. . . “53 Given the facts and context of the 
case, the Court examines in detail the context that gave rise to the 
doctrine of perpetration by means of control over organized 
apparatuses of power, developed originally by German jurist Claus 
 
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/15157C68-85AE-4226-B41A-
C6F6E6E21026/0/Element_of_Crimes_Spanish.pdf (last visited May 18, 2009). 
 51. Id. art. 7. […] (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
(emphasis added). The phrasing of the text of the Elements of Crimes of the ICC 
Statute is identical. Pro Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶¶ 463-65, available at (in 
English) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf (last visited May 25, 
2009). Decision based on: Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-
A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
 52. Barrios Altos, et. al., AV 19-2001, ¶¶ 718-22. 
 53. Id. ¶ 722. 
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Roxin.54 The Court, along this line of reasoning, looked to 
comparative jurisprudence55 as well as national case law. With regard 
to the latter, the trial and appeal judgments in the case of Abimael 
Guzmán are highlighted in particular.56 What follows is the detailed 
analysis of the premises for the establishment of this type of 
responsibility. Thus, the Court identifies as a general premise the 
existence of the organization, which entails the assignment of roles, 
and the development of an operational life of these power structures 
that is independent of its members.57 Next, the Court lists and 
explains extensively the objective elements/requirements58 and the 
subjective elements/requirements.59 Two objective requirements are 
cited: i) command authority, that is, the high-level strategic capacity, 
of the “person in the background,” to give orders or  assign roles to 
the part of the organization subordinate to him [two levels are 
identified: formal orders common in state organizations, and orders 
given for their actual effectiveness, common in organized 
apparatuses of power designed from their inception to be totally 
separate from the legal system]; and; ii) deviation from the law, that 
is, the functioning of the apparatus as a whole outside the legal 
system, producing unlawful effects as a unit that acts totally outside 
the law. In the specific case of state criminality, the central authority 
at the high strategic level of the State uses the structures of the state 
apparatus for the commission of international crimes.  
There are also two subjective requirements/elements that are 
mentioned: i) fungibility, that is, that the physical perpetrator can be 
substituted or exchanged by the superior to execute the crime. This 
feature has been explained graphically by Roxin through the 
changeable or substitutable wheel or cog (immediate or direct 
perpetrator) in the power machine (apparatus of power) and; ii) the 
 
 54. Theory originally developed in 1963. 
 55. Reference to the Eichmann and Staschynski cases, the conviction of the 
Military Juntas of Argentina and case law from the German Supreme Court. 
 56. Respectively: Guzmán Case, Case No. 560-2003, National Criminal Court, 
Oct. 13, 2006 (Peru); Guzmán Case, Case No. 560-2003, Second Temporary 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, Dec. 14, 2007 (Peru). 
 57. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 726, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 729-36. 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 737-40. 
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predisposition to carry out the unlawful act, which refers to a 
psychological predisposition of the direct perpetrator with respect to 
carrying out the order that entails the commission of the crime. In 
this context, commission of the unlawful act is ensured by the 
internalized interest and the conviction of the direct perpetrator that 
such act take must place. Finally, the Court ends this part by 
addressing the treatment of perpetration by means and superior 
responsibility in international criminal law, correctly differentiating 
between the former, which is a by commission (orders), and the 
latter, which is by omission—that is, when the superior fails to 
comply with his duty to prevent, monitor and punish all crimes that 
are committed, or may be committed, by his subordinates.60 
In applying the above conceptual framework to the specific case at 
hand, the Court establishes that the defendant, in his status as holder 
of the highest position of the State,  of the National Defense System 
in particular, and as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 
abused his position of authority by creating an organized apparatus 
of power based on the SINA’s central and derivative units, which 
included the commission of the offenses of murder and grievous 
bodily harm in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, in the context of the 
fight against subversion. Those crimes, in addition to the unlawful 
acts conducted in the basement of the SIE, were carried out by the 
COLINA group, which was hierarchically subordinate to the 
organized apparatus of power under the control and will of the 
defendant. Such situation, based also on similar experiences within 
Latin America, has been described appropriately by the Court as 
“Dirty War,” a concept that is related to the term “Criminal State.”61  
Finally, as an additional remark, the Court’s legal analysis is not 
only consistent with judgments from other national courts and the 
prevailing criminal law doctrine but also with recent decisions of the 
 
 60. The mode of superior responsibility (by omission) is contained expressly in 
the Yugoslavia Statute, supra note 42, art. 7.3, the Rwanda Statute, supra note 42, 
art. 6(3) and Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 28. 
 61. The Court has held that the phrases “Criminal State” and “Dirty War” 
carried out by  state organizations can be considered quantitative modes of the 
same type of action or modus operandi for carrying out acts such as forced 
disappearances, extrajudicial executions and torture. In the former, the widespread 
nature of the criminal acts spans different spheres of the State, whereas the latter is 
predominated by the sector-based and selective activity of strategic bodies and 
special operations. See Barrios Altos, et. al., AV 19-2001, ¶ 747. 
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ICC. The Peruvian State is a party to the ICC Statute, and it is in the 
process of being incorporated into our domestic law. Indeed, in 
applying Article 25(3)(a),62 of the ICC Statute, which is essentially 
similar to the content of our Criminal Code, the ICC recently issued 
a decision ordering the arrest of the sitting President of Sudan, Al 
Bashir, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:   
CONSIDERING that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that Omar Al Bashir has been the de jure and de facto 
President of the State of Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Sudanese Armed Forces from March 2003 to 14 July 
2008, and that, in that position, he played an essential role in 
coordinating, with other high-ranking Sudanese political and 
military leaders, the design and implementation of the 
abovementioned GoS counter-insurgency campaign; 
CONSIDERING, further, that the Chamber finds, in the 
alternative, that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (i) 
that the role of Omar Al Bashir went beyond coordinating the 
design and implementation of the common plan; (ii) that he 
was in full control of all branches of the “apparatus” of the 
State of Sudan, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and 
their allied Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police Force, the 
NISS and the HAC; and (iii) that he used such control to 
secure the implementation of the common plan . . . .63 
 
 62. Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 25. “Individual criminal responsibility. 
[…] 3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
[…] (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally 
responsible;” [emphasis added]. 
 63. ICC, Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of 
Arrest issued, ¶¶ 7-8 (Mar. 4, 2009) available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc644487.pdf (last visited May 25, 2009). For more details, 
see Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, ¶¶ 209-18 (Mar. 4, 2009). The above only confirms what the ICC had 
already established in prior decisions. The Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges in the case of Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui is of particular 
value in the analysis of what the ICC understood the objective elements of the 
modality to be. Indeed, it is indicated first that:  
496. A concept has developed in legal doctrine that acknowledges the 
possibility that a person who acts through another may be individually 
criminally responsible, regardless of whether the executor (the direct 
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4. REPARATIONS  
In this part, the Court basically seeks to answer the following 
question: Is it proper to issue a judgment ordering the payment of 
civil reparations ex delicto to the victims and relatives for the acts 
perpetrated against them, when there is already an international 
judgment that addresses that same issue?64 
Upon establishing that the human rights violations affecting the 
victims in the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases were evaluated by 
the IACtHR from the logical perspective of international human 
rights law,65 the Court indicated that, insofar as: i) the victims are 
identical, and; ii) they pertain to a single event, having identified the 
victims and their relatives as well as the specific reparations, it is not 
possible for them to receive—in the Court’s opinion—a double or 
additional compensation. The Court asserted that this would result in 
the unjust enrichment of the victims or their successors,66 and 
therefore a double payment for damages was impossible.67 Based on 
 
perpetrator) is also responsible. This doctrine is based on the early works of 
Claus Roxin and is identified by the term: “the perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator” (Täter hinter dem Täter).  
497. The underlying rationale of this model of criminal responsibility is that 
the perpetrator behind the perpetrator is responsible because he controls the 
will of the direct perpetrator. As such, in some scenarios it is possible for both 
perpetrators to be criminally liable as principals: the direct perpetrator for his 
fulfillment of the subjective and objective elements of the crime, and the 
perpetrator behind the perpetrator for his control over the crime via his control 
over the will of the direct perpetrator.  
The paragraphs that follow (500-518) specify that the objective elements of 
perpetration through another person are: i) Control over the organization; ii) 
Organized and hierarchical apparatus of power; and iii) Execution of the crimes 
secured by almost automatic compliance with the orders. See Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sep. 30, 2008) available at http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf (last visited May 25, 2009). On the 
concept of perpetration by means in the context of macro-criminality, see also 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges, ¶ 332 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF (last visited May 25, 2009). 
 64. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 778, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 65. Id. ¶ 779. 
 66. Id. ¶ 780. 
 67. Id. ¶ 781. 
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the case law of the IACtHR,68 the Court, in its best judgment, 
rejected the prosecution’s argument whereby it asserted  
that the IACtHR had not considered the facts, for purposes of 
compensation, in their real aspect—that is, as grave violations of 
human rights.69  
The Court next examines other reparations claims that are non-
pecuniary in nature. In doing so, it acts in accordance with the latest 
developments on the issue of reparations in international law, in 
which reparations are the broader category, and compensation is 
merely one specific type. This has as a correlative, in addition to the 
UN Principles and Directives70 and the relevant case law of the 
IACtHR71 (cited by the civil party and included in the Judgment), the 
express provisions of ICC Statute,72 which are beginning to be 
 
 68. Id. ¶ 780. The references are: Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. 
Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
134, ¶¶ 211, 214, 287 (Sep. 15, 2005); Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 210, 213 
(Nov. 29, 2006). 
 69. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶¶ 782-86, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema 
[Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).. 
 70. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, at 789-791, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
 71. Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 87, ¶¶ 29, 33, 38 (Nov. 30, 2001); Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 204, 
205, 213, 216 (Nov. 29, 2006). References made in Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and 
Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 778, Sala 
Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special Criminal Chamber of the Supreme 
Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru).. 
 72. Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 34. 
Reparations to victims. 1. The Court shall establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation 
and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon 
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the 
scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims 
and will state the principles on which it is acting. 2. The Court may make an 
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations 
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation. […]. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also, ICC Rules of Procedure, supra note 36, at 97(2). 
Taking into account the scope and extent of any damage, loss or injury, the Court 
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interpreted by the ICC itself.73 In resolving these non-pecuniary 
claims, the Court ruled that the twenty-nine recognized victims in the 
Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases did not have ties to the terrorist 
acts of the Communist Party of Peru/Shining Path and were not 
members of this criminal organization.74 The Court responds in this 
part of its holding to the pertinent part of the prayer for relief filed by 
the victims, who requested the issuance, as a measure of satisfaction, 
of an official statement or court decision to restore the dignity, 
reputation and  rights of the victims, as well as of the individuals 
close to them.75 Finally, the Court found that the payment of 
compensation would entail necessarily what it called “double 
compensation” by creating, in its opinion, a double payment. As a 
general observation, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the 
judgments of the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases the IACtHR 
determined that the Peruvian State was responsible, and therefore, as 
 
may award reparations on an individualized basis or, where it deems it appropriate, 
on a collective basis or both. 
2. At the request of victims or their legal representatives, or at the request of the 
convicted person, or on its own motion, the Court may appoint appropriate experts 
to assist it in determining the scope, extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in 
respect of victims and to suggest various options concerning the appropriate types 
and modalities of reparations. […]. (emphasis added), available at: 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7B3E8B115E8 
86/140167/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_Spanish.pdf (last visited May 25, 
2009). 
 73. We must take into account that the ICC is the first international criminal 
court that recognizes the participation of victims as such and not merely as 
witnesses, which was the practice of the international criminal courts that preceded 
it. Among other decisions on the issue of the participation of victims in the 
international criminal proceedings of the  ICC, there are the following: Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, 
VPRS4, VPRS5 and VPRS6 (Jan. 17, 2006) available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183441.PDF; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, Decision on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense of the Decision 
of the Trial Chamber I on the Victims’ Participation (Jan. 18, 2008) available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc409168.PDF (Last visited May 25, 2009); 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Indirect Victims 
(Apr. 8, 2009) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc662407.pdf (last 
visited May 25, 2009). 
 74. Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Army Intelligence Service Basement Cases, 
Case No. AV 19-2001, ¶ 827, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte Suprema [Special 
Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court], Apr. 7, 2009 (Peru). 
 75. Id. ¶ 789. 
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part of the reparations it ordered the Peruvian State to pay the 
respective compensation to the victims; on the other hand, in the case 
of the judgment issued last April 7th, we are dealing with a decision 
from a national criminal court that, had it included the compensation 
order, would have ordered that it be paid by convicted defendant 
Alberto Fujimori.  
With regard to the Barrios Altos Case, the Court indicates based 
on the information submitted that the compensation has been paid to 
the victims. With respect to the La Cantuta Case, the Court stated 
that although the payment of the money damages to the victims by 
the State has not been verified, the Peruvian State—according to the 
IACtHR’s Judgment—paid out three million soles between 1996 and 
1998; it added that the military criminal court judgment regarding the 
La Cantuta Case confirms the payment of the civil reparations. 
Nevertheless, the Court does not examine the potential effects, in 
terms of the reparations, of the fact that in one case (La Cantuta) 
there is a conviction from a military court, whereas in the other case 
(Barrios Altos) there is still no such judgment, as the respective 
criminal case—concerning the members of the Colina Group—is 
pending.76  
However, what the Court understood as “unjust enrichment” is 
what finally prevented it from granting a “double compensation or 
payment” to the victims. In addition to the aforementioned 
considerations of the differences (State responsibility before the 
IACtHR versus criminal responsibility before the Court), the purpose 
of the compensation in question must be specified. The case law of 
the IACtHR, which the Court cites as one of its central grounds, does 
not prohibit (at least not expressly) additional compensation in cases 
of convictions in domestic criminal cases. What the case law of the 
IACtHR has sought and understood fundamentally, according to the 
notion of “unjust enrichment,” is for exorbitantly high amounts (for 
example, millions of dollars to a single victim) not to be awarded; it 
has also stressed that compensation (and in general) reparations are 
not punitive in nature,77 and must be proportional to the human rights 
 
 76. Id. ¶ 777. 
 77. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Reparations and Costs, 1998 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶ 43 (Aug. 27, 1998). 
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violated.78 In light of the facts and amounts involved in the Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta Cases (especially in the first case), it would 
seem that if defendant Fujimori had been ordered to pay 
compensation to the victims, it would not have given rise to unjust 
enrichment, which is what the Court  ultimately intended to prevent. 
This assertion would further find support in the judgment rendered in 
the Castillo Páez Case and in the provisions of the ICC Statute.79   
 
 78. Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶¶ 283-85 (July 5, 2004). 
 79. In the Castillo Páez Case, in which the IACtHR ordered the Peruvian State 
to comply with the respective reparations (including the payment of 
compensation), the First Temporary Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court 
ordered the payment of compensation without making reference to any limitation 
on “double compensation,” “double payment” or “unjust enrichment”. See, 
respectively: Case of Castillo-Páez v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, 1998 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43 (Nov. 27, 1998); Case of Castillo-Páez, R. N. No. 2779-
2006, Supreme Court, First Temporary Criminal Chamber (Dec. 18, 2007) (Peru) 
available at http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/nuevos/2008/agosto/21/sentencia_cas 
tillo_paez.pdf (last visited May 25, 2009). With respect to the ICC Statute (mainly 
Article 75), we find that: i) there is no express or implied prohibition against the 
payment of double reparations, and; ii) Article 75(6) establishes that: “Nothing in 
this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims [including the 
right to reparations] under national or international law.” Rome Statute, supra note 
34, art. 75. 
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THE JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: SELECTION OF 
KEY PARAGRAPHS 
PART ONE: FACTUAL BACKGROUND  
Chapter I: Criminal Evidence 
§1. Introduction 
¶1. Statement of the Case. Facts alleged. 
51. [. . .] The facts that would establish this secret and clandestine 
strategy or method, of course, do not require that the evidence 
produced be supported exclusively, under the requirement of 
materiality of the evidence, by written regulations. These facts, by 
their very nature, cannot be set forth or ordered through regulatory 
documents, even in the denunciation of the creation and actions of an 
organized apparatus of power inside the State itself, which carries 
out clandestine and substantially criminal operations. The respective 
orders and instructions, in the specific context of the case in 
question—for acts such as forced disappearances, arbitrary or 
extrajudicial executions, grievous bodily harm and kidnappings—are 
not drawn up in laws, and it is certainly very unlikely that they would 
be set out in writing or through another administrative mechanism 
typical of the modus operandi of an administrative or governmental 
entity. The decisions that involve human rights violations made 
inside an organized apparatus of power, therefore, are not justified or 
supported by regulatory instruments. It is precisely the clandestine 
nature of the unlawful practice of an organization that rules out, for 
obvious reasons, the possibility of verifying its existence and the acts 
that it commits by means of regulatory instruments [. . .].  
56. [. . .] The Office of the Public Prosecutor aims to prove the 
existence of a policy—the strategy for implementing the dirty war. 
Such policy would demonstrate the “political element” of the crimes 
against humanity. [The Court indicates that such policy may be 
proven in the following manner:] The existence of that “policy” can 
be proven based on the finding of legal provisions, administrative 
decisions or official directives, but they are not a necessary 
requirement. Thus, for example, the European Court of Human 
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Rights allows for such a practice or policy to be identified through (i) 
an accumulation of identical or analogous violations, sufficiently 
numerous and interconnected so as to be not mere isolated incidents 
or exceptions, but rather a pattern or system; and (ii) the official 
tolerance of State authorities. The latter is understood as the fact that 
the superiors, in spite of having knowledge of the violations, refuse 
to take measures to punish those responsible or to prevent the 
repetition of the violations, or they express their indifference by 
refusing to conduct an adequate investigation into the truth or 
falsehood of the alleged abuses.80 
57. In addition, the requirement should be noted (strictly speaking, 
criteria that must be followed for the admission of evidence) of 
materiality, in addition to pertinence, in a “free evidence” system 
such as ours. Such a system establishes the free evaluation of 
evidence, that is, freedom of choice and use of the different means of 
proof. This means, as a rule, that no special or exclusive type of 
evidence is required to prove a particular fact. The procedural 
doctrine indicates that through materiality that the law makes it 
possible to prove the fact under examination—or part of it—with a 
specific piece of evidence. Therefore, it must be duly noted if there 
are any prohibitions against evidence or if the law stipulates that a 
particular fact must be proven with a specific means of proof. With 
respect to the facts alleged, the thema decidendi, in accordance with 
the preceding paragraphs, there is no procedural rule that precludes 
the establishment of some point of those facts with a specific means 
of proof. There are no exclusions, exceptions or limitations with 
regard to the matter. Obviously, as noted by FLORIÁN, the evidence 
must be lawful, appropriate and conclusive. As such, the evidence 
offered in the case shall be examined and weighed pursuant to these 
standards. 
¶2. The charges and the principle of correlation 
[. . .]  
¶3. Proceedings with respect to legally admissible evidence.  
65. In terms of the submission of facts to the case, a pretrial 
investigation (even one conducted at the preliminary stage by the 
 
 80. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1978); 
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1192 (1996). 
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Police or the Office of the Public Prosecutor) may be accorded 
weight as evidence, or it may form part of the weighing of the 
evidence (a general prohibition is unacceptable) provided that, from 
the internal perspective, it meets the legal requirements or formalities 
of the venue where it is produced. The defendant’s opportunity to 
challenge its production (specific requirements of confrontation), 
bearing in mind the peculiarity of the evidence in question, is vital 
(objective requirement). Furthermore, there must be some 
circumstance derived from the notions of non-repeatability—or 
fleetingness or unavailability—and urgency that make it impossible 
to reproduce at trial (substantive requirement); that would be the 
case, for example, of the irreparable absence of a witness or expert 
witness. It must be noted, in this hypothetical of exception, that there 
is a set of minimum guarantees in the acquisition of the source of the 
evidence as well as in its conservation and in its submission at trial. 
This is the procedural requirement, which is satisfied with the 
reading of the record, or other equivalent means, under conditions 
that allow the defense to raise any objections to those proceedings. 
§2. Evidentiary issues.  
[. . .]  
¶1. Initial objections to the evidence raised by defendant 
Fujimori Fujimori’s counsel. 
[. . .]  
¶2. Evidence offered by the Office of the Attorney General  
71. STATEMENTS MADE IN OTHER CASES. [. . .]  
4. In principle, there are no internal limits to the transfer of 
evidence in the case of official expert opinions, reports and 
documentary evidence. It is sufficient for it to be in the 
source proceeding in order to be incorporated into the case 
underway. The relevant provision states as follows: “Without 
need for such grounds to be present. . .”  
5. There are restricted grounds or specific limits for the 
production of other evidence, including testimony—
statements from defendants and witnesses, confrontation 
hearings, identifications, on-site inspections—and objective 
and irreproducible proceedings. It is required that the transfer 
be indispensable due to the fact that in the case receiving the 
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evidence “. . .the production [of the evidence] is impossible 
to obtain or difficult to reproduce due to the risk of loss of the 
source of evidence or threat to a witness.” This assumes the 
verification of a reasonable cause that prevents the production 
of the evidence in the case receiving it. Such limit would be 
based on the fact that a statement of a witness who failed to 
appear at  trial prevents the Court from hearing and seeing, in 
accordance with the principle of immediacy, and the parties 
from being able to make the pertinent challenges. Therefore, 
the statement of a witness given in another criminal 
proceeding—presumably a connected one—cannot be used 
when that witness has not been offered in the current oral 
proceedings, and grounds for his irreparable absence have not 
been verified. As such, the inclusion of the previously 
mentioned statements and declarations is denied.  
72. PRETRIAL STATEMENTS MADE IN THE CASE [. . .] 
Witness testimony is, by nature, reproducible at trial in order to be 
subject to confrontation, and if it is not produced, even though it is 
possible to do so, that statement taken during the investigative phase 
of the proceedings cannot be used, unless by resorting to its reading 
based on some serious absolute or preventive reason. They would 
have to be reasons independent of the will of the parties and the 
Court—legal or factual force majeure—that prevent the witness from 
appearing at trial and entail the exhaustion of all legally provided 
possibilities for the reproduction of testimony at trial. Along these 
lines, the European Court of Human Rights recalled in the Case of 
Isgró v. Italy (Judgment of February 19, 1991, paragraph thirty-four), 
that: “The evidence normally must be presented before the defendant 
at a public hearing, with a view to adversarial argument, but the use 
of statements that go back to the preliminary investigation stage is 
not inconsistent in and of itself with sections 3(d) and 1 of Article 6 
[of the European Convention on Human Rights, a provision similar 
to Article 8.2(f) of the American Convention on Human Rights], 
without prejudice to the rights of the defense; as a general rule, they 
require that the accused be granted a sufficient and adequate 
opportunity to challenge the testimony against him and to examine 
the witness, at the time of the statement or subsequently.”  
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Consequently, the reading of the pretrial statements81 is 
unacceptable if the witness was not requested to appear at trial, and 
there is no reasonable and well-founded reason for his absence. 
Therefore, the Court will not consider the evidence of the two 
witness statements read. 
The case of the statements of Army General Pérez Documet is 
different. A request was made for the reading of his pretrial 
statement in this case at page seven thousand seven hundred and 
ninety of the record, of his statement to the police at page fifteen 
thousand seventy five [given before the DIRCOTE], of his testimony 
given before the First Special Court of Lima at page fifteen thousand 
eighty-five, of his pretrial statement given before the Fifth Special 
Criminal Court of Lima at page forty-one thousand six hundred and 
seventy-one, and of his statement given before the TRC. As this 
witness made use of his right to remain silent during the trial, bearing 
in mind the charges for these same acts in related cases pending 
before the Superior Court of Lima, it is proper to consider these 
statements due to this exceptional situation.  
Another situation that allows for the consideration of pretrial 
statements is that of Army General Rojas García. He testified at trial, 
and the questions also emphasized the answers he had given before 
the investigating court [page nineteen thousand six hundred and 
twelve]. As such, it is important to take cognizance of that statement 
not only to measure the degree of credibility of his testimony at trial 
but also in order to, in the case of inconsistencies, to be able to use it 
in its place. 
73. We turn now to the possibility that information gathered by the 
communications media can be considered proven, insofar as it 
reflects incontrovertible facts of general knowledge or the statements 
of political organizations or public figures (or reports on the 
experiences of different social actors, which usually involves a 
specific perception of an external reality that is perceived and 
transmitted by the journalist who participates in it) that have not been 
 
 81. The Office of the Public Prosecutor likewise offered the reading of the 
pretrial statements given before the Investigating Judge by Orlando Enrique 
Moncayo Peña and José Luis Bazán Adrianzén, and the preliminary victim’s 
statement of Susana Higuchi Miyagawa. The defense has opposed their inclusion 
(Publisher’s note). 
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refuted or questioned in the case. Journalistic information operates, 
then, as prima facie evidence that if it is not refuted and called into 
question, comes to have full evidentiary effects. (The refutation or 
questioning, obviously, must be serious and significant, one that is 
merely procedural is not sufficient). It is clear that another point of 
validity or, rather, of the validity of the information, is that it not be 
an isolated news article. The bulk of the journalistic information 
incorporated into the case reflects a general, informative content, 
commonly accepted by the print media, and it refers to public events 
or events of general political relevance. [. . .] It should be noted that 
only content that is introduced objectively by the professional author 
of the information can be admitted with full probative value; the 
value judgments that may be brought into a news article are thus 
excluded. In addition, strictly speaking, the defense has not 
questioned the legitimacy or origin of the press clippings; rather, it 
has questioned their sources. Consequently, journalistic articles can 
be a suitable means to verify and prove the acts at issue in the trial; 
in particular, the existence of a news item in the newspaper is proof 
of the public repercussions of the specific fact or event.  
[. . .]  
In short, journalistic publications are admissible evidence that can 
be weighed together with other evidence in a joint and 
comprehensive manner; they are not witness testimony, and therefore 
are not subject to the same treatment. As such, they can be weighed 
outside the rules governing testimony, and the concept of hearsay 
witness does not come into play because it is a matter of objective 
news that, furthermore, is in the public domain. This is, of course, 
provided that the two above-mentioned conditions are met: they 
reflect incontrovertible facts or statements from public figures or 
government employees, and they have not been refuted or called into 
question.   
74. BOOKS OF DIFFERENT WITNESSES. [. . .] Books, and 
even interviews, contain spontaneous statements; they are not formal 
interrogatories, and since, by their nature, they are not testimony, 
they must not be subject to the same procedural rules. The 
requirements demanded in the case of a statement cannot be imposed 
upon them; nor can it be required that they be produced before the 
judge or during the trial. The information or assertions contained in a 
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book are public and voluntary and entail the expression of some 
knowledge before society. They cannot be ignored based on the 
understanding that they are not testimony, which does not mean that 
their authors may be called to testify. In that case, there would be 
two types of evidence: documentary and testimonial, which require 
different procedures. In the case of the latter, on one hand, there 
would be the documents, which include out-of-court statements 
usually brought into the case through documentary evidence; on the 
other hand, the authors would be examined at trial, which is a 
different kind of evidence, although they would have to be examined 
jointly and weighed together.  
Once it is acknowledged that the book is a valid source of 
information for the case, documentary evidence would consist of its 
being read, nothing more. It is not necessary for it to be confirmed, 
or for its author to be questioned about all of the events recounted in 
it, or questioned with regard to their terms. A different issue is, of 
course, the probative value—with respect to the information included 
therein—that should be assigned to the book. Much will depend 
upon its content and, later, on whether the information in it can be 
confirmed or supported through other means of proof.  
75. INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. [. . .] The statements of a 
witness must be submitted to a serious credibility analysis, and if the 
witness has made statements about the same facts in other venues, it 
is appropriate to take them into account and assess them fully. 
Undoubtedly, an absence of uniformity in the totality of a witness’s 
statements, including those of a defendant or an expert witness, does 
not contribute to an initial opinion of merit; nevertheless, it is 
absolutely possible for there to be a retraction or change to one’s 
version of the events. As such, in this case, in order to determine 
which of the versions is most consistent with the events (which is an 
issue of credibility, not legality, as an essential element in the 
shaping of the court’s opinion on the basis of the facts argued) the 
totality of witness statements must be examined internally as well as 
in relation to the other evidence in the case. It is a requirement of 
reasonableness in weighing the evidence, which is deepened when it 
is appropriate to use the pretrial statement, given its lack of 
immediacy and the hypothetical greater credibility of the statement 
provided at trial. Therefore, it must rest on their objective similarity, 
which requires corroboration by other peripheral circumstances or 
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evidence. It is incumbent upon the Court to differentiate, verify and 
interpret the terms and scope of the contradictions, weighing them 
for evidentiary purposes according to its best judgment. 
It is therefore feasible, with the due precautions, to confer greater 
credibility upon one statement over another, including those given in 
other venues and before the prosecution, police and congressional 
authorities—as they are, strictly speaking, investigation 
proceedings—over those given before the trial Court. This will 
depend upon whether such statement is more coherent in terms of the 
specific assertions it sets forth, the information it provides, the 
presence of other peripheral circumstances or the presence of 
external facts or indicia that give it sufficient objectivity (objective 
credibility) to make reasonable its favorable assessment as opposed 
to the other statement. It is without question, however, that the 
witness’s contrasting statements must emerge during the course of 
the trial or examination by any other means that guarantee the 
defendant’s right of confrontation, and it is sufficient that the 
questions and answers given at trial make express reference to such 
pretrial statements, so long as the contradictions are made clear so 
that a timely explanation may be given.   
The fact that the defense attorney was not present during these 
statements—those provided during the investigative phase itself as 
well as those given in other proceedings—does not render them 
excludable, as there is no lack of defense; a statement that is made 
spontaneously is still of value and cannot be left out. Indeed, it does 
not give rise to a lack of defense because the witness is examined at 
trial even though his contradictions are not read and weighed. In fact, 
the affiant’s acknowledgement during the trial that he made a prior 
statement in such terms could be sufficient for these purposes. As 
stated earlier, it is not necessary for there to be effective 
confrontation at the time the pretrial statement is given; it is only 
required that there be an opportunity for the defendant to challenge 
it.  It is clear that it is not always legally and physically possible to 
meet the requirement of effective confrontation. As such, it is 
sufficient to meet the legal and constitutional requirements of that 
investigative proceeding. It is the subsequent opportunity for 
confrontation at trial that fulfills the requirement of confrontation 
and makes up for any observable deficit or omission during the 
investigation phase of the proceedings. Meeting these confrontation 
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requirements makes it is possible to examine the contradictory 
statements and give credence to one witness statement or another to 
provide the basis of the conviction. 
77. BOOK PUBLISHED BY CONGRESS: TRANSCRIPTION 
OF VIDEOS AND AUDIO RECORDINGS.  
[. . .]  
2. Even though the issue has not been raised, it is appropriate 
to specify that the conversations in question, recorded by 
order of one of the parties, do not violate the right to privacy 
in communications or the right to individual privacy. Both 
fundamental rights are contained autonomously in the 
Constitution, in Article 2, numbers (10) and (7), respectively.  
The right to privacy in communications is procedural in 
nature [Final Judgment of May [14th, 2007], Motion for 
Nullity No. 926–2006/ AV, Fourth FJ]. It protects speakers 
from any form of interception or capture of the 
communication by outside third parties, whether government 
agents or private individuals. Its purpose is the confidentiality 
of the communication process as well as the content of the 
communication. However, the right to privacy in 
communications is independent of the content of the 
communication, which may or may not be private. In this 
case, this fundamental right is not adversely affected, to the 
extent that the recording was not made by order of one of the 
participants in the communication process. If the 
constitutional provision protects the communication and not 
what is communicated, then no infringement has occurred if 
one of the parties to the communication discloses the news, 
unless, clearly, the information adversely affects the right to 
privacy; there is no confidentiality when some event is 
recounted or a remark is made to another party to the 
communication. 
The right to individual privacy, on the other hand, has a 
substantive content or character. As such, the Constitutional 
Court has held that the individual may carry out the acts he 
deems in his interest in order to withdraw from others, 
because it is an area exclusive of others in which he has the 
right to prevent intrusions and where every invasion that 
disturbs the individual right to secrecy, solitude or isolation is 
prohibited in the interest of the free exercise of one’s 
individuality outside of and prior to the social realm (STC 
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No. 6712–2005–HC/TC, of October [17th, 2005]). This right 
affects and protects specific expressions of private life and is 
covered by a special protection by virtue of being related 
directly to the dignity and development of one’s personality. 
In the instant case, the recorded material does not fall within 
this personal sphere that is inherent to privacy or subject to 
express legal protection, not only because the parties to the 
communication revealed their thoughts and points of view 
voluntarily and without coercion, but also because the 
conversations themselves are of public significance in terms 
of the issues discussed. They were derived from the 
government functions of at least one of the parties; his 
personal or private life was not at stake, and the 
communications were conducted on government premises, in 
the office of a government employee. Furthermore, if the 
communications involve criminal propositions or conduct 
that could be a public action crime, there is no constitutional 
right to secrecy.  
3. The book, procedurally, is a document insofar as it is a 
written medium or a representation that expresses a specific 
reality that precedes the case and is independent of it; it is 
submitted to the case essentially for evidentiary purposes. 
Moreover, it is also a public document, as it comes from or 
has been placed into circulation by State entities (in this case 
the Congress), and it refers to or is derived from audio 
recordings and videos that are in the institution’s archives.  
4. Given that it is a compilation of written transcripts of 
conversations contained in audio recordings or videos, it is a 
copy (the original documents would be the actual audio 
recordings or videos), which does not cause it to lose its 
consideration as a document, since it reflects an idea 
embodied in an original document (the audio recordings or 
videos).  
5. To the extent that what has been offered is, strictly 
speaking, the book and not the audio recording or video, as it 
is a written medium containing the transcript of a specific  
conversation, the manner in which it is properly introduced is 
by its reading. It is not by listening or viewing, which is 
conceivable only in the case of the presentation of the 
respective audio recordings or videos. Furthermore, the book 
contains an out of court transcription of documents that are in 
a government archive, and it was made by the proper 
authority in accordance with the legally provided 
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congressional procedure. A copy will be potentially 
inadmissible only if one of the parties challenges its 
authenticity, in which case it is appropriate to compare its 
content to the original document.  
6. The defense has not asserted that the content of the 
document is false, or that it has been tampered with in regard 
to the original source. It has only questioned the materiality 
of the book to the extent that the audio recording or video 
should have been produced, which—as stated previously—is 
not procedurally acceptable. Given the origin of the book 
under examination and the way in which it was put together, 
it is impossible to deny it the character of valid evidence 
relevant to the forming of the Court’s opinion.   
[. . .]  
81. On this basis, the probative value of the written documents 
offered and, previously, of the CD offered by the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor regarding what was forwarded by Congress, can be 
diminished. It shall be analyzed, therefore, together with the witness 
testimony, not in place of it. Merino Bartet has not only revealed 
what he did as a SIN advisor, but he has also submitted 
accompanying information that he copied from the computers of the 
office of SIN advisers—information that he has subsequently 
identified comprehensively in all of the other venues and 
individually before Congress. The credibility of the witness may very 
well rest exclusively on his oral testimony. Therefore, if the CD and 
the written documents that were transcribed are also taken into 
consideration by the Court in arriving at its decision, this method can 
in no way be considered improper in conferring validity upon it or 
characterizing it as sound evidence. 
The identification made by Merino Bartet, author of the files—
and, by exclusion, of the ones from the Huertas Caballero file, since 
files were copied only from  two computers in the office that both of 
them occupied—has been produced, and therefore they can be 
considered proven; moreover, this identification has been made 
within the context of his narrative of what he did as a SIN official. 
The defense has been able to challenge them one by one, but there 
are no grounds to reject them generally. The requirement of 
individual identification, especially in a context involving a large 
number of documents that came from electronic files, is not provided 
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for by law. Some documents have been submitted in a computerized 
format that their author has recognized as accurate, and, on having 
been identified as such, the defense cannot challenge them 
generically. There is no material defect in the identification made by 
Merino Bartet and, therefore, the authenticity of those files cannot be 
denied.   
 [. . .]  
83. Is the use of statements that Montesinos Torres has given 
before other government entities, namely congressional, prosecution 
and judicial, precluded? The answer is no. Those statements are fully 
admissible as evidence. The assertions they contain shall be 
examined individually and with the totality of the evidence produced.  
Those statements can be used because there is an exceptional and 
irreparable cause derived from Montesinos Torres’s refusal to testify. 
He was summonsed but invoked his right to remain silent. It is 
obvious that when a co-defendant decides not to testify, in the 
exercise of his right, that right is absolute; but once he does so in any 
place, he is understood to have waived that right and, therefore, his 
statement can be used. The refusal to testify, as is easily inferred, 
leaves the parties’ attorneys without an opportunity for examination 
and cross-examination. This conduct is not the fault of the State or 
the Court, which has summonsed him, but of Montesinos Torres, 
who refuses to testify.  Therefore, the Court has met its obligation to 
summon him to allow the defense the right to confront his statement; 
the right existed and was granted, although the witness declined to 
testify.  
The value of Montesinos Torres’s statements, as that of all other 
statements (from other witnesses) that properly may be considered, 
inasmuch as they meet the previously specified requirements 
(absolute impossibility or serious difficulty that reasonably prevents 
the witness’s appearance at trial, that is, irreparable absences), is 
clear through documentary, not testimonial, means; this is because 
they are not witnesses, strictly speaking, in that they did not appear at 
the hearing. However, they have done so—have made spontaneous 
statements—in other cases, which is the same, for example, as 
having done so in a book, since one is just as much an out of court 
statement as the other. 
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84. THE RECORD OF CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES [. . .] The 
Record of Congressional Debates that was read contains, on one 
hand, the presentation of the Ministers of Defense and the Interior, 
Army Generals Malca and Briones, on the killings in Barrios Altos; 
in addition, it includes the participation of the senators, in particular 
the speech given by Senator Diez Canseco Cisneros, who discussed 
the so-called “Ambulante” Plan of Operations. It also offered the 
Record of Congressional Debates of the Democratic Constituent 
Congress during the sessions that dealt with the congressional 
debates for the enactment of Laws 26291, 26479 and 26492, the so-
called Cantuta Law and Amnesty laws, which are fully admissible as 
documentary evidence. Their capacity to be weighed as evidence 
does not require the individuals who spoke before Congress to be 
brought into the trial as witnesses. As previously specified, not every 
statement made by an individual can be reduced to testimonial 
evidence. In the case of the Record of Congressional Debates, that is 
the source of the evidence, which in turn contains specific 
information that was provided by a specific person, fully identified, 
in compliance with congressional guidelines or practices. They are 
instruments that contain statements, and are weighed as such.  
[. . .]  
86. It is not simply a question of a pretrial proceeding82 that, by its 
very nature, is unrepeatable and unavailable; rather, it was conducted 
by the Criminal Judge in the regular exercise of his investigative 
authority, under seal, which was lifted after the proceedings were 
conducted (as stated in the decisions at page sixty-three thousand 
five hundred and eighty-four, of May [3rd, 2002], page sixty-three 
thousand five hundred and sixty-three, of April [19th, 2002]), which 
is permitted under Article 73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
This confidentiality is justified by the need to guarantee the success 
 
 82. In relation to the proceeding (conducted by the Judge of the Fifth Special 
Criminal Court) to exhibit documents from Army Headquarters–SIE and DINTE, 
including documents such as communications referring to the transfer of personnel 
from different Army offices, including the CCFFAA, to form the Colina 
Detachment under the command of Army Commander Rodríguez Zabalbescoa; 
documents which confirm the activities of personnel linked to the Colina 
Detachment; Reports from the operative intelligence officer (including the 
members of the Colina Detachment) and the return of materials (supplies, 
engineering materials and war materiel) lent to the Colina Detachment. 
(Publisher’s Note). 
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of the investigation and prevents communications in the case that 
might cause the individuals involved in the punishable act to flee, 
and/or destroy or tamper with the sources of evidence.  
The decision that ordered the exhibition of the evidence has a 
minimal, but reasonable basis: it identifies the proceeding, specifies 
the reasons for it to be carried out, and indicates that it must so 
proceed in order to prevent it from being leaked—which would be  
feasible if a request is made to the military institution itself. This last 
argument is the one that essentially justifies the secrecy of the 
investigation: the documents being sought are linked to the criminal 
act of a military intelligence detachment that, as is public and well-
known, had officially been denied; further, they belonged to the 
archives of an intelligence organization, which by its very nature 
made secret court proceedings advisable. It is true that it is a 
proceeding that comes from a different, but connected, case. Its 
unrepeatable or unavailable nature justifies its use, in view of its 
relevance and usefulness to this case. As such, it shall be weighed 
under the rules of documentary evidence.  
Finally, reiterating what has been underscored throughout this 
Chapter, the presence of the accused’s defense attorney or the person 
who may be adversely affected by the proceeding and its findings is 
unacceptable in these types of urgent pretrial investigation 
proceedings. Simultaneous confrontation of the evidence, due to its 
very nature and the secrecy that such proceedings involve, was not 
possible. The deferred or successive confrontation of the evidence 
was possible insofar as all of the parties had knowledge of this 
proceeding from the time this Court took the case from the lower 
court; the defense knew about it even earlier, and therefore were able 
to prepare the necessary defense in response.  
[. . .]  
88. [. . .] The Manual examined [Manual ME 38-20] contains at 
least three points of interest: 
1.  On page eight, addressing “Basic Considerations,” 
subsection d) states: “According to doctrine, intelligence 
activities are designed to search for and obtain information, 
or to deprive the enemy of it/(counterintelligence). However, 
particular to the OEI considered in this manual, they can also 
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be directed towards causing harm to the adversary (sabotage, 
kidnappings, etc).”  
2.  On page ten, Section III “Special Intelligence Operations 
and Special Counterintelligence Operations,” point 9) Special 
Intelligence Operations, number (1) Espionage, states: “It is 
the obtaining of secret information, through the use of spies 
with a high level of technical training, by which classified 
information is obtained for an organization, in violation of the 
laws governing the area or country where it is going to be 
conducted.”   
3.  On page thirty-five of Chapter Five, “Planning and 
Preparation of a Special Intelligence Operation,” Section I, 
General Comments, point forty-one, “Levels of Planning,” 
subsection a), reads: “For the planning and execution of 
special intelligence operations (OEI), the National 
Intelligence Service (SIN) is considered to be the highest 
level of planning and decision-making, as the head of the 
Intelligence System; as the Central or Sponsoring Agency, 
the Army Intelligence Directorate (DINTE) or its counterpart 
in other institutions, and as the Executive Body, the Army 
Intelligence Service (SIE) or its counterpart in other 
institutions.” Subsection b) states: “Planning of the highest 
level. At this level, the OEI are the result of needs the 
government may have in order to meet its objectives; 
likewise, those that may be a product of the needs of the TG 
(CCFFAA) are considered to be of the highest level.” With 
regard to the execution of the OEIs, point fifty-five, 
subsection a) “the determination of objectives,” states: (1) 
“Objectives may be imposed if it is a matter of providing 
support to the TG in order to satisfy needs of the Operational 
Force, or also may be imposed by the SIN in order to meet 
the general needs of the National Intelligence System. The 
Central Entity (DINTE) shall select its objectives in order to 
meet the needs of the SIDE.”  
90. [. . .] Although other high-ranking Army officials have not 
acknowledged it, whether because they are outside the sphere of 
military intelligence or because they did not use it during their 
service [such is the case of the SIE chief in [1992], Army Colonel 
Pinto Cárdenas; of Army General Luis Salazar Monroe—who stated 
that he did not recall having read the Manual, only of having seen the 
concepts; of Nicolás Hermoza Ríos; of José Valdivia Dueñas; of 
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Salazar Monroe—who stated that he did not use this Manual during 
his time as a SIN official in [1992]], it should be noted, according to 
the statements of the directors of the DINTE, the Commander 
General of COINDE, SIE Chief in [1991], and according to the 
proceedings conducted for the production of evidence, that this 
manual not only existed and was implemented; it was also officially 
approved and, therefore, expressed the official doctrine of the Army 
during that period—the same time during which the terrorist violence 
had been unleashed and the terrorist organizations were being 
confronted. Many of those who deny or diminish the importance of 
its existence have criminal cases stemming from the exercise of their 
duties. This allows for the rejection of their assessments, 
strengthened all the more by the previously highlighted 
documentation and presentations.  
It is unacceptable in view of the above documentation, and the last 
official letter, from the DIGEOPTE, mentions something unheard-of: 
that an Army Manual, duly approved, registered and numbered, was 
a mere draft that was meant to be confirmed—and even more so, that 
such was the case for several years.  
91. ME 38–23, the Basic Teams Manual, which addresses the 
work procedures of the Basic Intelligence Teams, establishes at page 
forty-one that the operational technique to be used is consistent with 
that provided in the doctrine contained in Intelligence Operations 
Manual ME 38–20. This further reinforces the validity and 
implementation of this last Manual; it is impossible to maintain that a 
document that has not been approved could be referred to expressly 
in another Manual, or even a draft of it.  
Point thirty-two, “Countersubversion Teams,” subsection a), 
states: “Mission. Prevent, detect, locate, identify, neutralize and/or 
eliminate persons, networks or organizations engaged in subversive 
activities against military security.” Army General Rivero Lazo, 
Director of the DINTE, in the thirty-ninth session, acknowledged the 
existence and validity of the aforementioned Manual. He even noted 
that he studied it in [1972], when he took a basic intelligence course. 
The manual was republished several times, and he exhibited one 
from [1999], which is the same as the one published in [1991]. Army 
General Robles Espinoza based part of his presentation on this 
Manual, to the point of specifying that the president’s 
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congratulations for Army Captain Martin Rivas’s promotion enabled 
the requirements of this Manual to be met, as it meant having a 
higher rank to give orders. 
[. . .]  
Given these conditions, the veracity of the official letter from the 
DIGEOPTE (No. 760/DIGEOPTE/V–3C/07.08 of August [11th, 
2008]) is questionable. This letter reported that ME 38–23 was a 
draft to be confirmed, which had not been approved by Army 
General Pedro Villanueva Valdivia. ME 38–23, a copy of which was 
submitted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor during the twelfth 
session, had been identified by the highest ranking military 
intelligence official. Therefore, beyond the fact that Army General 
Villanueva Valdivia does not recognize or does not remember having 
approved it, its existence, validity, and implementation are supported 
by the evidence. The objection of the defense is overruled.   
[. . .]  
95. The documents submitted by Marcos Flores Alván in the 
effective cooperation proceedings were also included in other 
criminal proceedings before the first one ended. One of the essential 
features of the effective cooperation proceedings is, precisely, the 
verification of the accuracy of the information provided by the 
applicant, based on which the judge will determine the admissibility 
and scope of the reward benefit. However, the law does not prohibit 
the offering or use of documents in general in open proceedings prior 
to the end of the original proceedings in which they were initially 
submitted. There may be many grounds or circumstances that 
determine the advance use of this information—the law does not 
impose any limitation—but at the same time it will be incumbent 
upon the judge in the case where this information is introduced to 
weigh it autonomously and give it the appropriate weight in relation 
to the other evidence produced. The inclusion of this evidence, 
furthermore, does not adversely affect the defendant’s right, nor does 
it give rise to a lack of defense, since he has knowledge of it and is in 
a position to see it and offer the appropriate defense. What is 
presented before the court conducting the effective cooperation 
proceedings, and the decisions that arise therefrom, in no way places 
conditions on the presentation of evidence and the analysis and 
decision that must be handed down in other cases; obviously, they 
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must be weighed and reviewed, compared to and checked against the 
particular evidence in those cases.  
The documents submitted by Flores Alván must be examined 
according to the account that he provided. Some of them—on which 
defense counsel’s questioning is focused—are only written 
expressions, made in advance, of what he saw and the specific 
experiences he had, as well as transcripts of accounts or 
circumstances, in the manner of recollections, appointments made by 
a superior officer, or relevant events that occurred in the Detachment 
to which he belonged. It is clear, for example, that the list of officers 
is not, strictly speaking, a document—the fact that it was not 
prepared in advance is well known—and that many of the documents 
he presented do not meet many of the administrative requirements 
imposed by the internal practices and directives of military 
intelligence (stamps, signatures, the author’s signs of identification, 
the receiving entity, etc.). However, the characteristics of the Colina 
Detachment must be taken into account, starting with the typically-
criminal acts that it perpetrated—which would tend to relax the 
inclusion of information that might “upset” the continuity of the 
Detachment and the integrity of its members—which, for reasons 
that will be seen, was the essence of its creation and operation. Its 
value, therefore, cannot be ruled out in advance; rather, it must be 
submitted to the respective analysis, and only to that extent can the 
corresponding evidentiary significance be excluded, if appropriate.  
96. “Plan Cipango” [. . .]  
1. [. . .] According to its content, the chief of the operation is 
Army General Rivero Lazo, the control officer will be Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa, and the case 
officers will be Army Captains Martin Rivas and Pichilingue 
Guevara. The chief of the operation shall maintain constant 
coordination with Commander General of the Army, the 
Chief of the CCFFAA and the Chief of the SIN. The DINTE 
shall be in charge of directing the operation, which shall be 
under the direct command of the Commander General of the 
Army, and shall coordinate its duties with the SIN command 
group. In Part One, entitled “Situation,” it sets forth the need 
to take active measures—including intelligence measures—to 
protect the public from the advance of  terrorist subversion. 
Part Two, “Mission,” indicates that the DINTE will conduct a 
systematic infiltration of intelligence officers in the city of 
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Lima, Huaral and Huacho, with a view to detecting, locating 
and identifying the members of the Central Committee and 
National Leadership of the PCP–SL and the MRTA, in 
support of the military and intelligence operations of the 
Second Military Region, the CCFFA and the DINTE. Part 
Three, “Execution,” specifies that the operation will have 
three stages: selection and retraining of twenty-five 
intelligence officers, infiltration of fifteen officers into area 
companies to seek information, and analysis of appropriate 
information in order to convert it into operational 
intelligence.  
The Part entitled “Appendices” lists five appendices: 
personnel, weapons and munitions, equipment, funding, and 
diagram of the zone. The provision of weapons and 
ammunition (HK–P7 pistols, FAL and others), equipment 
(cars and pickup trucks) and funding for operational and 
administrative costs shall be the responsibility of the Office 
of the Treasurer of the DINTE.  
[. . .] 4. The changes observed among the three plans detailed 
are not significant. Flores Alván himself has mentioned that 
the document was subject to changes once the plans began to 
take shape and be implemented. Particularly demonstrative is 
official letter No. 5690/DINTE of August [30th, 1992] (page 
[8,400]), in which Army General Juan Rivero Lazo addresses 
the Commander General of the Thirty-first Infantry Brigade 
of Huancayo, and states that with the approval of the Cipango 
P/O the Commander General of the Army had ordered the 
formation of a Special Team within the DINTE; that the 
Cipango P/O is a classified document; that Petty Officer 
Second Class military driver Vera Navarrete by virtue of both 
decisions was transferred to the DINTE as of January, [1992]. 
Army General Rivero Lazo (thirty-ninth session) 
acknowledged that he signed it, although he denied having 
made any P/O Cipango or having knowledge of its content. 
Army Colonel Silva Mendoza, Assistant Director of the 
DINTE in [1992], acknowledged (in the thirty-second 
session) the drafting of the aforementioned official letter—
based on the approval of the Cipango P/O and the existing 
documentation at the DINTE—as well as of radio message 
No. 260 B4.a02.37, of March [4th, 1992] (page 8,402]), 
which requests the forwarding of wages for January and 
February and other items pertaining to Vera Navarrete 
because his placement in that unit had been canceled.  
704 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:657 
5. Consequently, a Cipango P/O did exist, and based on it, the 
Colina Special Intelligence Detachment was formed; of this 
there is no doubt whatsoever. According to what wiretap 
intelligence officer Flores Alván has stated, the above-cited 
official letter and the identifications made by Army General 
Rivero Lazo and Army Colonel Silva Mendoza are 
conclusive with respect to the matter. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the documentation obtained by the Judge of 
the Fifth Special Criminal Court of Lima, which proves 
incontrovertibly the creation of various documents for the 
establishment and operation of this Detachment.  
97. Marcos Flores Alván turned over to the Office of the Attorney 
General twenty-six applications for retirement dated December 
[15th, 1991]. The defense acknowledges that they are original 
documents and that some members of the Colina Detachment signed 
them, but they take issue with them because there is no evidence that 
they were forwarded; there is no stamp and signature acknowledging 
receipt. The essential matter, however, is the reality of these 
retirement applications, which have been acknowledged by several 
members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment, and the 
certain fact that it is a typical intelligence procedure—fictitious 
separation from service—pertinent to the members of Special 
Detachments who undertake specific OEIs whose disclosure could 
give rise to institutional problems.  
98. [. . .]  
1. In this speech,83 the following is of note: (1) Conducting 
the war against terrorist subversion requires political 
decisiveness, which was the leadership that the politician had 
to assume; and this meant assuming responsibility for leading 
the war. (2) Now there is a legal framework and there is 
political leadership. (3) In this war, which is political and 
must be given political treatment, there is a visible part—the 
visible troops, who work with the strategic objectives 
established to win over the population and to confront armed 
terrorists—and there is an invisible part, which is “you,” who 
fulfill one of the strategic objectives of the pacification policy 
in the military field. (4) The population is now being won 
over because the intelligence community has been better 
understood and better harmonized, as an Intelligence System 
 
 83. Speech of Army General Hermoza Ríos (Publisher’s Note). 
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that does not seek premature results and is concerned that the 
intelligence be timely and that it get to the right people 
quickly. (5) You have great motivation, as Major Martin said, 
you are anonymous, but you are motivated by what he talked 
about, by pure patriotism. (6) Well, I congratulate you. We 
are paying attention to everything that you do, and  we are 
here to support you in everything. You should not hesitate to 
express your needs through your chief, Major Martín, 
captain, the DINTE General, as it is our obligation to solve 
your problems for all of you. [. . .]  
4. It is clear, as Flores Alván acknowledges, that he recorded 
the speech given by Army General Hermoza Ríos, and that 
what he submitted was a transcript of it. That document is 
part of his witness statement, and as such it must be weighed. 
In addition, Army General Hermoza Ríos acknowledges that 
the words he spoke are essentially those that appear in Flores 
Alván’s transcript, and he has also explained its content. The 
argument then, is framed in terms of the attendees of that 
military meeting, whether it was held for the members of the 
Colina Special Intelligence Detachment or for all of the 
members of the SIE, and whether the activities of that 
Detachment were authorized or supported in general terms. 
5. The express mention of Martin Rivas is significant, 
including when he is identified as chief of the group. That 
reference demonstrates that the meeting was not for all of the 
SIE personnel but rather for the Colina Detachment; 
otherwise, he would not have singled out Martin Rivas, who, 
given his rank, could not have been chief of all the 
detachments or members of the SIE. In addition to the 
foregoing, we have not only the reference made by Flores 
Alván but also those of the rest of the members of the Colina 
Detachment.  
6. As far as the interpretation of the speech is concerned, it is 
clear that he is not praising criminal acts expressly; nor does 
he approve of a policy of dirty war mainly under the 
responsibility of military intelligence. However, the act of 
emphasizing the qualities of the group at a time when it had 
already committed several crimes, only demonstrates a real 
and institutional support—through his representations—of 
the clearly criminal activities of a detachment that, as will be 
seen in the following Chapters, was engaged basically in the 
elimination of persons under the alibi of their links to 
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terrorism. Accordingly, the objections of the defense are 
overruled.   
102. The documentary nature of the information84 under 
examination is beyond debate. Its particularity lies in the fact that it 
is written information that reveals a set of communications 
exchanged between the Embassy of the United States in Peru and the 
United States Department of State, access to which was possible—as 
has been explained sufficiently by expert witness Katherine Doyle—
by virtue of an internal procedure under U.S. law, the legality and 
admissibility of which is not in question under our own laws.  
The communications in question contain not only intelligence 
analysis, evaluations of the situation in the country with respect to 
the events pertinent to this trial and the dates on which the public 
inquiries and the investigations took place, which was covered 
intensely by the national press; they also report on interviews or 
information provided by various sources, some identified and others 
not (mainly they mention their institutional location or position, in 
order to assess the degree of reliability of the information). In other 
cases, they report on meetings and direct conversations with the 
Head of State and with other government officials, a succinct 
account of which they set forth, and to which they add their own 
assessments.   
There is no doubt that such documents constitute evidence that 
may be examined by the Court in determining the facts and resulting 
liabilities. It should be taken into account, as an initial reference 
point for its examination, that they were created by third parties—
United States government employees in the context of their 
diplomatic duties—without further personal interest in the events 
they summarized contemporaneous to their occurrence. They reflect 
information provided—in several passages—by “intelligence 
sources” that portrays the exchange of information on this activity. 
Naturally, the reality of the facts and the perpetration imputed to 
defendant Fujimori Fujimori cannot be based exclusively on those 
documents; their mere mention and individual analysis will not allow 
for them to be either rejected or considered proven. Consequently, 
 
 84. Declassified documents from the U.S. Department of State (Publisher’s 
Note). 
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the proper weight to be assigned to them is only referential, or rather, 
limited, and they necessarily must be contrasted with the other 
evidence presented in the case—as does the expert opinion report 
written by expert witness Katherine Doyle.  They can be used, in any 
case, to corroborate the testimony and documentary evidence on the 
record; but they have no probative value in and of themselves.  
As previously stated, it is clearly unacceptable, in view of the 
information contained in a document—insofar as it has been 
provided by a specific person—to understand that person to be the 
source of evidence and that, as such, to consider that the information 
must be introduced into the case only through witness testimony. The 
information is contained in the document; it is an expression that was 
recorded in that out-of-court instrument. It is true that the individuals 
referred to could have been summonsed to appear as witnesses (the 
parties, all of them, decided not to do so) and examined at trial, but 
in this case such examination would serve two purposes: as 
testimony and as an attestation of the authenticity of the document, 
that is, as a kind of document comparison.   
Internally, the declassified documents establish (1) as an 
independent piece of information (made clear by its very fact), the 
concern of the United States government over the events and the 
reports of human rights violations motivated by the fight against 
terrorist subversion; and (2) as a telling piece of information (which 
will be confirmed by the analysis to be conducted in due time), the 
government line against a serious and transparent investigation to 
find out who was involved in the crimes that had publicly come to 
light. Likewise, it firmly establishes a very clear fact: the pressure 
from the U.S. government, which demanded a consequence to such a 
sensitive matter, beginning with the public announcements of the 
Peruvian government on the implementation of a policy respectful of 
human rights. It also establishes in particular the conversations that 
the ambassador had with the defendant, conveying the concern of the 
U.S. government. The latter reveals that defendant Fujimori 
Fujimori, at a minimum—based on this demand from the U.S.—was 
fully aware of the importance of the crimes of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta, which went beyond the national sphere. It is impossible to 
maintain that  the defendant was unaware of the consequences of 
what had happened, or that he put forth a determined effort to 
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establish the facts and punish those responsible for the crimes 
perpetrated; judging by what later occurred, he failed to do so.  
The documents also demonstrate that the Government of the 
United States already had intelligence information, with a certain 
degree of solidity—so assessed by them—about the influence of 
Montesinos Torres, his special advisory relationship with defendant 
Fujimori Fujimori and the role he played in the Intelligence System. 
They were also aware, through an unidentified intelligence source, of 
the dual policies that Montesinos Torres sponsored: one public and 
the other confidential, which included the special operations units of 
the Army, trained in extrajudicial killings in the fight against 
terrorism. The reality of this—in the case of the latter—is quite clear 
in the actions and crimes of the Colina Special Intelligence 
Detachment, as will be examined and established in other Chapters 
of this judgment. Based on these considerations and the relative 
weight assigned to them, the declassified documents are admitted as 
documentary evidence.  
105. It is important to differentiate the merit of a judgment of the 
IACtHR as precedent, the jurisprudential lines it draws in 
interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights and its 
extension to national law.85 The relevant issues here are the actual 
 
 85. The judgment states the following in a footnote:  
81. The Constitutional Court has held that treaties provide a framework for 
the interpretation of the rights recognized in the Constitution, which means 
that the concepts, scopes and spheres of protection enshrined in such treaties 
establish parameters that should play a part, if appropriate, in the 
interpretation of a constitutional right.  
(STC 01124–2001–AA/TC, of July [11th, 2002], FJ 9). Likewise, beyond the 
criterion of interpretation of fundamental rights in accordance with international 
human rights law, it is understood that the latter concept is not restricted only to 
international treaties on human rights to which the Peruvian State is party (IV Final 
and Transition Provision of the Constitution) but rather that it also encompasses 
the case law on those international instruments that may have been issued by the 
human rights protection bodies (STC 04587– 2004–AA/TC, of November [29th, 
2005], FJ 44). The IACtHR itself has stated that:  
. . . [it] corresponds to a basic principle of the law on the international 
responsibility of the State, which is supported by international case law; 
according to this, a State must comply with its international treaty obligations 
in good faith […] a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification [to escape its pre-established international responsibility].  
Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Competence, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 104, ¶ 61 (Nov. 28, 2003).  Consequently, this Criminal Court must 
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compliance with a specific judgment, which is of indisputable and 
direct application domestically (enforceability),86 and the statement 
of proven facts that an IACtHR judgment contains, and its general 
effects beyond the decision itself. This is especially relevant if it 
concerns a criminal case—that is, if the IACtHR’s judgment is 
prejudicial with respect to a criminal case it addresses, as would be 
the case of the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta judgments as they relate 
to this criminal case. The discussion therefore focuses on the Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta judgments. The Velásquez Rodríguez 
judgment provides, in any case, a framework for assessing 
institutional mechanisms of forced disappearance, the concepts of 
which, in pertinent part, will be valuable in organizing the 
evidentiary guidelines in factually similar or comparable cases. The 
IACtHR has made the following assertions, and clearly so in the La 
Cantuta judgment, specifically in paragraphs 80.18, 81 and 96, in 
which the following were stated as proven facts:   
1) That  diverse evidence caused the Colina Group, whose 
members participated in the events of the instant case, to 
become well-known to the public. Colina was a group related 
to the SIN whose operations were known by the President of 
the Republic and the Commander General of the Army. It had 
a hierarchical structure and its personnel received, besides 
their compensations as officers and non-commissioned 
officers of the Army, money to cover their operating 
expenses and personal monetary compensation in the form of 
 
follow the interpretation of the IACtHR on human rights matters, noting especially 
that the criminal matters are linked directly to the scope of human rights on which 
there are existing judgments, [and to] the specific compliance with a particular 
judgment of indisputable and direct application in our domestic system. 
 86. The judgment states the following in a footnote:  
82. The establishment of the facts and the IACtHR’s legal determination with 
regard to them within the scope of its jurisdiction, where it determines the 
responsibility of the State, naturally cannot be misrepresented or ignored at 
the national level, and must be respected—and enforced—by the domestic 
courts. It is the so-called “direct effect” of the judgment of the IACtHR, by 
virtue of which the States that have been a party to the case must obey and 
comply with that judgment. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras Case, 1988 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 28-29 (July 29, 1988). Consequently, its 
binding nature is not limited only to the judgment; rather, it extends to the 
conclusions of law that explain, justify and state the grounds for the measures 
taken, as well as indicate the criteria that must be followed, the limits or scope 
of the measures, or the proceedings necessary for compliance with the 
judgment. 
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bonuses. The Colina Group carried out a State policy 
consisting of the identification, surveillance and elimination 
of those persons suspected of belonging to insurgent groups 
or who opposed to the government of former President 
Alberto Fujimori. It operated through the implementation of 
systematic indiscriminate extrajudicial executions, selective 
killings, forced disappearances, and torture.  
2) That those serious acts fall within the systematic 
mechanism of repression to which certain sectors of the 
population were subjected as they had been labeled as 
subversive or somehow contrary or in opposition to the 
Government, which was known to or even ordered by the 
highest command of the armed forces, the intelligence 
services and the then-governing Executive, by means of the 
State’s regular security forces, the operation of the so-called 
“Colina Group,” and a framework of impunity favoring these 
violations.  
3) That the planning and execution of the detention and 
subsequent cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, 
extrajudicial execution, and forced disappearance of the 
alleged victims, carried out in a coordinated and concealed 
way by the members of military forces and the Colina Group, 
could not have passed unnoticed by or occurred without the 
superior orders of the Executive Branch and the military 
forces and intelligence bodies at that time, especially the 
chiefs of intelligence and the President of the Republic 
himself. 
106. The Peruvian State admitted the facts alleged in the case 
brought by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but 
the IACtHR also found that the facts had been proven based on the 
evidence on record in the case. The State’s admission was not 
immediate—there were prior proceedings at the Court, and the 
preliminary stage  concluded before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights; rather, it came about after these events, once a 
new government was established through the democratic procedures 
provided for in the Constitution. The defense has even mentioned 
specific evidence that was noted in the judgment of the IACtHR, 
which in its opinion are  blatantly insufficient; however, such 
analysis is inadequate to diminish the merit of the international 
decision, given that the IACtHR weighed the evidence and 
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conducted a trial consistent with the principles of international 
human rights law. Apart from that, there are no reasonable bases or 
indicia to consider that the State’s acceptance was fraudulent. 
Further, the fact that no decisions have been issued in the national 
courts, at this time, finding that the facts at issue in the international 
case have been proven, in no way places conditions on the State’s 
capacity to admit the charges arising from the international 
responsibility attributed to it; there is no national or international 
provision or legal principle that prohibits it.  
Nevertheless, beyond the intrinsic value of the decisions of the 
IACtHR in general and of the judgments in the Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta cases in particular, it is notable that, without prejudice to the 
facts proven, their relevance under the criminal law, the 
implementation and interpretation of the pertinent criminal 
provisions and, if appropriate, the determination of the sentence, are 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Criminal Court. The IACtHR 
does not determine the guilt or innocence of an individual—the 
international court determines the international responsibility of the 
State for a violation of treaty provision—and it is in the criminal 
court where the evidence necessary for a final judgment on the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant will be examined. Otherwise, the 
evidentiary phase of the criminal trial would be unnecessary. The 
attribution of international responsibility of the State has its own 
criteria, which cannot be extended automatically to the field of 
criminal responsibility—although they cannot be simply left out; for 
that, a judgment is required, which shall be a conviction if the 
presumption of innocence is overcome. Such judgment does not 
exclude, incidentally, taking into account both international decisions 
as an important element, with a persuasive weight that is determined, 
in particular, by the common scope of judicial latitude in the court’s 
consideration of cases before it, the contextual facts, and the patterns 
of State conduct and that of its leaders at a specific time.   
107. The same reasoning is essentially applicable with regard to 
the judgments of the Constitutional Court handed down in the 
amparo or habeas corpus cases filed by the defendants accused of 
committing these acts (who are allegedly members of the Colina 
Special Intelligence Detachment, linked to it, or members of the SIN, 
and are accused of crimes against life, crimes against the rights or 
freedoms of others, and crimes against humanity) as well as crimes 
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against government and its administration. Thus, the Constitutional 
Court:  
1) Assumed the so-called theory of coordination, which 
would overcome the dualist theory with respect to the 
primacy of international law over domestic law or vice versa. 
This approach seeks a comprehensive solution and the 
building of jurisprudence based on the relationship between 
the Inter-American human rights system and national 
constitutional law, which gives priority to the effective 
protection of the fundamental rights of Peruvian citizens.  
2) It found that through the amnesty laws the drafters of the 
criminal law intended to cover up the commission of crimes 
against humanity, and to guarantee impunity for grave human 
rights violations; this is the context in which the criminal 
activities of the so-called Colina Group unfolded. The Court 
considered those laws null and void, and found that they 
lacked, ab initio, legal effects. This was due to the existence 
of a systematic plan to promote impunity with regard to 
human rights violations, based on these central themes: the 
deliberate prosecution of common crimes by military courts, 
and the issuance of amnesty laws during that time period—
which in any case revealed the lack of a government 
willingness to investigate and punish the perpetrators with 
sentences appropriate to the seriousness of the crimes 
committed.  
3) It accepted what the IACtHR had previously declared 
proven facts with respect to the Colina group, that is, its 
insertion in the State’s military and intelligence services, and 
its compliance [with] State policy through systematic acts of 
indiscriminate extrajudicial executions, selective murders, 
forced disappearances and torture. 
4) It acknowledged, as previously stated, the legal validity of 
those facts that have been submitted, examined and proven 
before the international human rights protection bodies. 
However, in defining this declaration, it acknowledged the 
need for a criminal investigation, which entails a range of 
action exclusive to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts; it 
involves the application of provisions of criminal law and 
criminal procedure, but is in no way disconnected from 
constitutional law and international human rights law.  
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108. Consequently, the merit and importance of the decisions of 
the IACtHR and of the Constitutional Court cannot be simply 
dismissed. The legal findings they contain must be respected in terms 
of the affirmation and interpretation of the treaty rights and 
fundamental or constitutional rights of the individual. The criminal 
case, so ordered by both courts in protecting the constitutional or 
treaty claims, has its own purpose and specific rules; nevertheless, 
the essence of what has been determined in international or 
constitutional courts cannot be ignored. At the same time, what other 
evidence may contribute to the case, and the rules for attributing 
responsibility pursuant to the criminal law, cannot be denied either. 
¶3. Evidence offered by the civil party.  
[. . .]  
113. The purpose of Manual ME 41–7 “Unconventional 
Countersubversive War,” according to Article 1, is to establish 
procedures for the planning and execution of National Territorial 
Defense (DIT) operations. Its purpose is to serve as a guide for the 
various commanders and General Staffs to standardize procedures 
regulating the planning and execution of the operations of National 
Territorial Defense. It addresses the general characteristics of 
subversion and specific points on countersubversive operations, 
within the framework of the National Territorial Defense doctrine 
(page one). This Manual, in addition to specifying the channel of 
authority in the countersubversive war, indicates in number 74, 
“Disruption of the Armed Subversive Groups,” that, “considering 
that the Countersubversive War is eighty-percent intelligence and 
twenty percent operations, the following actions must be established 
in the intelligence and operations fields.” As for the phases of 
countersubversive operations, specifically in the intervention phase 
(number 78) there is reference to the destruction of the local 
Political-Administrative Organization (OPA), which means the 
elimination of its members. Section II, Operations against the 
Political-Administrative Organization, indicates that the destruction 
of the central system is achieved through the elimination of its 
leaders, which is considered necessary to put a halt to the advance of 
subversion (number 83, General Information). Finally, in Chapter II, 
Complementary Aspects, Section I: Intelligence, under “Sources of 
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Information” (number 210), the six intelligence objectives are set 
forth.  
In the eighty-second session, Army General Hermoza Ríos 
acknowledged the validity of the Manual and indicated that he was 
its main promoter as Commander General of the COINDE, and that 
its doctrine did not change when he was Commander General of the 
Army. He explained that the essence of the Manual is to gain the 
support of the population, and that the terms elimination or 
destruction are understood in the context of a direct armed 
confrontation. He stated that when there is a “red zone” there is 
direct armed confrontation, and in that case, it is within the objective 
of pacification to eliminate, confront and eliminate [sic] armed 
subjects in combat.  
114. Manual ME 41–7 defines an Army field of action within the 
context of an unconventional war against terrorist subversion, which 
was what Peru underwent in 1990-1992. That Manual, which 
complements—and does not contradict—the previously examined 
Initial Text, not only emphasizes the role of military intelligence in 
the internal conflict but also—beyond gaining the support of the 
population  (Articles 67(a), 69(a) and 73)—has the essential aim of 
disrupting the armed subversive groups, in such a way that provides 
for the elimination of commanders, leaders and ideologues in the 
field of operations, including those from the OPAs. In addition, in 
the case of an intervention in “red zones” (areas controlled by the 
subversives or with significant subversive activities), the third step is 
the destruction of the OPAs, which aims to eliminate its members. It 
is  further understood that the destruction of the OPAs is achieved 
through the elimination of their leaders. 
A selective logic is evident, from a perspective of unconventional 
warfare, that is aimed at the identification of subversive elements and 
their elimination or death. The Manual, regardless of other 
considerations, outlines a rigorous doctrine for confronting armed 
subversion, in which part of the strategy is directed at eliminating the 
leaders of the armed insurgent organization. Of course, it does not 
contain a direct authorization to kill at any cost whomever can be 
identified as a terrorist leader—whether national, regional or local. 
However, to a great extent it softens the targets and procedures for 
their elimination, so as to relax the mechanisms of control and the 
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safeguards for conduct that adheres to the canons of international 
humanitarian law and respect for constitutional government with a 
view to combating terrorist subversion in a manner both effective 
and respectful of human rights. Under these premises and limits, the 
objections of the defense are overruled.   
115. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT NUMBER 001–
X24J.A.6. In the one hundred and twentieth session, in presenting 
Issue VIII “The existence of a systematic pattern of human rights 
violations,” the civil party submitted four documents: 1) the 
previously-cited Special Intelligence Report of November [10th, 
2001], from Intelligence Headquarters at the Ministry of the Interior 
–Search Bureau, DIRBUS–entitled “Possible extrajudicial 
executions – Ayacucho 1991,” (at page forty-one thousand eight 
hundred and seventy-nine); 2) a copy of the document entitled 
“Congratulations,” dated November [18th, 1991], signed by Army 
General Hugo Martínez Aloja, which congratulates several 
intelligence officers, including Fabio Urquizo Ayma (at page forty-
one thousand seven hundred and twenty-five); 3) a copy of the 
document entitled “Congratulations,” dated August [8th, 1991], 
signed by Army General Hugo Martínez Aloja, in which he 
congratulates Fabio Urquizo Ayma and others (at page forty-one 
thousand seven hundred and twenty-six); 4) a copy of the Standard 
Personnel Efficiency Report on Technical Officers and 
Noncommissioned Officers, dated December [31st, 1991], pertaining 
to Fabio Urquizo Ayma [. . .].  
118. The documentation that was submitted was provided, as 
indicated by the civil party that offered it into evidence, by the 
Documentation Center of the Office of the Ombudsman. There are 
no valid reasons to doubt that they are documents that were in an 
official registry and that they were provided at the request of the civil 
party. On the other hand, while the intelligence report submitted does 
not contain the document signed with the number one, entitled 
“Agent Carrión 1991,” its complete transcript is inserted in the body 
of the report, which allows for reliable information of its content 
(See pages forty-one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine (back) 
to forty-one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six, with the 
exception that the transcription was done on both sides of each page). 
There is no doubt as to the fact that it is a military intelligence 
document. The intelligence report from the Ministry of the Interior 
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reasonably establishes that the crimes it reports were committed by 
military intelligence officers and were understood as special 
intelligence operations, subject to superior orders and based on a 
mindset of elimination of individuals linked to the terrorist 
subversion of the PCP–SL. Apart from that, the document found at 
the residence of operative intelligence officer Favio Urquizo Ayma 
recounts a type of Army intelligence conduct—centered in this case 
in Ayacucho, the Department of Peru that was hit the hardest by the 
terrorist subversion of the PCP–SL—and the design of missions to 
eliminate or murder citizens considered to be affiliated with 
terrorism and instrumental to its criminal objectives. From this 
perspective such document, which is fully admissible as evidence, 
has the following evidentiary significance: it contributes to the 
determination that means of elimination of persons considered 
intelligence targets or objectives were used, institutionally and from 
the Army. The intelligence report from the Ministry of the Interior 
has established, based on the police intelligence techniques, (1) the 
reality of a modus operandi of a Special Intelligence Detachment in 
Ayacucho; (2) that information was exchanged about the reality of 
the deaths in question; and (3) that one of the operative intelligence 
officers who perpetrated the crimes was Urquizo Ayma. The first and 
the last points are relevant to the instant case in order to demonstrate 
that, behind the official speeches, the authorities opted for an 
unlawful and legally unacceptable way to fight terrorist subversion. 
What occurred in Ayacucho, at least, in [1991], would be a 
demonstration, a statistically solid example, of the phenomenon of 
illegitimate violence that emanated from the State itself.  
[. . .]  
123. The Final Report of the TRC is a public document. The TRC 
was an entity created by the Executive Branch with a specific, 
preestablished purpose, of prominent public importance, and its 
members were appointed by an official act of government. They had 
the status of government employees, and therefore the activities they 
conducted and the documentation that the Commission created are 
official in nature. The court’s assessment of that documentation will 
depend upon the characteristics of the facts it covers, the scope and 
nature of its conclusions and the evidence it provides. 
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1.  It is clear, on one hand, that with regard to those facts that 
must be litigated, something presented on its own merit 
cannot be considered legally proven. That is what this 
Supreme Court held in Case No. 1598–2007/Lima, FJ 17, in 
ruling that, “. . .the conclusions of the above-cited Report 
[Final Report of the TRC] are not binding upon the court, 
other than to acknowledge its undisputed legal weight and 
source of reference.”  
2.  However, the criterion will be different with respect to 
contextual facts, that is, those concerning the general 
situation of the subversive phenomenon and the conduct of 
State agents in confronting it. The characteristics of the Final 
Report, the material it analyzed (which it compiled, organized 
and compared) and the methods used (its interdisciplinary, 
scientific nature, the verifications that the sources warranted 
and the database that was built for that purpose, as a result of 
the task imposed by the creation of the TRC) make it possible 
to grant it—or essentially its verification of factual 
situations—undisputed probative value, unless specific 
evidence or consolidated judicial information diminishes its 
value, which has not occurred in the instant case. This 
Supreme Court, in Final Judgment No. 918–2006/Junín, of 
June [7th, 2006], in Point Three of the Conclusions of Law, 
assuming this criterion, first, declared that the TRC report is a 
public document, and second, upheld part of the statement of 
proven facts in the description of the plan of attack near the 
town of Pichanaki, which resulted in the killing of numerous 
members of the community of Delta in the Pichanaki district.  
3.  From this perspective, the IACtHR in numerous judgments 
in which Peru has been a party has recognized the evidentiary 
merit [of the TRC report]. Thus, in its judgment in the Case 
of Cantoral Huamaní et al., of July [10th, 2007], the Court 
stated in paragraph ninety-two: “. . .The Court has given 
special weight to the CVR [TRC] report as relevant evidence 
in the determination of the acts and international 
responsibility of the Peruvian State in several cases that have 
been submitted to its consideration.” In paragraph two 
hundred and twenty-four of the La Cantuta judgment, it 
stated: “. . .the work undertaken by said Commission 
constitutes a major effort and has contributed to the search for 
and establishment of truth for a period of Peru’s history. 
However, and without failing to recognize the foregoing, the 
Court deems it appropriate to specify that the “historical 
truth” contained in said report does not complete or substitute 
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the State’s obligation to also establish the truth through court 
proceedings. . .” 
4.  The Constitutional Court, along the same lines as the 
IACtHR, assumed the probative value of the Final Report of 
the TRC and, on its merit, declared, for example, that that 
Report proved that the acts attributable to the group that 
called itself the “Colina Group” represented a widespread and 
systematic pattern of human rights violations, expressed in 
such acts as the disappearances of La Cantuta and of 
journalist Pedro Yauri, as well as the murders of numerous 
students at the National University of Central Peru and the 
Barrios Altos massacre [STC 2798–2004–HC/TC, of 
December [9th, 2004], paragraph twenty-five, Case of Vera 
Navarrete].  
124. In conclusion, based on the Final Report of the TRC, it can be 
affirmed with certainty that the numerous forced disappearances and 
arbitrary executions perpetrated during the years 1990-1993, those 
attributed to State agents, constituted a widespread and systematic 
practice, and in certain circumstances—especially in the areas 
declared to be under a state of emergency—selective. Furthermore, a 
standard modus operandi was followed, basically in the case of the 
forced disappearances [see footnote ninety-eight].  
125. In his book Fuerzas Armadas – Lecciones de este siglo, 
[Armed Forces: Lessons from this Century], Army General Hermoza 
Ríos presents four summaries of the terrorist activities from [1990-
1996]. If the years [1990-1992] are taken into account, it adds up to a 
total of eight thousand two hundred and fifty-nine (8259) violent 
terrorist acts (chart at page 21). However, by comparison, the chart 
on pages 175-176 (which is broken down by location of the attack 
rather than by type, which the first chart highlights) shows, 
contradictorily, that the total number of terrorist attacks in [1992] 
was one hundred and forty-seven (147), in spite of the fact that three 
thousand six hundred and twenty-two (3622) violent terrorist acts 
had been counted previously. This inconsistency diminishes the 
convincing force of the information it provides, and therefore it is 
impossible to refute successfully the figures and analysis of the TRC.  
[. . .]  
128. It is clear that the PCP–SL declared “strategic equilibrium” 
and that it stepped up its terrorist attacks or actions in Lima—there is 
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no contradictory opinion on this point—in 1992, when the 
democratic constitutional order was disrupted. But it is also obvious 
that the PCP–SL failed to meet its objectives, and that the State had 
begun years earlier to defeat it strategically. The PCP-SL was unable 
to attain hegemony in the countryside, much less besiege the cities; it 
neither managed to attain political equality nor to dismantle the State 
based on its own forces. The considerations of Merino Bartet, 
Degregori Caso and Fernández Dávila Carnero are solid and have not 
been successfully refuted by other, contrary statements, such as those 
of Jiménez Baca and Jhon Caro [even the president of the CCFFAA 
at that time, Army General Hermoza Ríos, and the SIN Chief, Army 
General Julio Rolando Salazar Monroe, support this line of thinking: 
there was no strategic equilibrium, which is why the assertions in 
Hermoza Ríos’s book can be qualified as propagandistic and mere 
justification, without any real basis, of the actions taken by the 
regime at that time]. Therefore, based on this assertion, any 
justification of the changes to the institutional system lacks solidity 
and, on the contrary, reveals intentions other than the publicly 
declared extreme need to save the country; furthermore, it is not 
possible to declare the supposed salvation of democracy by denying 
it in practice and taking control of its basic institutions.  
[. . .]  
130. The following are pertinent highlights of the reports87 
presented orally:  
1.  The report of the Inter-American Commission stated that 
the armed conflict that broke out in Peru beginning in [1980] 
led to the declaration of a state of emergency over a large 
area of Peruvian territory, and that this conflict caused law 
enforcement personnel to employ methods that violate human 
rights. It stated that the United Nations Working Group on 
enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons as well as 
the Peruvian government itself have registered more than five 
thousand complaints involving disappearances ([1983-1990]), 
and also reports the commission of attacks on personal safety, 
individual freedom, due process and freedom of expression, 
without any perpetrators being punished accordingly. The 
Commission’s report also states that, according to the figures 
 
 87. Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Amnesty 
International (Publisher’s note). 
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detailed by human rights bodies, forced disappearances and 
summary executions continued during the defendant’s 
regime. It states that as a result of the coup d’état various 
individual rights were violated, and that this event resulted in 
several very serious acts, such as the death of prisoners at the 
Castro Castro Prison, the disappearance of numerous people 
in El Santa, at La Cantuta University, of Pedro Yauri, of 
attorney Wilfredo Terrones Silva and professor Teresa Díaz 
Aparicio of the National University of San Marcos.  
2.  The 1991 Amnesty International report found that three 
hundred people disappeared during that year after being 
detained by the law enforcement personnel. It stated that a 
National Commission to guarantee respect for human rights 
was proposed, but that such Commission never materialized. 
It further stated that three hundred new cases involving the 
disappearance of detainees were reported, of which eighty-
nine were freed, twenty-four turned up dead; nothing was 
ever heard about the rest. Finally, it said that frequent reports 
were received of abuse and torture, as well as the rape of 
rural women, and that no official investigations had been 
opened into those matters. 
3.  The 1992 Amnesty International report indicated, in 
addition to several individually identified acts involving 
human rights violations, that more than three hundred people 
had disappeared and at least sixty were executed 
extrajudicially by law enforcement personnel or by 
paramilitary groups. Dozens of cases of torture and abuse 
were reported, and the government had still failed to shed 
light on thousands of human rights violations documented 
since [1983]. The report stated that in the month of 
September the government issued a presidential directive on 
respect for human rights acknowledging that the 
disappearances of five thousand people had been reported 
since [1981]. However, no effective results were seen in 
terms of investigating and punishing the State agents 
involved in these illegal acts, in spite of the international calls 
and exhortations to do so. The directive simply conveyed the 
fact that forty-eight servicemen had been disciplined, which 
meant that law enforcement personnel enjoyed near total 
impunity, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of 
their responsibility.   
4.  The 1993 Amnesty International report stated that at least 
one hundred and thirty-nine people had “disappeared” and at 
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least sixty-five were executed extrajudicially by law 
enforcement personnel. Reports were also received of 
widespread torture and abuse. It stated that large regions of 
the country remained under military control, and that cases of 
forced disappearance and extrajudicial executions continued 
to be reported, without any results in terms of their 
investigation. It stated that Amnesty International’s requests 
for the establishment of specific facts, such as those 
surrounding the deaths at the Castro Castro Prison and La 
Cantuta, and requests to investigate the numerous cases of 
human rights violations, were not accepted. 
131. It is clear that the Reports of the IACHR and Amnesty 
International are, strictly speaking, written documents. They record 
an expression of intellectual content; they represent the physical 
materialization of a thought. Both entities, one of which belongs to 
the Inter-American human rights protection system, and the other 
being a non-governmental human rights organization, transmit 
through their reports a specific knowledge of the human rights 
situation in a particular country and a particular context. Neither the 
legal requirements for their existence nor the requirements for their 
validity as documentary evidence are subject to debate. In terms of 
their evidentiary effectiveness—the accuracy of their content—it 
must be noted that the statistics or figures they provide, intrinsically 
vital as far as the “contextual facts” are concerned, are essentially 
consistent with those presented by the TRC, the evidentiary solidity 
of which has been affirmed at this point. The reports indicate the 
source, although in general terms. They contain information provided 
by non-governmental organizations, public complaints and their own 
documents on specific cases. It is sufficient, with respect to the 
matter, that the information is consistent with the records of the 
TRC, which are extensively documented and have not been 
disproved. Furthermore, there are two notable pieces of information 
that have already been confirmed: a) former president Alberto 
Fujimori’s own government acknowledged the forced disappearances 
that had taken place in the country, and that there were five thousand 
such cases; and b) in spite of his declarations of oversight over 
human rights crimes committed by State agents, those crimes were 
never investigated, explained and punished, either in specific cases 
or with respect to the general trend. Consequently, the objections of 
the defense with regard to the questioned reports are overruled.  
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¶4. Evidence submitted by the defense.  
[. . .]  
134. [. . .] There are discrepancies in his pretrial statements88 with 
regard to certain matters concerning the Intelligence Note, as he first 
stated that he had not discussed its content with defendant Fujimori, 
but later mentioned that he had done so, and that he had even 
delivered it personally to defendant Fujimori Fujimori. Nevertheless, 
it is a discrepancy that—although it does not prove that Vice 
President San Román Cáceres informed defendant Fujimori Fujimori 
immediately of what had taken place in Barrios Altos and that 
Fujimori had access to the above-cited Intelligence Note—neither 
does it deny the reality of that information and the media’s 
knowledge of it from at least December of [1992], although there is 
information indicating that that Note had already been circulating 
months earlier. 
Finally, on the issue of the discrepancies among the statements of 
a single witness, that is, the diversity of statements, it is essential that 
they be subject to confrontation and verification at trial. From that 
point forward it is the responsibility of the adjudicating court to 
undertake the reasoned and reasonable weighing of the credibility of 
the various individuals, in accordance with the principle of 
immediacy. The existence of contradictions, retractions or 
corrections to parts of an account of the facts does not signify the 
absence of prosecution evidence. It is unacceptable to maintain that 
for such reason the evidence and the information that it contains is 
cancelled out or rendered ineffective. It is an issue pertinent to the 
weighing the evidence; it affects the Court’s opinion in its weighing 
of the evidence, not the weighability itself. Accordingly, it is 
incumbent upon the Court to compare different versions and draw a 
conclusion according to the ordinary principles of experience with 
regard to its respective veracity, bearing in mind its internal 
consistency as well as its consistency with the other evidence in the 
case. In the instant case, witness San Román Cáceres was examined 
at trial and attention was called to what he said in his different 
statements given before other (investigative, prosecution and 
congressional) government entities. Some parts of his witness 
 
 88. Reference to the statements of Máximo San Román Cáceres. 
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statements—only some passages of his detailed account—are 
inconsistent and, given the absence of positive proof to strengthen 
the account given at trial, it is not possible to give full credit to the 
latter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that such divergence, in 
light of the totality of the evidence produced [with a view to an 
assessment of all of the evidence together, which is the evidentiary 
method that forms the adequate basis, grounds and explanation of the 
conclusive judgment reached] cannot be disregarded. 
139. The effective cooperation procedure governed by Law No. 
27388, which has been incorporated into the new Code of Criminal 
Procedure, established the mechanism of plea bargaining. This has 
given rise procedurally to so-called “rewards-based criminal law,” 
which rests on the concept of the arrepentido [cooperating witness 
under the Repentance Act]. Its philosophy is determined by the need 
to fight impunity and  break the law of silence prevalent in organized 
crime, as well as to serve as a tool for the prevention of crimes 
involving grave social harm. One of the principles on which this 
special procedure is based is effectiveness, so that the cooperation the 
criminal offers the justice system is useful. Notably, the cooperation 
and the accompanying information must be relevant—that is, it must 
lead to the discovery of criminal acts and prove the involvement of 
other individuals. The information must be authentic, complete and 
accurate, and the judgment that is issued, insofar as it grants benefits 
to reward informants who have committed crimes, must 
appropriately reflect the severity of the admitted or uncontested 
charges, and the proven value of the information produced by the 
cooperating witness. Accordingly, one of the essential phases of the 
proceeding in question is the corroboration of the information by the 
Office of the Public Prosecutor (art. 6, para. 2 of the Regulations).  
Based on the aggregate of information on the alleged criminal 
participation of the “repentant” defendant [arrepentido]—essentially, 
the investigations or cases pending against him—he decides 
voluntarily to cooperate with the government, and either admits to 
the charges or does not contest them. The court’s supervision of the 
Cooperation and Benefits Agreement is limited on this point. It 
requires only the voluntariness of the defendant’s submission to the 
proceedings and his assisted knowledge of their scope, as well as 
indicia of criminality or “probable cause” of his involvement in the 
crimes of which he is accused and based on which he is negotiating a 
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benefit as a reward for his cooperation. Another aspect of the judicial 
oversight, beyond the appropriate legal authorizations concerning the 
subject and purpose of the proceedings, has to do with the benefits 
granted and the obligations imposed, with the criterion of 
proportionality among the weight of the information corroborated, 
the severity of the charges and his responsibility for the act.  
The defense, with respect to the judicial supervision of the 
Cooperation and Benefits Agreement, questions first of all the 
court’s classification of the facts as criminal offenses in terms of 
what has been admitted with respect to some facts: the arrepentidos 
said that they took part in specific crimes as backup—that is, they 
did not fire the shots that killed the victims; nevertheless, they were 
convicted as perpetrators or co-perpetrators. [Another arrepentido 
stated that he had been a driver, that he transported the officers to 
carry out the criminal act. Likewise, one of the operative intelligence 
officers acknowledged having participated in the events but asserted 
that he did not shoot at any of the victims, notwithstanding the 
accusation of another member of Detachment, who in turn was 
incriminated by the former]. This classification is not relevant to 
conclude that the position  of the prosecutor and the Court was 
fraudulent. A criminal act was found to exist, it was determined that 
the cooperating witness took part in it, and he was convicted in a 
criminal trial without his opposition. It is possible to consider, based 
on what the cooperating witnesses have stated, that they took part in 
the offense not as co-perpetrators but rather as accomplices. 
However, such classification does not invalidate the judgment or the 
cooperation itself, since they took part in the act in either case—
which the defense does not question. Further, it can be assumed that 
their account of their own criminal involvement downplays their role 
in the act.   
141. On the other hand, it is true that the cooperating witnesses 
denied the charges at a certain point prior to the effective cooperation 
proceedings, and assumed a defensive stance from which they 
radically rejected the accusations against them. Such situation, as has 
been emphasized repeatedly, in and of itself does not invalidate their 
subsequent testimony or statements. For this the Court must  bear in 
mind the reasons for the change in the witness’s version of the 
events, the explanations provided and the respective internal 
consistency and comparative analysis, as well as the presence of 
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other objective, external elements that enable corroboration. In 
addition, the fact that some arrepentidos do not admit certain charges 
in no way influences the fate of the effective cooperation proceeding. 
This charge is simply excluded from the scope of the proceeding and 
is subject to the results of the adversarial proceedings in progress. 
Likewise, the fact that a cooperating witness who does not oppose a 
charge is included in the corresponding agreement and is approved in 
the judgment does not invalidate the proceeding or give rise to the 
inference that the judgment was obtained fraudulently; the law and 
its regulations authorize this judicial course of action. The focus is 
not on this matter, but rather on the evidence of criminality—
unquestioned by the arrepentido—with respect to the charges that 
were admitted or uncontested.   
142. The cooperation judgments have approved the agreements 
because they find that they meet the legal requirements and pass the 
proportionality test. They are final judgments, whose legality, 
proportionality and judicial merit cannot be denied or dismissed by 
this Court. Whether or not certain information is considered 
corroborated in the effective cooperation proceeding is not subject to 
review in this case; any defects it may have cannot be litigated in the 
adversarial proceedings. Notwithstanding, it is clear that what these 
judgments acknowledge with respect to the content, existence and 
validity of specific information—that they affirm that it has been 
corroborated—does not predetermine the assessment [or] the 
findings of fact that the Court must render in the adversarial 
proceedings that may take place as a result or in relation to the 
information offered by the arrepentido. It is clear that in the criminal 
court the judgments are not prejudicial to other future judgments in 
other cases. Obviously the statement of proven facts has clear merit 
as a public document, but those facts do not predetermine or 
anticipate similar judgment in other criminal cases. Regarding “Plan 
Cipango,” those judgments of course will not be mentioned as proof 
of its existence; rather—as it indeed occurred—an independent 
assessment shall be made in terms of the evidence presented (see 
paragraph 96).  
Consequently, there are no grounds for the evidentiary exclusion 
of the effective cooperation judgments, without granting or 
acknowledging prejudicial effect. The position of the arrepentidos 
with respect to their prior statements is an issue that goes to the 
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weight of the testimony, not the legality of its assessment. The 
objection is overruled.  
[. . .]  
§3. Audio and video evidence.  
[. . .]  
¶1. Evidentiary Objections. 
148. “[. . .] Regardless of whether this video document89 was 
stolen, it lacks constitutional relevance, as in any case it has been 
proven that one of the parties at the scene of the interview—a SIN 
employee, obviously authorized by and known to the interviewer and 
the interviewee, especially if the interview took place at that 
institution’s headquarters—was the person who recorded the event. 
Beyond any defect in the video specifically, the “questionable” 
editing of its content for purposes of putting together a specific video 
document is consistent with a news report. A very clear assumption 
of  “mitigation of the link” has arisen, as the interviewer affirmed the 
reality of the prior conversations and the advance participation of 
Montesinos Torres, who was giving advice or instructions to Army 
General Picón Alcalde as to how he should testify.  
It is of interest for evidentiary purposes to note, on the one hand, 
the presence of Montesinos Torres in an interview that, according to 
the SIN strategy, was necessary in order to reinforce specific 
messages; and on the other hand, the statement of an important figure 
cited in Army General Robles Espinoza’s public denunciation, in the 
context of legal persecution against Robles Espinoza and a smear 
campaign in which the Army was involved, en masse, through its 
senior officers. There is no question that the interview took place at 
the SIN headquarters; that Montesinos Torres took part, at least in 
the prior stages, and was telling the interviewee what to say; and that 
he emphasized the drastic action of the military court, while Army 
General Picón Alcalde was convinced that the denunciation was 
unfounded. Journalist Guerrero Torres has acknowledged what 
Montesinos Torres said, although he has stressed that he neither 
interrupted the interview to speak nor controlled the interview. 
 
 89. Journalist Alejandro Guerrero Torres’s interview of Army General José 
Picón Alcalde. (Publisher’s note). 
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However, that information is meaningless for purposes of the 
evidentiary issue and the information sought. Consequently, the 
objection of the defense is overruled. 
The question is also raised of whether the rule of impartiality has 
been violated, as the video that was viewed was put together 
expressly for use in this case. What is relevant, however, are not the 
journalist’s remarks or the additions to certain events that were 
filmed previously—which is what, strictly speaking, violates this 
requirement (which is very well-known in Italian procedural 
doctrine); what is useful in evidentiary terms, or rather, the typically 
documentary consideration for complying with the applicable 
procedural requirements, is the scene that contains a specific piece of 
information, aside from the fact that commentary or other film clips 
were added later. If the information is self-sufficient, and is able to 
capture a specific message, without  any danger of confusion or 
distortion, it is improper to invalidate its evidentiary potential. In the 
instant case, in light of the above paragraphs, this has been satisfied: 
Army General Picón Alcalde testified against his classmate and 
close personal friend, Army General Robles Espinoza, outside his 
own realm; he was not at CSJM headquarters. He was following his 
own motives, and was under the influence of Montesinos Torres, de 
facto chief of the SIN (the institution that led the smear campaign 
against General Robles Espinoza), which even led him to issue an 
opinion in the case of La Cantuta that no members of the Army were 
involved in the crime.  
150. The defense challenges the lawfulness of the audio 
recordings90 claiming the violation of two fundamental rights: 
privacy and the right against self-incrimination. First, there is 
mention in the audio recordings of family issues, health and personal 
problems; it is therefore alleged to have private content. In addition, 
they mention facts that implicate the speakers—some of whom have 
denied the charges—as the possible perpetrators of a crime; this is 
relevant  especially since the right against self-incrimination arises 
when, in facing criminal prosecution, an individual decides whether 
to confess, contest the charges or remain silent. The topics covered in 
 
 90. Audio recordings turned over by journalist Uceda Pérez, which came from 
the recordings made by operative intelligence officer Sosa Saavedra (Publisher’s 
note). 
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the conversations recorded by one of the parties to it (operative 
intelligence officer Sosa Saavedra) deal with the amnesty, their ties 
to the Army and the promises of support they had received. Of 
course, but still in that context, they mention personal problems and 
the need for financial support as a result of their imprisonment—
information that, incidentally, is not relevant for these purposes and 
bears no significance in the elucidation of this case. It is it clear, 
from a substantive perspective, that the important topics covered in 
that conversation do not affect those exclusively personal areas that 
belong to a sphere of privacy shielded from the acts and knowledge 
of others. Everything said in the conversations, including the 
mention of financial needs and health problems—presented in 
general terms, without the specificity that could entail the 
communication of compromising information, or information not 
meant to go beyond the circle of people present—lies outside the 
very restricted sphere of one’s own individual privacy.  
The remarks and statements that one person makes to another in a 
voluntary conversation, free of duress, do not violate the right to 
privacy; nor can its recording be called fraudulent. There is not even 
a reciprocal right to confidentiality or a mutual duty to imply that the 
person to whom a communication is conveyed has an obligation of 
discretion or silence.   
The right against self-incrimination, which is an instrumental right 
included in the right to a defense, functions with respect to state 
agents and prevents defendants—or people who may become 
defendants—from being forced or tricked into making a statement 
and admitting criminal responsibility. Such is not the case with 
regard to conversations held between individuals in which ideas are 
transmitted and information or expressions are exchanged 
voluntarily. 
151. The defense also questions the relevance of the audio tapes 
because they are not original, and it has not been verified that they 
are true copies of the originals. According to the assertions of 
Ricardo Uceda Pérez at page thirty-seven thousand seven hundred 
and twenty-seven of his writing, operative intelligence officer Sosa 
Saavedra gave him the originals of the audio recordings. He obtained 
copies, one of which is the one he sent to the Court. In that writing, 
and in his testimony at trial, journalist Uceda Pérez stated that Sosa 
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Saavedra turned over the audio recordings to him voluntarily, and he 
made a copy, which he used as a source for his book Muerte en el 
Pentagonito [Death at the Pentagonito (Army Headquarters)]. The 
conversations themselves have been acknowledged by Navarro Pérez 
and Chuqui Aguirre, who was the most direct in doing so; he 
identified not only his own voice but also those of everyone whose 
voice appears on it. Rivero Lazo has identified his voice in some 
parts—he claims not to have known that he was being recorded, and 
that is why the conversation is natural—while Sosa Saavedra admits 
that he is the one who recorded the tapes and turned them over to 
Uceda Pérez, but states that he did not authorize him to turn them 
over; he has the originals. Pichilingue Guevara denied recognition of 
the recorded voices. It is therefore inferred, from the statements of 
Uceda Pérez and from the identifications made at the hearing, that 
the conversations contained in the audio recordings did in fact take 
place. As such, the determination of its authenticity is confirmed. 
Sosa Saavedra does not allege that the audio recordings presented by 
Uceda Pérez are false; he only questions the fact that Uceda Pérez 
had turned them over. However, as previously indicated, there is no 
duty of mutual confidentiality between the parties to a conversation. 
Chuqui Aguirre endorses them absolutely. There are no objections 
from Navarro Pérez or Rivero Lazo. Although Rivero Lazo states 
that in part, while listening to them, he went by the subtitles because 
he had trouble hearing (recently stated and not alleged at the time he 
testified), such circumstance is not a determining factor to reject the 
authenticity of the audio recordings. Furthermore, it should be made 
clear that the clean-up and subtitling that was ordered with respect to 
those audio recordings (as noted on the record in the corresponding 
session) did not involve any changes or manipulation. The parties 
knew about both “versions” (the one turned over by Uceda Pérez and 
the materials returned subsequent to the technical procedures), and 
had the opportunity to review them and, if appropriate, to object to 
them. The questioning is dismissed. The audio recordings are fully 
admissible as evidence. 
153. THE AUDIO RECORDING ENTITLED “FUJIMORI-
MONTESINOS CONVERSATION.” [. . .] As stated earlier, the 
confidentiality of communications, whether telephonic or other, can 
be violated only by third parties who intercept communications held 
by others. This means that there is a particularly intense need for 
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their protection, especially in view of technological advances that 
could facilitate their vulnerability and jeopardize the very system of 
fundamental rights. The special importance of this right demands 
great care in ensuring that it only can be overcome through a court 
order, which must be rigorously proven, as must any assertion that 
one of the participants in the conversation was the one who recorded 
and disseminated it. Consequently, if one of these circumstances is 
not proven adequately on the record, that is, that the recordings were 
obtained lawfully—the burden of proof being on the party offering 
the evidence—they will be inadmissible as documentary evidence. 
Army General Hermoza Ríos did not record the conversations that he 
had with Montesinos Torres, and his inference that Montesinos 
Torres recorded and disseminated them lacks categorical evidentiary 
support. It has not been proven that the conversations were 
intercepted with judicial authorization, which would be relatively 
easy to prove. Therefore, the audio recording in question is excluded 
from the evidence. 
[. . .]  
155. AUDIO RECORDING ENTITLED “STATEMENT OF 
VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS TO TELEMUNDO.” This is, in fact, 
from a statement that Montesinos Torres recorded surreptitiously—
without the knowledge and authorization of prison authorities—and 
turned over to the press, which saw to its distribution. According to 
the news report of Canal Dos [Channel 2] that was attached to the 
audiotape from Telemundo, the Ministry of Justice disclosed the 
measures taken in light of what had occurred, including the 
disciplinary action taken against the prison warden, and provided an 
account of the events, indicating that a list of questions was sent to 
Montesinos Torres for him to answer. This fact is insignificant to the 
exclusion of the statement, since it does not affect the essence of the 
statement as far as its voluntariness and authenticity as a document 
are concerned. 
In that statement, Montesinos Torres questioned why the 
defendant [Fujimori] was not facing up to the charges against him 
and stated, among several issues, the following: 1. That the 
intelligence services operate in secret and always act along the fluid 
line between legality and illegality, often breaking the rules. 2. That 
he worked under the orders of President Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, 
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followed his instructions strictly so as to make it possible for him to 
remain in government, increase his power and consolidate his 
political plans, even attaining his reelection for the 2000-2005 term. 
3. That, therefore, as political leader and head of state, he must 
answer for what his subordinates did or failed to do, including the 
commission of acts that go against the rules in force.  
It should be noted that every video or recorded tape is an audio or 
video document, as the case may be, and must be assessed as such. 
Furthermore, this recording was in the public domain and was at no 
time denied by Montesinos Torres. Its authenticity is not in question. 
As noted earlier, the fact that Montesinos Torres was not cross-
examined at trial, for a reason not attributable to the Court, does not 
prevent the analysis of prior statements (in which, clearly, he waived 
his right to remain silent); they are known to the parties, who have 
had the opportunity to introduce evidence to dismiss them, minimize 
them, or even discredit their effects. Insofar as it is documentary 
evidence, its content—Montesinos Torres’s statement—can be 
examined as an out-of-court statement, although cross-examination is 
not applicable because the documents would be read or viewed or 
listened to. As such, the objection is overruled.  
[. . .]  
159. [. . .] The document91 has been viewed in the proper 
proceedings, and it has been identified by two of the people who 
took part in the meeting. Consequently, all possible limitations to the 
document viewed are overcome by the express acknowledgement of 
its participants. Furthermore, it is clear that this document was sent 
by Congress to the Office of the Public Prosecutor once it was 
announced that a criminal complaint would be filed against the 
defendant, and that Office in turn attached it to its formal complaint 
as evidence. Consequently, the objection is overruled.  
160. [. . .] With respect to the matter, it is clear that it is a fluid 
dialogue between Montesinos Torres and Briones Dávila and Luisa 
María Cuculiza, and that in referring to the matters of Barrios Altos 
 
 91. Vladivideos marked with numbers 880/881 [This is footage of a meeting 
held at the SIN on April [29th, 1998], which includes two separate events: the first 
is a conversation among Luisa María Cuculiza, Juan Briones Dávila and Vladimiro 
Montesinos Torres; and the second is a conversation among the three 
aforementioned individuals and Alberto Fujimori Fujimori]. 
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and La Cantuta, he mentions the SIE expressly and rules out the SIN. 
It is also clear that he pointed to the chair where the highest ranking 
official sits—which is the place the defendant occupied and sat in 
when he entered the Chamber—and stated emphatically “everything 
comes from here.” In all of his statements he clearly rejected the 
SIN’s perpetration of the act, so it is possible that this statement was 
meant to indicate the defendant and the Intelligence System. 
Nevertheless, it is a phrase or accusation that is not very clear on the 
matter of who gave the order for the two criminal acts, or for all of 
the ones Montesinos Torres cited at the meeting. In any case, those 
words and that gesture are not unequivocal statements that defendant 
Fujimori Fujimori had given the criminal orders, taken part in them 
or known of the course of events. They allow for several 
interpretations, such as those that have been given by the people at 
that meeting, the prosecutor, the civil party and the defense. As such, 
they require other supporting evidence that will be examined at the 
appropriate time; on their own, they are neither sufficient nor 
categorical as incriminating evidence.  
¶2. Evidence offered by the Office of the Attorney General  
161. VIDEO ENTITLED “LOS SIAMESES” [“THE SIAMESE 
TWINS”] [. . .] The objections as to relevance must be overruled, 
because what is relevant in these cases are the sources of these film 
scenes. They are public, from a journalistic source, and publicly 
known because they were broadcast on various television news 
programs, including open signal television such as channel 2, 
Frecuencia Latina. The important point, it must be stressed, are the 
defendant’s statements—not the additions and news commentary.  
They help show the content of the defendant’s statements at a certain 
point, but there is no serious risk of misrepresentation or possibility 
of confusion with respect to them. Furthermore, the images and 
words have been acknowledged by the defendant. In addition, it is 
obvious that some phrases concerning who served in his government 
from the time he took power must be weighed with the totality of the 
evidence produced and, if appropriate, their convincing force and 
their merit as incriminating circumstantial evidence must be 
determined. 
162. VIDEO ENTITLED “MESSAGE FROM MARTIN RIVAS” 
[. . .] In this “message” Army Major Martin Rivas states that the acts 
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attributed to him—Barrios Altos and La Cantuta—were a 
government decision; otherwise, it would be impossible to explain 
the Cantuta Law, the rolling out of the tanks, the antiterrorist laws, 
the amnesty laws, let alone for so much to be done just to defend one 
Army major. He states that the amnesty laws did not protect him; 
rather, they protected those in government and those responsible for 
the State policy implemented, the responsibility for which lies, in any 
case, with the President of the Republic as Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces and his advisor who governed with him, 
Vladimiro Montesinos Torres [. . .] There is no doubt of the 
authenticity of the video footage in question. Martin Rivas himself 
has acknowledged it. The argument that he was deceived and that it 
was simply a rehearsal does not withstand even the least analysis. 
Martín Rivas knew that he was being filmed and that the footage 
would be used by journalist Jara Flores; that was the testimony of the 
journalist at trial. His statements are convincing and well thought 
out, and are aimed not only at explaining a very serious event but 
also to defend himself from the charges against him. Furthermore, it 
is a video document. As such, it is subject to the rules of 
identification and a determination of authenticity, overcome 
successfully in this case. It has already been established that, as such, 
it serves not only to judge the credibility of his testimony at trial but 
also, if appropriate, it can replace it if the evidence of the case so 
determines. The reasoning for this has already been stated repeatedly 
in this Chapter. The objection is overruled. 
163. AUDIO RECORDING OF THE INTERVIEW OF 
OPERATIVE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER JESÚS SOSA 
SAAVEDRA CONDUCTED BY JOURNALIST MARÍA ELENA 
CASTILLO, OF THE NEWSPAPER “LA REPÚBLICA.” In these 
statements, Sosa Saavedra mentions that the special intelligence 
detachment in question did exist, although not with the name 
“Colina” but rather “Lima.” He acknowledges that that is what it was 
called, that there are even documents under that name, and that it was 
Martin Rivas who gave it that name. He states that the first operation 
was Barrios Altos and that it was ordered by Montesinos Torres, to 
whom they reported on the job done. Martin Rivas, Pichilingue 
Guevara and Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa went; he states that they, as 
members of the military, had not wanted to work for Montesinos 
Torres but rather for the Commander General of the Army. He states 
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that the rest of the operations were ordered by the Commander 
General of the Army, General Hermoza Ríos, and that he even 
congratulated them and offered to have a luncheon for them. He 
states, nevertheless, that the order for La Cantuta was to make 
arrests, but that Martín Rivas ordered them to kill; he states that the 
group answered administratively to the DINTE, which is why 
Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa was present as the coordinator between the 
Detachment and the DINTE. He states that Martin Rivas would 
coordinate directly with Army General Hermoza  Ríos, and that the 
Colina Detachment was formed in the COFI, while Montesinos 
Torres was first starting to gain power.   
[. . .]  
The defense questions the audio recording because it is 
documented testimony, and testimony can only be introduced 
through a live witness. This objection, asserted repeatedly throughout 
this phase of the trial proceedings, is baseless. It must be emphasized 
that tape recordings are governed by the rules of documentary 
evidence. And if the person interviewed acknowledges his voice and 
the content of what is stated therein, it is improper to exclude it from 
the evidence. Sosa Saavedra says that he does not recall everything 
that he stated there, especially the quote against  Montesinos Torres. 
However, what has been set out above is convincing, there is no 
evidence whatsoever that any phrase was added or that the statement 
was misrepresented; and as far as the reference to Montesinos, it is 
simply a retraction, although without any explanation to justify the 
change in story. The objection is overruled.  
[. . .]  
165. [. . .] In the instant case,92 the place where the meeting was 
held (the SIN) the content of the presentation, the status of the 
attendees (pro-government members of Congress) and the role of 
Montesinos Torres, who boasts of his power and his connection to 
former president Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, are all of note. This 
scene demonstrates the significant role that Montesinos Torres 
played, in spite of his formal title, in the real operational structure of 
the regime and its view of the countersubversion strategy. 
 
 92. Interview with Sosa Savedra by Mabel Huertas on Día D (Channel 9). 
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166. [. . .] The defense questions the procedure by which the video 
evidence is introduced93 when it is testimony, and also complains of 
the lack of requisite impartiality. These objections, however, are not 
sound. It is indisputable that the videos are documentary evidence, 
and that their fundamental content, which has been subject to 
identification, is the statement of Army General Hermoza Ríos. Its 
authenticity has not even been disputed, and its content and message 
are very clear: he confronted the public inquiries and the questions 
raised before Congress, he branded it an offense to the military 
institution, and declared that he would not allow it. From there, as is 
well-known to the public, there was a reaction from the military, 
which included a parade of tanks and public demonstrations of 
support for the senior officer, in spite of the evidence of criminality 
with respect to the perpetration of the serious acts condemned. The 
objection is overruled.  
¶3. Evidence from the civil party.  
[. . .]  
¶4.  Evidence from the defense.  
[. . .]  
§4. Other evidentiary arguments from the defense.  
[. . .]  
¶1. Congressional Proceedings  
175. With respect to the congressional procedure of acusación 
constitucional [similar to impeachment proceedings], it is relevant to 
bear in mind two specific provisions: (i) Article 100 of the 
Constitution, which establishes that “the defendant shall have the 
right, in these proceedings, to defend himself pro se and with the 
assistance of counsel before the Permanent Committee and before 
the full Congress;” and (ii) Article 89 of the Regulations to 
Congress, which provides three basic stages of the acusación 
constitucional procedure, and recognizes that the defendant may be 
assisted or represented by counsel. Article 89 further provides that 
the debate of the acusación constitucional before the full Congress 
shall not be suspended due to the defendant’s or his attorney’s 
 
 93. Video containing the public statements of Army General Hermoza Ríos. 
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unjustified failure to attend, as determined by the Congressional 
Board. In such case, upon verification that notice was properly 
served upon the accused and his defense counsel, the acusación 
constitucional shall be debated and voted upon.   
176. The meaning and scope of the acusación constitucional 
procedure have been defined by the Constitutional Court. In STC 
number 0006–2003– AI/TC, of December [1st, 2003], it was 
classified as a duly regulated political legal proceeding, conducted 
before Congress. In such proceeding, the legislative body must have 
determined the likelihood of the facts alleged in the accusation, and 
found that those facts are consistent with the legal definition of a 
crime or crimes committed by a public servant, previously and 
unequivocally established under the law, and as such warranting 
criminal prosecution. It is a preliminary impeachment hearing to 
shed light on accusations of the alleged legal and criminal liability of 
high-ranking government employees pursuant to Article 99 of the 
Constitution for crimes allegedly committed in the performance of 
official duties. Once Congress has determined that, in its opinion, 
there are sufficient facts evidencing the commission of such crimes, 
it acts as the prosecuting entity. It sets aside the official rights and 
privileges of the dignitary, suspends him from the performance of his 
duties, and brings him before the criminal court.  
[. . .]  
177. The political nature of the Congressional trial (without 
prejudice to the assessment of whether there is evidence of 
criminality in the conduct attributed to a high-ranking government 
official), and its effect of relieving the defendant of the official rights 
and privileges vested in him, and given its role in relation to the 
regular criminal courts as a mere prosecuting entity—understood in a 
broad sense—is clearly established. Such is also the case insofar as, 
from a procedural law perspective, the decision of Congress is 
established as a condition or requisite for it properly to proceed; it is 
a procedural element that determines the initiation and validity of the 
criminal case, but nothing more. 
Consequently, because of their political effects, it is not possible to 
equate such proceedings with a criminal court case. The criminal 
case establishes the facts of an event—its goal is to shed light on it—
and the responsibility of an individual. If appropriate, it determines 
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the application of the criminal law and the imposition of a sentence 
or preventive measure, without prejudice to the civil reparations. The 
congressional investigation only yields political consequences or 
effects at the heart of the bodies of the Legislative Branch; it does 
not impose criminal sanctions. However, strangely, from the 
perspective of comparative law, the Congressional resolution to 
bring the acusación constitucional, which has a criminal content, has 
binding effects for the initiation of the criminal case—but that in no 
way “transforms” the preliminary impeachment hearing into a legal 
or court case.  
From this perspective, not all of the requirements or guarantees of 
a court case can be transferred to the preliminary impeachment 
hearing. Of course, the right to a defense must be respected in its 
essential content: knowledge of the charges, the assistance of 
counsel, participation in the investigation proceedings, the 
opportunity to present arguments and to contest the charges. In the 
case of the congressional proceedings, as previously stated, the 
defendant has the right to defend himself pro se and with the 
assistance of counsel before the Standing Committee and before the 
full Congress. In the preliminary impeachment hearings before 
Congress, as opposed to the criminal case, due to the conflicting 
rights and the effects that the sentence entails, the defense is limited, 
with regard to the assistance of counsel, to the right to name his own 
attorney. This right cannot be hindered or impeded; however, it is not 
an obligation of the State to appoint an attorney in the absence of the 
defendant’s designation, as it is in a criminal case  [ECtHR Judgment 
of January [21st, 1999], Case of Van Geyseghem].  
Along these lines, the Regulations to Congress recognize legal 
defense as a right, not as an obligation of the State that requires the 
legislature to appoint an attorney if the defendant fails to do so. 
Furthermore, they consider it an elective right in that the defendant 
may choose not to name an attorney. In the case that an attorney has 
been named, his failure to appear does not suspend the proceedings, 
and proof of the service of notice to the defendant is sufficient to 
meet the legal requirements for the defendant to be able to assert his 
right. That has been done in the instant case. To assert the 
interpretation, as the defense has, that the proceedings are null and 
void due to the absence of appointed counsel in view of the voluntary 
nonappearance of the defendant’s own attorney, when the law does 
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not require it—and does not even allow it—would be to open the 
door to the failure of any investigation.   
178. Irrespective of the above, the main point is that we are not 
dealing here with congressional acusación constitucional 
proceedings leading to the criminal case, but rather with proceedings 
held in Congress that lack such procedural or court nature, whose 
documentary character is beyond all discussion. As already stated 
repeatedly: it is improper to require criminal trial guarantees and 
evidentiary rules in proceedings that do not, because of their nature, 
require them. The congressional proceedings (statements, expert 
testimony, identifications, the production of different kinds of 
documents and information) are out-of-court sources of evidence. 
They are incorporated into the case and examined therein according 
to the means by which they are introduced—in this case as 
documentary evidence. As such, they do not require prior 
confrontation, because sources of evidence never do. The objections 
of the defense are therefore unacceptable. All of the congressional 
investigative proceedings, by their nature documentary, insofar as 
they have been subject to debate, may be used by the Court. 
¶2. The pretrial investigation proceedings and the right to the 
assistance of counsel 
179. [. . .] It has been known since the beginning of the case that 
defendant Fujimori Fujimori was in Japan; the Investigating Judge 
specified that he fled the country to avoid prosecution by the 
Peruvian justice system. In spite this fact, he was not declared a 
fugitive immediately nor, therefore, was he assigned court-appointed 
counsel. The Court notes that the right to a defense is a guarantee 
and, as such it is the State’s duty properly to provide it. If it fails to 
do so, the pretrial investigation proceedings will not be admissible as 
evidence. 
[. . .]  
181. However, the following must be reiterated: (i) that the right to 
a legal defense recognizes within its scope the principle of 
interdiction in the case of a lack of defense, which at the heart of the 
case means the exclusion and censure of a deprivation or limitation 
of the essential opportunities provided by all the rights instrumental 
to a defense, including the right to be assisted by counsel; (ii) that 
observance of the interdiction in the case of a lack of defense is 
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directed at the court and prevents its orders from harming the 
defendant’s legal situation arbitrarily; therefore, if the lack of defense 
is created by the defendant’s own reasons and volition, entails an 
attitude voluntarily adopted by the defendant, or is due to the lack of 
diligence or expertise of his defense counsel, it does not exist as 
such; (iii) that, in the instant case, the defendant knew of the 
existence of a criminal case against him—a fact he has not denied—
and decided not to comply with the judicial summons in the case, 
which academically and legally is called not absence but rather 
contempt of court; (iv) that the ruling of absence or contempt is a 
procedural act that creates such status, and its issuance requires that 
all necessary means be exhausted to put the defendant on the right 
path, at which point he is assigned court-appointed counsel; (v) that, 
in the instant case, once the investigating court officially verified the 
defendant’s deliberate avoidance and his willful failure to comply 
with the court summons, he was formally declared in contempt of 
court and a fugitive (there are two such orders in this consolidated 
case) and he was assigned a court-appointed attorney; (vi) that, 
therefore, a material lack of defense was not an issue in the pretrial 
investigations because the lack of representation at that phase was 
due to the defendant’s own attitude; moreover, the Chambers of the 
Investigating Judge did not deny access to the proceedings or hinder 
the assistance of a private attorney, which the defendant failed to 
name; (vii) that the opportunity for confrontation, central to the lines 
of defense required in the investigating court, was not diminished or 
maliciously impeded, and therefore the pretrial investigation 
proceedings cannot be  preliminarily rejected or considered irrelevant 
in terms of their admissibility according to the circumstances of the 
case.  
Chapter II: Alberto Fujimori’s assumption of the presidency and the 
bases of his regime 
§1. The presidential election.  
¶2. The new government strategy  
[. . .]  
190. The foregoing demonstrates that significant changes were 
made beginning on July [28th, 1999], starting with the preeminence 
of the SIN and the central role of Montesinos Torres in the definition 
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of those changes. In this new functional and political aspect, the SIN 
was authorized to conduct operational intelligence, thus rendering it 
more accountable to the President of the Republic. Its most important 
regulatory reference initially was Legislative Decree No.746, which, 
incidentally, was not the only reference, given the dynamics of an 
entire process involving the cooptation of the Armed Forces and the 
PNP and the significant role—undoubtedly excessive and 
illegitimate—of the SIN [. . .]  
§2. The coup d’état of April [5th, 1992]  
¶1. Circumstances and prior acts.  
[. . .]  
197. The coup d’état was not impromptu. There were several prior 
meetings between the high command of the Armed Forces and the 
National Police and Alberto Fujimori and his presidential advisor, 
held on April 3 and 4, 1992, and attended by the following 
individuals: Nicolas Hermoza Ríos, Salazar Monroe, Carmona Acha, 
Velarde Ramirez, Robles Esponiza and Pizarro Castañeda. All of 
them, as previously stated, were Heads of the Armed Forces and the 
Police and have acknowledged their attendance at said meeting 
(Operative Point 197,  p. 197-199). 
¶2. The Message to the Nation and the deprivations of liberty  
[. . .]  
199. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori ordered the Armed Forces and 
the PNP to take immediate actions to guarantee the measures 
announced and to ensure order and national security. This is 
evidenced by the fact that that the Army, Navy, Air Force troops, and 
National Police, took control of the city of Lima and the main cities 
in the provinces. Congress was occupied, as were the Palace of 
Justice, media facilities and public areas, while political figures and 
well-known journalists were deprived of their liberty.   
[. . .]  
¶4. Immediate measures and consequences  
206. The coup d’état that defendant Fujimori Fujimori ordered on 
April 5, 1992, in spite of the fact that on July 20, 1990, he had taken 
a solemn oath to defend the Constitution and promised to fight for 
democracy, was a clearly unconstitutional and criminal act with no 
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mitigating circumstances.  This act resulted in the installation of a 
dictatorship. There is no justification for the criminal  illegality of his 
conduct, nor any legally or constitutionally relevant motive that 
would prevent the political censure and criminal prosecution of its 
participants. The rejection of the coup d’état internationally was 
unanimous. The pressure that the OAS and the most important 
democracies brought to bear upon the de facto regime resulted in a 
set of commitments and agreements for the restoration of democratic 
order.   
Chapter III: The President of the Republic and the control of 
terrorism 
[. . .]  
§2. The President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and 
the PNP  
[. . .]  
216. The head of state as commander in chief of the Armed Forces 
and National has discretionary powers. Therefore, the president—the 
operator or agent of such authority—enjoys the freedom to choose 
the course of State action, and his decision is an exclusive 
manifestation of his power. As held by the Constitutional Court, the 
constitutional framework does not establish specific conditions, 
precautions or procedures with regard to these types of powers, 
unlike those that are regulated.  Rather, the constitutional framework 
sets forth only the respective allocation of powers. As such, the 
manner, timeliness, convenience or inconvenience of that allocation 
is subject to the political criterion of whomever exercises the 
authority. For this reason, the acts that fall within the purview of the 
head of state’s authority are not justiciable, unless the courts 
responsible for the oversight and defense of constitutionality declare 
their own jurisdiction over the issue.   
[. . .]  
¶2. Actual exercise of leadership of the Armed Forces  
220. Presidential military authority, in the terms set forth above, 
was a recurrent invocation and practice of defendant Fujimori 
Fujimori in his relations with law enforcement personnel, when 
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facing the public, and in the context of the fight against terrorist 
subversion.  
§3. The military powers of the President of the Republic  
[. . .]  
¶2. Political command authority over the military  
224. Assuming these guidelines, several general and senior 
officers of the Armed Forces and the PNP testified at the trial. Their 
testimony established the constant exercise of Fujimori Fujimori’s 
political authority over the military as commander in chief of the 
Armed Forces and National Police. This authority was expressed 
outwardly through binding governmental or presidential directives 
relative, mainly, to the fight against terrorist subversion. Thus, 
among others, it is necessary to highlight the statements of Army 
Generals Cubas Portal, Rojas García, Rivero Lazo, Luis Salazar 
Monroe, Robles Espinoza, Hermoza Ríos and Briones Dávila, as 
well as that of Army Colonel Pino Benamú.  
¶3. Effective command authority over the military  
[False]  
227. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that whomever has 
command authority unfailingly has operational command. That is to 
say, this person has the power to give orders and the ability to 
exercise that power over a specific unit, with the consequent duties 
and responsibilities that come with it. Nevertheless, whomever has 
operational command does not always have authority or strategic 
command in the strict sense of the term over a specific unit. 
Now, effective military command, or operational command stricto 
sensu is commonly held by professional servicemen, given the 
technical characteristics required for its efficient exercise. In the case 
of the head of the Peruvian State, this expression of military power is 
not entirely perceptible, since this power amounts to a function that 
involves merely the execution of policies and strategies designed and 
shaped by the political military leadership—that is, by the entity in 
charge of the National Defense and Security System, whose highest 
decision-making body is the National Security Council (which in the 
previous decade was called the National Defense Council) and which 
is presided over by the President of the Republic.  
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¶4. Military powers of the commander in chief  
228. In view of the foregoing, it can be asserted that the 
Constitution grants the head of state military powers for national 
defense that are developed prominently in terms of political authority 
over the military. Nevertheless, the constitutional provisions do not 
specify the scope of effective military command or operational 
command, strictly speaking, that he could exercise when a number of 
factors are combined.  
The subordication of the Armed Forces and the National Police is 
established immediately because the Constitution refers to a category 
of leadership. As such, the premise is one of operational command 
arising from the interaction of hierarchical steps in a vertical line.   
Moreover, by classifying such leadership as “supreme,” the 
operational command that it embodies is the maximum possible in 
the Armed Forces and the National Police. In this way, the chain of 
operational command (not of political command authority) 
culminates, by express constitutional mandate, in the institution of 
the President of the Republic.  
229. However, this operational command must be expressed 
lawfully only in the areas where the military command relationships 
do not operate, so as not to infringe upon the authority of others—
that is, to not act in disregard of the command authority of others. It 
is, consequently, an authority with which to respond to assumptions 
of fact, and to fill in the gaps that result from the command structure 
of the clearly defined system of powers. Therefore, the orders issued 
by the President of the Republic in the exercise of his role as 
commander in chief or maximum operational commander of the 
Armed Forces and National Police hierarchies, do not necessarily 
require any particular formality. They may be written, verbal, 
express or implied. It should be made clear that the procedural 
requirements of an order are reserved exclusively for the military 
command relationships within the organizational structure of the 
specific military units, which are frequently governed by a strict 
procedure that establishes the  observance of legal formalities for the 
order and a written record of it.  
¶5. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori as Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces 
[. . .]  
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232. Consequently, all of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori’s activities as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the PNP that have 
been reviewed and proven on the record demonstrate the military 
authority that the constitution confers upon the head of state. It is 
proven, then, that defendant Fujimori Fujimori undoubtedly 
exercised political authority over the military as well as effective 
military authority, thus outwardly expressing his command authority 
and maximum operational command over the Armed Forces and the 
PNP, at a strategic political level, and at a tactical and operational 
level, which included specific personnel or units.  
[. . .]  
§5. The President of the Republic and the SIN  
¶1. Regulatory changes. 
[. . .]  
241. The major change, from a regulatory standpoint, was 
consolidated with the enactment of Legislative Decrees No. 743 (the 
National Defense System Act), and 746 (the National Intelligence 
System Act), both of November 12, 1991. The general thrust of these 
changes are that the SIN, accountable directly to the President of the 
Republic, is now considered the central and governing organization 
of the SINA, which is composed of (in addition to the  SIN) the 
intelligence agencies of the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, Economy and Finance, and Education, the intelligence 
bodies of the defense sector, and the intelligence bodies of other 
government ministries and entities. It has the status of a government 
ministry, is a budget sector agency and adopts its own regulations. It 
produces national, field and operational intelligence, and is 
responsible for integrating the intelligence gathered in the political, 
economic, psycho-social and military fields—while still producing 
the first three kinds—for the President of the Republic and the main 
agencies of the National Defense System. Principally, it can conduct 
operational intelligence actions according to the different disturbance 
factors affecting National Security and National Defense (Article 
10).  
According to Legislative Decree No. 743, the SINA is part of the 
National Defense System (Article 11(c)).  SINA’s role is to provide 
the President of the Republic and the main National Defense System 
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agencies the intelligence required for the planning and conduct of 
National Defense (Article 19). The SIN Chief is the highest ranking 
official of the SINA, and is appointed by the President of the 
Republic (Article 19). [. . .]  
¶2. Explanations based on the exercise of power  
243. All of the foregoing is explained by defendant Fujimori 
Fujimori’s interest in positioning Vladimiro Montesinos Torres as 
the great coordinator of the intelligence system and the one to 
channel his decisions into the military sphere. Fujimori Fujimori did 
this because he required the centralization of military power and 
control of the intelligence and military spheres, in order to carry out 
his countersubversive strategy and to establish a system for the 
exercise of power that served his political objectives.  
[. . .]  
Chapter IV: The Armed Forces and the Government of Alberto 
Fujimori Fujimori  
[. . .]  
§2. Organization and operation of the Armed Forces  
[. . .]  
255. In conclusion, the power that Army General Hermoza Ríos 
held as of December 19, 1991, in the previously mentioned positions 
(Commander General the Army, president of the CCFFAA and Chief 
of the COFI), was well-known and definitive, at least formally. He 
concentrated the dominant power of the military in all the operations 
against terrorist subversion, and was in practice the highest military 
chief, to whom, in this field, all of the armed forces institutions were 
subordinate. However, this unity and concentration of military 
power, of course—as established in the preceding Chapters—was 
under the supreme leadership of the commander in chief, that is, 
accountable directly to the President of the Republic, defendant 
Fujimori Fujimori. Moreover, the President had positioned 
Montesinos Torres as an operator and intermediary in his relations 
with the Armed Forces, when Montesinos Torres was also the de 
facto head of the SIN, and with it the entire SINA.  
[. . .]  
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§6. The absolute interference of Army General Hermoza Ríos in the 
Armed Forces  
[. . .]  
272. There is also no doubt that Army General Hermoza Ríos, in 
his capacity as Commander General of the Army, was authorized to 
exercise his power to intervene in all spheres and functional levels of 
the Army.  
[. . .]  
273. All of these events, without a doubt, would not have been 
able to take place without the knowledge, approval and active 
involvement of the senior military commander. His rank and the 
military post or position that he held, and the very operation of the 
military structure (hierarchical, disciplined and extensively 
formalized, with rigid levels of internal information and specific 
control of the activities of its members), would have made it 
impossible for everything that took place—and it was a lot, in terms 
of extent, intensity and time frame—to have occurred behind his 
back and, moreover, without his malicious interference.  
274. In light of Hermoza Ríos’s major interference, the Court 
rejects the explanation that he was ignorant of what occurred. The 
degree of his power within the Armed Forces demonstrates that it 
was near absolute. The Court also takes into account, as information 
that reveals his knowledge and participation in the events, the 
absence of immediate sanctions and corrective measures. These two 
points, taken together, reveal with abundant clarity the degree of 
involvement of the highest levels of the military in the commission 
of the crimes at issue in this case.  
Chapter V: The National Intelligence Service 
§2. Placement of Vladimiro Montesinos Torres within the SIN  
280. It is clear that Montesinos Torres attained, his position 
position because President’s Fujimori Fujimori order. The defendant 
initially sought to appoint him as SIN Chief, but given the objections 
of the president of the Council of Ministers, Hurtado Miller, he opted 
for the position of advisor to the Office of the Senior Director of the 
SIN. At first it was informal, and later, when faced with public 
outcry, it became formal. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori was not 
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unfamiliar with Montesinos Torres’s history, through journalistic 
information as well as directly (Bulletin No. 001–SIE407 addresses 
this issue). Furthermore, his background could not be overlooked, as 
the appointment of a government employee to an important position 
with major ramifications for public policies on political matters, 
intelligence and security necessarily required sufficient investigation 
of his résumé and his public and professional career.  
§3. Influence of Vladimiro Montesinos Torres in the SIN  
[. . .]  
282. The testimony of Degredori [sic] Caso, Máximo San Román 
Cáceres, Benedicto Jiménez Baca, Pino Benamu, Robles Espinoza, 
Hermoza Ríos, Human Azcurra and Jara Flores only corroborate 
Montesinos Torres’s control, as a direct representative of defendant 
Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, in the spheres of Defense, the Interior and 
Intelligence, where, at least during the early years of the regime at 
issue in this case, an atypical model of national government was 
consolidated. 
284. In view of the above-cited statements, it can be concluded 
that the nominal SIN Chief during that period of time was Army 
General Salazar Monroe, while the actual Chief, who in fact assumed 
the authority inherent in the position, was presidential advisor 
Montesinos Torres.  
¶2. Involvement in the regulatory restructuring of the SIN and 
the National Defense System  
[. . .]  
288. It is clear, then, that under the direction of Montesinos Torres 
(who in fact was a direct subordinate of defendant Fujimori Fujimori, 
to whom he was accountable, to the exclusion of other top 
government officials), operational intelligence became an activity 
that fell within the purview of the SIN. This was achieved through 
Legislative Decrees 743 and 746. This activity had in fact already 
begun in January of [1991],  as will be explained in detail below, 
but—as previously explained—was not provided for legally in 
Legislative Decrees No. 270 and 271, which only authorized the SIN 
to produce strategic intelligence (See Article 2 of Legislative Decree 
No. 271).  
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It is therefore reasonable to consider that the ultimate goal of 
Legislative Decree No. 746, beyond making the operations more 
integrated and efficient—that is, authorizing the execution of special 
intelligence operations pursuant to its Article 10(c)—was to 
concentrate and direct the totality of the State’s intelligence activities 
and to impose the interference of the SIN at all levels of government, 
even under penalty of criminal sanctions. Indeed, Article 16 of 
Legislative Decree No. 746 established that the intelligence bodies of 
the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Finance, 
Education and Defense had a mandatory obligation to provide the 
documentation, information and intelligence requested of them; the 
same applied to other ministries, public agencies, and local and 
regional governments.   
[. . .]  
291. The set of rules established by the SIN was compatible with 
the needs of the countersubversive strategy of the Armed Forces: the 
increase of power and the discretion to act. The proposals of the SIN, 
which became rules with the force of law, consisted precisely of 
elevating the status and importance of the SIN within the SINA, to 
enable it to centralize and control the activities and budget of the 
police and military intelligence services. 
¶3. Management of the SIN’s Budget  
[. . .]  
293. It has been proven, consequently, that by the end of [1990] 
Montesinos Torres already had institutional control over the military 
and intelligence. He participated as a personal representative of 
President Fujimori Fujimori in meetings with the Minister of 
Defense and the CCFFAA. In fact, he had become the spokesman of 
the Armed Forces before the President of the Republic, which meant 
that the senior military officers did not have direct access to the 
president but rather had to go through Montesinos Torres. This was 
confirmed by Merino Bartet [. . .].  
§4. The SIN and special intelligence operations  
[. . .]  
300. In conclusion, it was from and beginning with the SIN—
under the direction of Montesinos Torres—that the state apparatus 
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was organized and restructured to deal with, among other things, the 
fight against terrorist subversion. An organized apparatus of power 
was set up for such purposes, to the point that it directed the totality 
of the State’s secret services, and centralized the intelligence 
activities and gave them new importance.  
It bears repeating that presidential advisor Montesinos Torres, 
among other undertakings: (i) suggested and obtained the 
appointment of senior military officers of the Army and the PNP (the 
appointments of Army Generals Hermoza Ríos, Salazar Monroe, 
Zegarra Delgado, Torres Aciego and others are relevant, as well as 
that of PNP General Cuba y Escobedo); (ii) proposed, from the SIN, 
the laws pertaining to the SIN and the SINA, including those 
concerning defense and public security; (iii) concentrated, from the 
SIN, the intelligence information from all spheres of national 
activity, which would be provided to President Fujimori Fujimori, 
and for which an intelligence channel was established to facilitate the 
receipt of the intelligence produced by the appropriate agencies of 
the Armed Forces and the National Police, including the SIN itself; 
and (iv) acted on behalf of the President of the Republic and, on his 
instructions, intervened in the ministries and other organizations 
involved in national defense and public security.  
Chapter VI: The National Intelligence Directorate and the Army 
Intelligence Service  
[. . .]  
§2. General Rivero Lazo, Director of the DINTE  
¶2. Administration of the executing unit. Funding of the 
Colina Detachment  
309. The transfer of the Executing Unit of the SIE to the DINTE 
indicates that the financial control of the activities of the Army 
intelligence agencies was the responsibility of the DINTE. The 
execution and control of expenditures were even demonstrated 
through  extraordinary budget allocations and special payments that 
were made to the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment. The new 
director of the DINTE, Army General Chirinos Chirinos, wanted to 
control this specific area of the DINTE in relation to the Colina 
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Detachment, but was unsuccessful in his attempts, as discussed 
below.  
¶3. Participation of the DINTE in the creation of the Analysis 
Group  
310. Army General Rivero Lazo acknowledged that he became the 
head of the DINTE on January [2nd or 3rd, 1991], and that ten days 
later he received an invitation from the chief of the SIN to coordinate 
intelligence tasks. There is no doubt that immediately after Army 
General Rivero Lazo became the director of the DINTE, an Analysis 
Group was formed at the at the request of the SIN to examine 
documents in the possession of the GEIN [Special Intelligence 
Group] of the DIRCOTE, and that it was controlled by the DINTE as 
well as the SIN, at their respective levels; it is understood that at that 
time the SIN began to control the SINA.  
 [. . .]  
312. Consequently, the DINTE was tied to the Analysis Group 
and, in a way, controlled its work, although the SIN—which had 
already assumed de facto leadership of the SINA—was the one that 
created it and, obviously, exercised complete control over its work. 
¶4. Participation in the events in Barrios Altos  
313.There is sufficient evidence of the involvement of the DINTE 
in the arbitrary executions in Barrios Altos. The statements of Army 
Colonels Pino Benamú and Silva Mendoza are important in this 
respect. 
¶5. Participation in the crimes at La Cantuta  
314. There is no doubt that he [Rivero Lazo] was involved in the 
acts perpetrated at La Cantuta University on July [18th, 1992]; his 
involvement was as Army Intelligence Director.  
On this point, it is important to note the statement of Army 
General Pérez Documet, Commander General of the DIFE, who was 
in charge of the Civic Action Base at La Cantuta. This Army General 
stated that on July [18th, 1992], the Commander General of the 
Army, Army General Hermoza Ríos, called him on the phone and 
ordered him to support Army General Rivero Lazo, Director of the 
DINTE, by providing the assistance of Army Lieutenant Portella 
Núñez. This order was carried out.  He stated that Army Major 
Martin Rivas came to his office at around seven o’clock in the 
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evening, saying that he had come on behalf of Army General Rivero 
Lazo. Rivas explained to him that they needed Army Lieutenant 
Portella Núñez because he had served at the Civic Action Base at La 
Cantuta, and they needed him to identify certain individuals who 
were going to be interrogated. Accordingly, General Pérez Documet 
ordered the Army Lieutenant to provide the support that Army 
General Rivero Lazo needed. He stated that that the next morning he 
was informed that Army Major Martin Rivas had taken students and 
a professor from La Cantuta University, killed them, and buried 
them. He further stated that on July twentieth of the same year, Army 
General Rivero Lazo called him and suggested that he remove Army 
Lieutenant Portella Núñez from Battalion No. 39, where he was 
serving, and to keep him near his office. When he asked Rivero Lazo 
the reason for this suggestion, he answered that it was necessary to 
instruct Army Lieutenant Portella Núñez as to what he would say 
about the events of July [18th, 1992]. He stated that he told Army 
General Rivero Lazo in response that if he wanted to instruct Army 
Lieutenant Portella Núñez, he should request that he be posted to the 
DINTE. He stated that the following day General Hermoza Ríos 
called him into his office and rebuked him for his lack of 
cooperation. Pérez Documet stated that he  told Rivero Lazo that he 
had always cooperated, but that he could not get involved in what 
took place at  La Cantuta. This response undoubtedly annoyed 
General Hermoza Ríos, who for that reason ordered him to leave.  
¶6. Participation in the subsequent acts of concealment  
315. The DINTE intervened in all of the institutional mechanisms 
that were conceived of to deny the events of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta, and to question the public information that pointed in that 
direction. [. . .]  
§5. Special intelligence operations  
Approval and execution by the DINTE and the SIE  
321. The DUFSIDE—updated by the DINTE in November of 
[1994], when Army General Hermoza Ríos was the Commander 
General of the Army, contains all of the rules and provisions issued 
by the DINTE that were in force up to that time. It prescribed that the 
SIE was the only agency authorized to plan and execute special 
intelligence operations, but that its execution necessarily required the 
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approval of the DINTE. The SIE, as the executive body of the 
DINTE, was directly responsible for seeking information for Basic 
Intelligence Training (EBI), and for providing it to the DINTE and to 
the bodies of the SIDE, according to the DINTE’s orders.  
Army Colonel PINO BENAMÚ stated that the SIDE was 
governed by the DUFSIDE, that it was a regulatory document, 
formally and officially in force in the year [1991]. He stated that all 
of the officers who went to work at the SIDE agencies had to read it, 
and that they even would sign a confidentiality agreement, given that 
it was a highly classified (“secret”) document that was under no 
circumstances to be removed from the headquarters to which the 
officer had been assigned [this is indicated in number 4.c of the 
DUFSIDE instructions].  
[. . .]  
Chapter VII: The Colina Special Intelligence Detachment  
§1. Background 
¶2. The Analysis Group  
325. The existence of the Analysis Group has not been denied by 
any of its members, or by the agencies to which they belonged.  
[. . .]  
326. The Analysis Group was formed at the request and under the 
control of the SIN, without detriment to the overriding involvement 
of the DINTE, between January and August of [1991]. The trial 
testimony of Cuba y Escobedo, Jhon Caro, Miyashiro Ayashiro, 
Vidal Herrera, Jiménez Baca, Rivero Lazo, Salazar Monroe, 
Rodríguez Zabalbescoa, Martin Rivas, Pichilingue Guevara, Flores 
Alvan and Pino Benamu confirm the existence and purpose of the 
Analysis Group. 
327. The following points stand out from the above individuals’ 
testimony: 
1. The Analysis Group was made up of members of the SIE, 
the SIN and Naval Intelligence.  
2.  The Analysis Group was established at the request and 
under the control of the SIN, under the responsibility of 
Montesinos Torres, who exercised complete control over its 
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work, without being dissociated from the DINTE. It started 
with the SIE members and their chief, Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa. Defendant Fujimori 
Fujimori was not unaware of the existence of the Analysis 
Group, as was also established in Chapters IV and VI of this 
Part Two. 
3.  The meetings and the agreement to form the Analysis 
Group were coordinated from January of [1991], and its 
presence within the GEIN of the DIRCOTE was imposed by 
the SIN. Its objective was to obtain intelligence information 
on the PCP–SL, as established in Chapter IV of Part Two of 
this judgment. In June of that year, when the Team withdrew 
from the GEIN, the written Manual—in fact the initial 
original text—was turned over to the then-PNP Commander 
Jiménez Baca. The document served as the basis for his 
presentation before the Army High Command, as discussed 
below. 
¶3. The meeting of the Army High Command 
328. The meeting of the military high command at the Peruvian 
Army Headquarters was held in June of [1991]. Those who took part 
in it have not denied that it took place. The date on which it was 
probably held, bearing in mind the first presidential memorandum 
and the date on which the Colina Detachment was formed, was June 
twenty-sixth. Army General Rivero Lazo, Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa and Army Majors Martin Rivas and 
Pichilingue Guevara also confirm this.  
[. . .]  
330. Consequently, Army Captain Martin Rivas’s presentation to 
the Army High Command was not an everyday presentation. Its 
importance has been underscored by then Army Chief of Staff, Army 
General Hermoza Ríos, who at the end of that year was appointed 
Commander General of the Army and at the beginning of [1992] was 
named president of the CCFFAA.  
It is notable that the very dynamics of the meeting of the Army 
High Command rule out the possibility that on that occasion they 
would have simply been made aware, without further detail and 
analysis, of what was happening and of the institutional and 
operational news from the large units. This is true especially if the 
PCP–SL and the MRTA had suffered several setbacks in the fight 
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against subversion, while at the same time they were dispersing their 
activities in a disorderly manner, which required an operational 
response that had to be prepared by the CCFFAA. Army Captain 
Martin Rivas even specified that the order was given to expand the 
initial original text; although it was thought that the analytical focus 
was correct, the military responses were criticized because it was a 
descriptive document. Therefore, the text was completed in 
November of [1991], although clearly parallel to the activities of the 
Colina Detachment.   
Army Captain Pichilingue [Guevara] stated that that signified the 
exchange and verification of information and data.  
[. . .]  
§2. Formation of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment  
334. Memorandum No. 5775–B–4.a/DINTE of August [22nd, 
1991], signed by the Director of the DINTE, Army General Rivero 
Lazo (the document contains handwritten notes, which Army 
Colonel Silva Mendoza identified as his own), can be classified as 
the official document that consolidated the creation of the Colina 
Detachment. This document ordered the SIE Chief to arrange for the 
presence of personnel for August [23re, 1991], at the SIE 
Maintenance Storehouse in Las Palmas. They would be under the 
command of Army Lieutenant Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa. The 
memorandum lists the names of nine operative intelligence officers, 
including Suppo Sánchez, Carbajal García, Arce Janampa, Coral 
Goycochea, Alarcón Gonzales, Caballero Zegarra, Gamarra Mamani, 
Salazar Correa and Benites León [under the heading that corresponds 
Benites León there is an indication of “no” and Yarlequé—who 
ultimately became a member of the Detachment—is indicated]. 
Further, it orders the delivery, for Monday, August [25th, 1991], of 
various items of equipment, weapons and ammunition, including six 
HK P–5 pistols, six HK P–7 pistols, twenty grenades, two desks, two 
mattresses and other items, plus two cameras, three Walkie Talkies, 
sleeping bags, night vision goggles, six pairs of handcuffs and six 
coveralls.  
[. . .]  
339. There were also changes within the Detachment, without 
detriment to its financial support, as is normal in any fully active 
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institution. It should be noted that in the documentation created with 
respect to such matters, in many written communications, there is 
express mention of “Desto Colina.” This means, clearly, that the 
Detachment was a unit, strictly speaking a Special Detachment, 
within the SIDE.  
[. . .]  
341. Another element of the Colina Detachment’s activities was 
the creation of the shell company Consultores y Constructores de 
Proyectos América Sociedad Anónima, or Conpramsa. This 
company was incorporated on November [13th, 1991], and the 
shareholders are listed as Army Captains Martin Rivas and 
Pichilingue Guevara, Army Commander Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa, 
and Army General Rivero Lazo. On September ninth of the 
following year, there was a capital increase and partial amendment of 
the bylaws, in the minutes of which operative intelligence officer 
Juan Pampa Quilla acted as the attorney. The officers involved stated 
that it was a business that belonged to Army Captain Pichilingue 
Guevara and his family, to whom a loan was given, and that their 
appearance as shareholders in the company was a result of the 
nonpayment of the loan. Such statements are, in and of themselves, 
implausible. The four shareholders did not state that they were 
active-duty servicemen; they signed the minutes and the document 
recorded by the notary; they were members of the  DINTE, and they 
were linked to the Colina Detachment and to Plan Cipango. In 
addition, wiretap intelligence officer Flores Alván explained that 
Conpramsa was a front for the Detachment. He stated that he went to 
work there in about November of [1991], that he rendered his service 
at that company, and also that when the events of La Cantuta took 
place he was left operating the company’s equipment (the company 
had communications equipment). He further stated that in June of 
[1992], the company’s business name was changed to Proyectos 
América, which was in operation until [1993], because a scandal 
broke when it became public knowledge that the company belonged 
to the Colina Detachment.  
§3. The mission of the Colina Detachment  
342. Wiretap intelligence officer Flores Alván, who transcribed 
Plan Cipango, stated that it created the Colina Special Intelligence 
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Detachment. It established the mission that the SIE or the DINTE 
was to carry out an orderly, systematic infiltration of intelligence 
officers in the city of Lima, as well as in the towns of Huaral and 
Huacho for purposes of detecting, locating and identifying the 
members of the Central Committee and the National Leadership of 
the PCP–SL and MRTA, respectively, in support of the military and 
intelligence operations of the Second Military Region, the CCFFAA 
and the DINTE. This formal document, which resulted in an entire 
administrative movement involving the deployment of personnel, 
budget allocations, logistics, and a structured level of coordination at 
the command level, placed the DINTE in charge of the Operation, 
and the SIE in charge of providing logistics and administrative 
oversight and control. In the appendix, Army General Rivero Lazo 
was assigned as Chief of the Operation, Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa was named the Control officer, and Army 
Captains Martin Rivas and Pichilingue Guevara were the designated 
Case Officers. This structure is even similar to that set forth in 
Section III of Manual ME 38–20, under “Intelligence Networks,” 
specifically the “Indirect Control Network.” According to this form 
of control, the executive body delegates control and leadership over 
the officers directly to the case officer, and maintains overall control 
of the network. The Manual provides that this shall be the usual 
method for the establishment of the networks, because of the 
advantages of the decentralization of command and the security of 
the network [See No. 30.b. Section III. of ME 38–20, Intelligence 
Networks]. Indeed, in the text, a central agency is considered before 
the executive body—which essentially would be the DINTE or the 
SIN. The documents created as a result of the activities of the Colina 
Detachment, which were provided by the arrepentido wiretap 
intelligence officer Flores Alván, recount that, at least between 
March and August of 1992, briefing notes, reports and official letters 
were issued with express reference to Plan Cipango. These three 
documents support the assertion that Plan Cipango defined the 
activities of the Colina Detachment. The Court has before it not only 
the assertions of specific operative intelligence officers but also 
documents created by the Detachment itself or by reason of its 
activities.  
343. The initial assertion of the operative intelligence officers is 
the same as what is indicated in Plan Cipango. However, some of the 
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members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment maintain 
that only after the killings or arbitrary executions of  Barrios Altos 
did they understand that the Detachment’s mission was to eliminate 
people. This information can be dismissed, given the preparations 
made for the execution of the crime, the fact that they carried 
offensive weapons, and the manner and circumstances in which the 
arbitrary executions in Barrios Altos took place. Furthermore, there 
was no punitive or disciplinary response from the institution as a 
consequence of the events, and many other crimes were carried out 
subsequently that involved forced disappearances and extrajudicial 
executions—to the point that they even carried picks, shovels and 
lime with them in order to bury their victims in secret. This 
corroborates the statements of operative intelligence officers Ortiz 
Mantas, Gamarra Mamani and Coral Goycochea, and even that of 
operative intelligence officer Tena Jacinto. They all knew about the 
Detachment’s basic mission: arbitrary executions, forced 
disappearances and extrajudicial executions, in a common pattern. 
[. . .]  
§4. Internal structure and reporting relationships of the Colina 
Detachment  
[. . .]  
348. [. . .] The Colina Detachment had to report its activities to the 
SIN, specifically to Montesinos Torres, as soon as it conducted any 
OEIs. There are express references by members of Colina 
Detachment to Montesinos Torres’s involvement or leadership. The 
statements of PNP Colonel Jiménez Baca and PNP General Vidal 
Herrera corroborate this, as they maintain that all activities pertaining 
to the control of subversion had to be reported personally to 
Montesinos Torres.  
§6. Meetings of the Colina Detachment and the rewarding of its 
members  
350. The Colina Detachment held one of its most important 
meetings on June 27, 1992, at the invitation of the Commander 
General of the Army himself, Army General Hermoza Ríos. That 
meeting signified for most of its members an incentive for the work 
they had been performing; by that time they had already carried out 
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approximately six special intelligence operations. They felt that they 
had the backing of the most senior military chief and head of the 
countersubversive operations, as he was president of the CCFFAA 
and chief of the COFI. Flores Alvan, Lecca Esquen, Hinojosa Sopla 
and Hermoza Ríos testified about this meeting.94   
[. . .]  
§7. Internal operations in the development of OEIs (sections 352 to 
355 of the Court’s holding)  
353. The activities of the Colina Detachment, consequently, were 
decided at levels much higher than the Detachment itself, especially 
in the cases of OEIs that resulted in the deaths of individuals. The 
positions and individuals cited in their planning and preparation go 
beyond even military intelligence itself, and reside at levels that are 
clearly higher. Not only was it a matter of defining the target of the 
attack and carrying out the actions necessary for their realization—
with all of the attendant internal organization, prior planning, 
effective training, readiness for attack, and discipline and order in its 
execution—but also of reporting and submitting to oversight and 
subsequent evaluations. A mission accomplished is not reported in 
order for the superior simply to be informed; rather, it is for a set of 
activities that go beyond the mere control of the specific actions 
taken.  
354. The special intelligence operations carried out by the Colina 
Detachment consisting of arbitrary and extrajudicial executions and 
forced disappearances (known to date) were the following: 
1. At the tenement house in Barrios Altos, on November 3, 
1991.  
2. In the district of Pativilca, in the towns of Caraqueño and 
San José, on January 28, 1992.  
3. In the district of El Santa in Chimbote, in the urban 
settlements of “La Huaca,” “Javier Heraud” and “San 
Carlos,” on May 2, 1992. 
 
 94. See this same section of the Court’s holding, which has been omitted from 
this summary, for the content of these individuals’ statements (Publisher’s note). 
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4. In the city of Huacho, against journalist Pedro Herminio 
Sauri Bustamante, on June 24, 1992.  
5. In the same district of Huacho, against the Ventocilla 
family, on June 24, 1992.  
6. In Chorrillos, in Metropolitan Lima, in the urban 
settlement of “Pescadores,” against Fortunato Gómez 
Palomino, in May or June of 1992.  
7. At La Cantuta University, on July 17, 1992.  
8. In Ate–Vitarte, in the vicinity of the Carretera Central 
[Main Highway], on an unspecified date in 1992.  
355. The following individuals were the targets of special 
intelligence operations consisting of surveillance and tracking:  
1. Members of the Asociación de Abogados Democráticos 
[Association of Democratic Attorneys], including attorneys 
Crespo, Cartagena and Huatay.  
2. The chief of the Annihilation Command of the PCP–SL in 
Metropolitan Lima and other alleged members of that 
terrorist organization, including Comrade Joel and Angélica 
Salas de la Cruz.  
3. Left-wing political leaders Yehude Simon Munaro and 
Javier Diez Canseco. 
4. Army General Robles Espinosa (tracking with a view to 
detention). Operative intelligence officer Mesmer Carles 
Talledo, accused of being a PCP–SL infiltrator within the 
SIDE, was also arrested and interrogated. Surveillance was 
also conducted in volatile areas with a strong presence of 
terrorist individuals, such as the urban settlements of 
Huaycán and Raucana in Metropolitan Lima. Operations 
were conducted to seize explosive material in the possession 
of terrorists (one unsuccessful case occurred on July 26, 1992 
in Matucana); and there was an intervention in 
Chanchamayo.  
The acts described above will be discussed later in greater detail in 
the Chapter on other crimes of the Colina Detachment.  
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Chapter VIII: Special Intelligence Operations 
§1. Scope of the concept of Special Intelligence Operation. 
356. Special Intelligence Operations [hereinafter OEI] were, as 
explained at the trial by Army Colonel Silva Mendoza (SIE chief in 
1991), “special and secret operations to meet specific, important 
intelligence and counterintelligence objectives for purposes of 
obtaining information and/or causing harm to the adversary.” He 
added, from the perspective of his military experience, and invoking 
subsection (g) of Article 4 of ME 38–20, Special Intelligence 
Operations Manual, that the phrase “cause harm” means to strike, 
take down, and eliminate—that is, kill. He further stated that 
document analysis cannot be called OEI, which was noted in regard 
to the congratulations that former president Alberto Fujimori 
Fujimori bestowed upon the group of officers that included Martín 
Rivas, Pichilingue Guevara and Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa.  
For his part, Army Colonel Pino Benamú,95 Assistant Director of 
the Internal Front of the DINTE in 1991, stated—without getting into 
security details—that special intelligence operations were performed 
by a multi-purpose group with officers with special qualifications 
(wiretapping, physical penetration) who could engage in espionage 
and terrorism, and whose mission was to obtain information or cause 
harm to the adversary. 
357. The operative intelligence officers, tried for the same acts that 
defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori is accused of, admitted 
conclusively in their trial testimony in this case that they belonged to 
the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment. They further 
acknowledged that it was a group designed to conduct OEIs resulting 
in death, which were called for and directed by Army Major Martín 
Rivas. [. . .] (The Court has received various statements—at least 13 
statements—that support this assertion.)  
358. The similarity in the planning and execution of the OEIs 
described by the operative intelligence officers who were members 
of the Colina Detachment is not by chance. Such description, in 
general terms, fits and is consistent with procedures regulated 
precisely in Manuals—Army doctrines that set forth, in theory, the 
 
 95. Statement of Army Colonel Pino Benamú at the thirty-fifth session. 
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form, structure and conduct of the OEIs—and in Directives with 
nuances tailored to their needs. 
The following are the four official texts relevant to the case:  
1. Special Intelligence Operations and Counterintelligence 
Manual me 38–20 [. . .].  
2.  Basic Teams Manual me 38–23666, in Military 
Intelligence of the Peruvian Army [. . .].  
3.  Manual me 41–7, Unconventional Countersubversive War 
[. . .].  
4.  Sole Operational Directive of the Army Intelligence 
System (hereinafter DUFSIDE) [. . .].  
359. The senior Army officials who have testified confirmed that 
the previously cited Manuals and the Directive did in fact govern and 
were used by the different bodies within the institution [. . .]. ( the 
Court considered the statements of: Army General Robles Espinoza, 
Army General Ramal Pesantes, and Army Colonel Pino Benamú). 
360. It follows from the above that, indeed, an organization was 
devised clearly for purposes of conducting special intelligence 
operations. Its management, planning and operation—including that 
of the Intelligence Team itself—undoubtedly was governed by the 
Manuals and the DUFSIDE, inevitable in the military culture. it must 
be stressed that this structure, or rather, organizational system with 
respect to the OEIs was based on Manuals (which are instruments 
that set forth the doctrine that specifically summarizes and 
consolidates an institutional practice, explains its operation and 
rationalizes or orders or defines the conduct of its members) and 
Directives (which in the case of the Colina Detachment were used to 
form the group and, to a certain degree, to govern its activities and 
internal logic). The participation of the DINTE and of the SIN is 
evident [. . .].  
§2. The Colina Detachment and the Execution of OEIs.  
[. . .]  
363. The OEIs of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta were developed 
based on a plan that had the assistance of higher levels of authority.  
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A. OEI in Barrios Altos:  
1.  This operation was likewise led by then-Army Captain 
Martin Rivas—backed by Captain Pichiligüe Guevara—and 
executed by the Colina Detachment. Their immediate 
superior, after Army Colonel Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa, was 
Army General Rivero Lazo, Director of the DINTE in 1991.  
2.  The next highest level, above Army General Rivero Lazo, 
was the SIN, specifically its de facto Chief Montesinos 
Torres. The following evidence (testimonial and 
documentary)—essentially consistent in their accusations and 
results, and therefore plausible—provide an account of the 
above: [. . .] (The Court considered the statement of operative 
intelligence officer Sosa Saavedra; an unnumbered, unsigned 
and undated Intelligence Note turned over by Maximo San 
Román; a report entitled Sociedad para el crimen 
[Partnership in Crime]; and statements from wiretap 
intelligence officer Flores Alván, operative intelligence 
officer Chuqui Aguirre, and journalist Hume Hurtado). 
B. OEI at La Cantuta University:  
1.  This operation was led by Army Major Martín Rivas, 
backed by Army Captain Pichilingüe Guevara. The next 
highest level of authority above Army Colonel Navarro Pérez 
was Army General Rivero Lazo, Director of the DINTE.  
2.  Army General Rivero Lazo’s immediate superior was 
Army General Hermoza Ríos, as Commander General of the 
Army in 1992, who ordered that things be facilitated for the 
Colina Detachment so they could take action against the nine 
students and one professor from La Cantuta University. This 
intervention, which will be explained in detail later, has been 
substantiated by the following DIFE members who, in one 
way or another, acted in compliance with the order: Pérez 
Documet, Miranda Balarezo, Córdova Rodríguez, Berteti 
Carazas, Velarde Astete and Aquilino Portella [. . .].  
3.  The other authority that took part in the planning of this 
OEI, according to the Manuals and testimony, was the SIN, 
principally Montesinos Torres [. . .]. (The Court considered 
the statements of journalist Jara Flores, journalist Cruz 
Vílchez, defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, and Army 
General Hermoza Ríos). 
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4.  It can be further inferred, as will be addressed in greater 
detail in the corresponding Chapter, that although defendant 
Fujimori Fujimori did not say anything in particular about the 
OEIs, and specifically denied his involvement in this OEI, it 
was clear that he was aware of everything that happened, and 
of the very management of this operation. This is particularly 
so, bearing in mind that as President of the Republic, 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he was the highest 
ranking official of the National Defense System and the 
person to whom the SIN, which was immediately accountable 
to him, reported its activities directly, and that he had even 
given Montesinos Torres sufficient power to control that 
institution and the entire SINA; this is all the more true if, 
once the first indications of the crime came to light publicly 
and consistently, he headed an extraordinary effort to cover it 
up and to persecute those who denounced it.  
364. A particularly important piece of information related to the 
execution of this OEI and the participation of the President of the 
Republic concerns the memorandum (at page five hundred and 
eighty-one) of July 30, 1991, sent to the Minister of Defense. This 
document states: “[. . .] said members of the Armed Forces have 
taken part in successful special intelligence operations that have 
enabled significant advances in the fight against subversion” [. . .].  
Reference is made to work that was done on documentary 
information obtained in GEIN operations against Shining Path 
leaders. They prepared a report based on that information, and the 
results were presented by Army Captain Martin Rivas at Army 
Headquarters. It is notable, however, given the regulatory definitions 
pertinent to the OEIs and the statements made by Army Colonel 
Silva Mendoza (SIE Chief in [1991]), that a document analysis 
project cannot be considered a special intelligence operation. As 
such, it must be inferred that the work performed may have had to do 
with other acts. [. . .]  
365. FUNDING OF THE OEIs  
1. Vladimiro Montesinos Torres admitted his criminal 
responsibility for the offense of illegal assumption of 
authority. He stated that he engaged in such conduct by order 
of the President of the Republic Alberto Fujimori, and with 
the knowledge of the presidents of the Council of Ministers 
and the SIN chief. He also acknowledged that he handled 
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funds from the budget item “reserve one and two” as well as 
of other allocations made to the SIN, although he denied that 
this management of funds took place since 1991.96 Army 
General Salazar Monroe was the one who had indicated that 
such was the case from the time he became head of the SIN 
in [1991].  
2.  Army General Salazar Monroe, chief of the SIN, stated 
that Montesinos Torres managed certain budget items called 
“Reserve one” and “Reserve two,” that they were turned over 
to him by order of the President of the Republic, and that it 
was Montesinos Torres who was directly accountable to the 
president. In addition, he inferred that the Colina Detachment 
would receive extra acknowledgements and bonuses; he has 
no doubt about this because he has now seen Montesinos 
Torres’s payment of different public figures recorded on 
video. He further added that it was common knowledge that 
the SIN would give money to the newspapers, and that the 
money was distributed by Montesinos Torres.97  
3.  Army Colonel Pino Benamú stated that he had knowledge 
that the SIN used to finance intelligence operations; that 
Montesinos Torres managed the SIN’s budget; that he did not 
know the details, but that Montesinos Torres would have the 
funds available and have them sent to the intelligence offices 
of the institutions; that General Rivero Lazo told him at the 
beginning of his tenure at the DINTE that they were going to 
have a good year of work because they were going to receive 
resources from the SIN.  
4.  Operative intelligence officer Chuqui Aguirre mentioned 
that Montesinos Torres took part in the evaluation of the 
Colina Detachment’s objectives [. . .].  
5.  Operative intelligence officer Marco Flores Alván 
indicated that Montesinos Torres had a lot of power within 
the Army and told them at that time that the doors were open 
to them for anything they might need.   
 
 96. Pretrial statement of Montesinos Torres, at 46, 644, Case No. 14–2001 
(Peru). 
 97. Pretrial statement of Army General Salazar Monroe, at 30, 675, Fifth 
Special Criminal Court of Lima (Peru). 
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6.  Declassified document No. 1990LIMA12513 (at page 
6,298)  recounts a report sent from the Embassy of the United 
States in Lima to the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington. 
The report indicated that a former Navy intelligence officer 
had informed the Embassy that the plan (an anti-subversive 
plan composed of two phases; the first of which was public 
and emphasized human rights, while the second phase was 
confidential and would include special army operations 
trained in extrajudicial killings) was supported by presidential 
advisor Montesinos Torres, although it was also mentioned 
that Montesinos Torres was losing support because of the 
denunciations against him.  
366. It is clear that the execution of a series of OEIs over a long 
period of time and based on a Plan of Operations with a broad 
scope—the only way to explain the validity, operation, and activity 
level of the Colina Detachment—had to have been financed with 
extraordinary funds. The receipts and account statements that have 
been admitted into the court record demonstrate at least part of the 
scale of the Colina Detachment’s activities. The statements in their 
entirety point to funding from the SIN channeled to the DINTE itself. 
There are numerous witness statements that coincide in this respect, 
in which Montesinos Torres is always present in a leadership role. 
On this basis, and according to the accounts that had to be settled, is 
clear that the President of the Republic had at least a general 
knowledge of the events. This assertion is strengthened by the 
special and intense connection and reporting relationship of 
Montesinos Torres to defendant Fujimori Fujimori.  
Chapter IX: Barrios Altos attack 
§1. Proof of the charge. 
367. On November 3, 1991, at about two o’clock in the afternoon, 
a neighborhood chicken barbeque was held at the tenement house at 
No. eight hundred and forty (840) Jirón Huanta, Barrios Altos – in 
the city center of Lima, in order to raise money to repair the 
property’s water and drainage system. The barbeque was organized 
by local residents, in particular by Filomeno León León and Manuel 
Ríos Pérez. The leaders of the Colina Special Intelligence 
Detachment [of the SIE–DINTE] became aware of this activity days 
earlier through operative intelligence officer Douglas Hiver Arteaga 
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Pascual, also known as Abadía [PCP–SL infiltrator]. They 
considered it to be a mode of operation of the Shining Path, to pass 
on information to its leaders and top officials, as well as to raise 
funds for the organization. As such, with the knowledge, approval, or 
acquiescence of the highest ranking members of the Army, the SINA 
and defendant Fujimori Fujimori, they decided to make a surprise 
raid on that tenement house and kill those who might be involved 
with the terrorist organization, which was very active in Lima. (As a 
result of the armed attack, nine people were killed and four were 
seriously wounded) [. . .].  
[. . .]  
§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.  
[. . .]  
441. Furthermore, it is indisputable that it was a “crime of state.”98  
The actual perpetrators were military intelligence officers who 
belonged to a  special intelligence detachment, and this was even 
inferred from the beginning of the police investigation, in both the 
psychological report and in the report signed by PNP General Jhon 
Caro (Report No. 095–DIRCOTE). In terms of their administrative 
placement, they were tied to the Peruvian Army and to the DINTE, 
as well as to the SIN, on a more extensive, functional level—as is 
deduced, in essential terms, from the anonymous Intelligence Note 
that Vice President San Román Cáceres received regarding the 
existence of the Colina Detachment, the commission of the Barrios 
Altos crime, the incorporation of the Detachment into the SINA and 
the involvement of Montesinos Torres as the most important figure 
in the operational model of the Intelligence System at that time. The 
perpetrators, over and above operational command, under the 
responsibility of Army Captain Martin Rivas at the scene of the 
crime, obeyed superior orders that were clearly and  reprehensibly 
illegal, and therefore excluded from any justification or exoneration. 
They proceeded according to a typical and planned military 
operation of elimination of alleged subversives—so clear, in fact, 
that plans were even developed for some officers to provide false 
information at the scene of the crime, which explains the initial and 
 
 98. Trial statement of expert witness José Antonio Martín Pallín in the ninety-
fourth session (Peru). 
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confusing news information that was disseminated immediately 
following the events [a demonstration of this method is seen in the 
news article in La República on November 5,1991]. These were tasks 
for which they had been assembled, and with that goal they prepared 
or trained at La Tiza, a military facility, not part of the SIDE 
structure, for which there must have been express permission from 
the highest levels of the military institution. They departed from La 
Tiza to carry out the crime and returned there after having 
accomplished the assigned “mission.” 
442. The manner and circumstances of the commission of the 
crime have been demonstrated with the abundant prosecution 
evidence discussed: the prior information obtained through an 
infiltrated officer about the place and the people who would be there; 
the indispensable surveillance conducted in advance and in the 
moments prior to the attack; the use of government vehicles with 
tinted windows and emergency lights for the execution of the 
mission; the studied and decisive attitude exhibited [for which they 
trained once the target was established]; and the presence of a 
military troop transport vehicle right in Plaza Italia, which enabled 
them to surprise the police officers guarding the DIRIN police 
facilities and the San Andrés police station and to gain access to the 
scene of the crime without impediment. This evidence paints a 
picture of the characteristics of the attack and its military logic. The 
order to attack, or “green light,” was given when the operation was 
devised, and again shortly prior to the attack; that order came—as it 
only could—from senior levels, to the SIN itself. The multiple 
references to Montesinos Torres are relevant in this respect. There 
was still an administrative structure designed for that purpose, the 
central focus of which was the very establishment and  operation, 
within the SIDE, of the Colina Detachment, tied fundamentally to the 
SIN. The members of the Detachment remained at the Army 
facilities because of their status as active duty servicemen. They had 
their headquarters and carried out their military training at the SIE 
storehouse and at La Tiza Beach, respectively. These facts are so 
well known that it is reasonable to think [as indicated in the article 
Sociedad para el Crimen and by Vera Navarrete, among others, in 
his supplemental statement of September 27, 2001, as well as by 
Flores Alván, at the fifteenth session of the trial proceedings, and 
Chuqui Aguirre in the testimony he provided at the one hundred and 
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twenty-fifth session of the parallel case, Case No. 28–2001], in spite 
of the specific tendency toward secrecy in intelligence activities, that 
the existence of the Detachment itself and the suspicion surrounding 
its activities were not unknown to the members of the military 
institution. Indeed, as evidenced in the documentation seized by 
court order, and that produced by cooperating witness Flores Alván, 
specific administrative procedures typical of the Army were followed 
for the extra payments that they would receive, the transfers, the 
equipment, and other allocations or acquisitions.  
443. It is true that the members of Special intelligence Detachment 
“Colina” have denied the charges since 1993. It is stated on the 
record that the first statement from a member of the Colina 
Detachment, Nelson Rogelio Carbajal García, provided in his pretrial 
statement in the case before the military criminal court for the 
Barrios Altos Case [page 2,523], was produced on April third of that 
year. However, beginning in 2001, and in the years following, many 
of them retracted and admitted the existence of the Colina Special 
Intelligence Detachment and their assignment to it.  
[. . .]  
During the trial, of the eighteen witnesses accused of being 
members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment, the 
following testified and admitted said criminal affiliation: Flores 
Albán (fifteenth session), Alarcón Gonzáles (sixteenth session), Tena 
Jacinto (sixteenth session), Suppo Sánchez (seventeenth session), 
Chuqui Aguirre (eighteenth session), Sauñe Pomaya (nineteenth 
session), Lecca Esquen (twenty-first session), Paquiyauri Huaytalla 
(twenty-first session), Hinojosa Sopla (twenty-second session), Ortiz 
Mantas (twenty-second session), Atuncar Cama (twenty-third 
session), Gamarra Mamani (twenty-fourth session), Coral Goycochea 
(twenty-fifth session), and Sosa Saavedra (eighty-fifth session). The 
following individuals denied the charges: Pino Díaz (twenty-fifth 
session), Vera Navarrete (twenty-fourth session, in spite of the fact 
that on September 27, 2001, he admitted that he had been assigned to 
the Colina Detachment; then, after that date, he again retracted his 
statement as of April 24, 2002, in his pretrial statement before the 
ordinary court (at page [30,874]), Pichilingue Guevara (twenty-
eighth session) and Martin Rivas (twenty-ninth and thirtieth 
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sessions). Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa refused to testify at this trial and 
also denied the charges in other venues.  
444. The retractions in question, which recount the existence of 
the special intelligence detachment and its members and the Barrios 
Altos operation, are more coherent and are consistent with the 
evidentiary results. Added to this is the content, discussed and 
assessed in the corresponding Chapter, of the documentation found 
by the Criminal Court Judge at the Peruvian Army Headquarters, 
which is conclusive on the matter. The information that the members 
of the Colina Detachment have introduced by way of retraction (in 
addition to the incriminating testimony of Sosa Saavedra, the last 
member of the Detachment to be captured by the police) regarding 
their material assistance in the acts is consistent with the statements 
of the victims and eyewitnesses, as well as with the news reports and 
journalistic investigations. The denials of Martin Rivas, Pichilingue 
Guevara and Rodríguez Zabalbeascoa have been weakened by the 
totality of the prosecution evidence previously set forth. There is 
relevant incriminating circumstantial evidence that proves their 
material assistance, not only in terms of the general justification 
(supposedly ideologically based on the concept of “low-intensity 
warfare”) of such atrocities offered by Martin Rivas and included in 
the book Ojo por Ojo [An Eye for an Eye], but also the 
acknowledgement he made before journalist Gilberto Hume Hurtado, 
and the results of the investigations of journalist Uceda Pérez, set 
forth in his book Muerte en el Pentagonito, and journalist Cruz 
Vilchez in the article Sociedad para el Crimen.  
445. There is no reasonable cause that would explain false self-
incrimination on the part of the members of the Colina Special 
Intelligence Detachment, let alone cooperation judgments that are 
effective or satisfied without reasonable incriminating bases—there 
being no material grounds whatsoever to weaken their potential—
especially if their statement not only involves third parties, but also 
harms them personally. Experience tells us that no one incriminates 
himself falsely, in spite of a conscious certainty of being able to 
withstand a conviction, unless there is a higher motive, ethically 
more valuable, that explains it. That has not been proven in this case. 
Likewise, it is unreasonable to think that out of mere hatred or some 
other contemptible motive, with the exclusive purpose of involving 
third parties, a person would be willing to undergo a term of 
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imprisonment for extremely serious crimes. Naturally, the 
“positivized” legal rule provides—on the practical basis of what is 
called “insufficiently reliable evidence”—that if third parties are 
involved, objective information and specific evidence to corroborate 
the co-accusation are essential. In this case, there is no doubt that the 
intelligence officers who admitted to the facts did so in light of the 
numerous pieces of evidence that, in one way or another, 
incriminated them with a solid degree of probability. The 
investigations, pushed forward steadily after the fall of defendant 
Fujimori Fujimori’s regime, began solidly to approach the full 
discovery of what the Colina Detachment had done and the orders it 
had carried out. The degree of involvement of the different military, 
intelligence and other government authorities was so deep and 
serious that, as the Court understands it, it caused those at the lowest 
level of the criminal culture established at the SINA to break the 
silence—a crucial step in uncovering organized structures and 
learning of their criminal mindset. They decided to reveal what had 
happened and, in so doing, obtain benefits in exchange for 
cooperation.  
446. In conclusion, the Barrios Altos massacre was carried out by 
the members of the Colina Special Intelligence Detachment. It was 
its first mission involving the physical elimination of people. Based 
on this objective piece of information, which has been proven 
conclusively, it is evident that the Detachment carried out this 
operation (so understood by the military intelligence sectors) 
following military guidelines and obeying higher orders, which, due 
to its very nature and the level of those who made it, had to be part of 
a larger plan. It is not too much to assert, as Martin Rivas noted in 
his statement to journalist Humberto Jara, that this order took shape 
pursuant to the emergence of the Colina Detachment, as the 
beginning of a type or mode of response to the urban actions of the 
PCP–SL and of a criminal policy to eliminate evading the legal 
route, all those persons whom the intelligence services understood to 
have organizational ties to the terrorist movements. The operations 
that would later take place—La Cantuta and others to which the 
members of the Colina Detachment have confessed—only confirm 
this institutional practice, so absolutely contrary to the requirements 
of the Rule of Law; it is further confirmed by the acts of concealment 
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that took place once the circumstantial evidence of such operations 
and of the involvement of the Colina Detachment began to mount.99 
Chapter X: Attack at the National University of Education “La 
Cantuta”  
§1. Proof of the charge.  
[. . .]  
449. On Thursday, July 16, 1992, at around nine fifteen at night, 
members of the PCP–SL blew up two vehicles loaded with some five 
hundred  kilos of ANFO on Tarata Street in the Miraflores district. 
This terrorist attack killed twenty-two people, injured more than a 
hundred, rendered some two hundred residences uninhabitable, 
destroyed several buildings and, obviously, caused serious alarm 
among the public. 
[. . .]  
450. As a consequence of the terrorist attack on Tarata, it was 
decided at the highest levels of power to conduct an immediate 
response action that would be the responsibility of the Colina Special 
Intelligence Detachment. That is how Army Major Martín Rivas 
designed and executed the respective plan of operations. The same 
day on which the operation began, July 17, 1992, operative 
intelligence officer Hinojosa Sopla was ordered to conduct a 
reconnaissance of the University and take photographs of the place. 
He was detected, intercepted, and beaten by some students, although 
he was protected immediately by infiltrated operative intelligence 
officer Tena Jacinto, who was able to free him without further 
trouble.100  
[. . .]  
 
 99. In arriving at these conclusions, the Court found it relevant to take into 
consideration the following: § 2. Evidentiary information, supra ¶¶ 368-81, from 
the various statements of victims, as well as of eyewitnesses, hearsay witnesses, 
police officers, generals, and the members of the Colina Detachment themselves. It 
likewise took into account § 3. Individual assessment of the evidence, supra ¶¶ 
382-439, such as expert witness evidence, documentary evidence, effective 
cooperation judgments, journalistic reports, the books, the video and audio 
evidence and the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 100. That decision resulted in the incursion into La Cantuta University, in which 
nine students and a professor were victims. (Publisher’s note). 
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§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced. 
[. . .]  
531. What stands out about these facts is the level of involvement, 
in order to facilitate and realize the crime, of several Army units or 
organizations, without whose participation the murders in question 
would not have been able to be perpetrated. Particularly relevant in 
enabling the incursion into La Cantuta University was the assistance 
of the commander general of the DIFE, the prior order of the 
commander general of the Army, and the active participation of the 
director of the DINTE and his immediate subordinate, the deputy 
director of the Internal Front. This involvement was even manifested 
in the events that took place in the immediate aftermath, with the 
transfer of two lieutenants from the DIFE, who happened to play an 
important role in the unfolding of the criminal events:  Portella 
Núñez and Velarde Astete. The former was sent to the DINTE—
something unusual for a young officer untrained in intelligence 
matters—and the latter was transferred to Paratrooper Infantry 
Battalion 39, away from the leadership of the Civic Action Base at 
La Cantuta.  
[. . .]  
532. [. . .] The foregoing, consequently, reveals not only the level 
of institutional influence of the Colina Special Intelligence 
Detachment—which undoubtedly went beyond the  SIDE—but also 
the personal and material involvement of the senior Army 
commanders and, likewise, of the SIN, which, given the logic of the 
real operation of the system and its decision-making authority in 
matters concerning the fight against terrorist subversion, was not 
unconnected to the events.  
[. . .]  
533. One piece of information that must be determined is whether 
the order received by the operational chief of the Colina Detachment, 
Army Major Martin Rivas, was to kill or simply to detain the victims 
of La Cantuta.  
[. . .]  
Consequently, bearing in mind the string of serial crimes 
perpetrated by the members of the Colina Detachment, the training 
and preparation inherent in their logic of military intervention of 
2010] JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI 773 
intelligence targets, the extent of the operation in question (it 
involved the mobilization of several sections of the Army), the 
subsequent concealment maneuvers (which came from the highest 
levels of the Army and, later, as will be seen in another Chapter of 
this judgment, from the SIN and the regime as a whole), the absence 
of immediate reprisals against Army Major Martin Rivas, the 
continuation of the Detachment’s operations, and the assertions of 
several officers that rule out any possibility to the contrary, it is clear 
that the order, from the outset, was to kill the victims of La Cantuta.  
534. With respect to the authority that ordered or approved the La 
Cantuta operation, regardless of what will be set forth in the 
corresponding Chapter on defendant Fujimori Fujimori, (according 
to the statements of the  members of the Colina Detachment) [. . .] [:] 
535. There is no doubt of the involvement of the highest levels of 
authority at the DINTE and the Peruvian Army Headquarters—but 
not only of the Army, there is also no doubt of the involvement of 
the SIN, as the highest body and authority within the SINA. Army 
General Hermoza Ríos himself affirmed before the Court that he 
found out about the events the day after they happened, from 
Montesinos Torres, who informed him that members of the SIE had 
conducted a special operation at La Cantuta and that the orders 
received had been exceeded; he had already informed the President 
of the Republic of this fact, which was confirmed by the director of 
the DINTE, Army General Rivero Lazo, and he allowed him to 
report it to the Minister of Defense, Army General Malca Villanueva.  
[. . .]  
Consistent with these conclusions, what Army Major Martin Rivas 
stated to journalist Humberto Jara Flores is significant. He noted on 
that occasion that an action of the magnitude of the La Cantuta 
operation, according to the logic of response that entailed devising an 
attack as brutal and damaging as the Tarata attack, could not have 
been authorized but by the highest authorities of the State (including 
Hermoza Ríos, Montesinos Torres and Fujimori Fujimori). This 
account, aside from his denial at trial, is consistent with the facts and 
the evidence in the case. That is to say, i) the Colina Special 
Intelligence Detachment operated based on a specific plan and with 
organizational guidelines and control from the highest levels of the 
Army and the intelligence agencies; ii) the operations it carried out 
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did not take place in isolation or due to the harsh words of an Army 
captain or major, but rather corresponded to a military and political 
objective of greater significance; iii) the most relevant mission of the 
Colina Detachment was the physical elimination of alleged 
subversives—all of it actions revolved around this objective—in 
terms of both the need to destroy the leadership elements (or those 
that played a strategically important role in the subversive 
organization at a given time) and the demand for a precise response 
to terrorist actions in which they could have been involved, or the 
hierarchical position or functional level that the alleged subversive 
might hold. This mission thus sought the destruction of terrorist 
leaders and top officials, thereby allowing the terrorist organization 
to expand and cause harm. Such objectives, obviously, could not 
have been met without an organization within the State that was 
subject to and compliant with orders from specific high-up 
government positions—civilian and military—and which, when the 
time came, defined the guidelines for protecting or covering for their 
most important members. This explains, in the end, everything that 
was done to prevent the establishment of the facts. It explains the 
fact that only following international condemnation and the fall of 
the political regime in question was it possible to conduct broad-
ranging investigations and prosecutions.101  
Chapter XI: Kidnapping of Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen  
[. . .] 
§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.  
555. Aside from the fact that the immobilization of an individual 
in a domicile, or a closed space, strictly speaking, is already an 
illegal deprivation of liberty and a kidnapping [. . .], common 
 
 101. In arriving at these assertions, the Court took into account the following: § 
2. Evidentiary Information, supra ¶¶ 457-76 such as the journalistic documents, 
documents submitted by former SIN advisor Rafael Merino Bartet, declassified 
documents from the U.S. State Department, audio documents, court decisions and 
reports of the TRC, judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
the reports of Amnesty International. The documentary evidence also includes the 
books. The testimonial evidence included the testimony of witnesses linked 
directly or indirectly to the events, servicemen, civilians, statements from members 
of the Colina Detachment, journalists, and others. 
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experience indicates that the kind of illegal deprivation of liberty that 
numerous individuals were subjected to [. . .] in the basement of a 
military intelligence agency [. . .], first of all, was not carried out 
based on the unilateral decision of a subordinate of the President of 
the Republic, outside the sphere of his knowledge and decision; and 
second, had to have formed part of a previously designed plan, in 
which there must have been i) an analysis of the advisability and 
usefulness of doing it; ii) the identification of the affected persons 
according to their activity and degree of “dangerousness” to the 
objectives of violating the constitutional order; iii) the definition of 
the intervention teams; iv) the coordination and specification of the 
detention centers or places; v) the establishment of a reasonable time 
for the victims to remain under such conditions of deprivation of 
liberty, and so on.  
556. The coup d’état, obviously, was not a sudden decision caused 
by an initial move by Congress to review Legislative Decrees issued 
on matters of intelligence, the Armed Forces and National Security 
or Pacification. It was a carefully thought-out measure, which 
entailed an authoritarian concept of the exercise of government 
power. It involved the Armed Forces and the SINA, directly under 
[Fujimori’s] command as President of the Republic, and was carried 
out after an entire process of reorganizing the military and 
intelligence structures. At the same time it  entailed taking absolute 
control of all State authority without the participation of the 
opposition and of persons who did not share the president’s political 
ideas. In this context of the alteration of the entire political system it 
is clear, in view of his position at the apex of the State structure, that 
he not only entrusted the operational design of the corresponding 
intervention measures to those who, by reason of their duties, were 
located within the state apparatus and had professional knowledge 
and control over the intelligence bodies and means of military 
repression, and were followers of his political strategy and ideology; 
he also, undoubtedly, had to approve of them, since a measure of 
such magnitude and relevance could not remain entirely in the hands 
of his subordinates. This hierarchical structure of the state 
apparatus—or a sector of it, specifically—of which the defendant 
availed himself establishes, as a consequence of the events, the fact 
that he knew about and authorized, at least broadly speaking, all of 
the measures carried out, including those restrictive of individual 
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freedom. He exercised organizational control—especially of the 
Armed Forces, the SIN and the PNP—by virtue of his position as 
President of the Republic, which included being Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces, and placing individuals who served his 
authoritarian agenda in key positions within the military and 
intelligence system. He thus controlled the Armed Forces and the 
SINA particularly intensely, which enabled the disruption of 
democratic order and the resulting enforcement of the measures that 
deprived the liberty of those he understood to be his opponents or 
who, at the time the new regime was installed, might hinder or 
seriously upset his plans. It is reasonable to understand that the coup 
d’état would not otherwise have been able to unfold and later be 
affirmed. It is important to stress that the deprivations of liberty of 
several individuals at the time of the coup d’état were not lifted once 
the press reported them [. . .]; rather, those persons remained 
detained for several more days. Furthermore, no investigation was 
conducted into these acts, which were carried out allegedly 
unbeknownst to, and against, the will of the head of state, let alone 
was anyone ever punished for planning and giving the order to 
kidnap and hold the victims incommunicado. That explains, 
reasonably, that the measures in question were not unusual or outside 
the design of the coup. The events that took place prior to the 
execution of the plan of operations for the coup, when all of the 
intervention measures were taken against individuals and 
government institutions, and in the period immediately afterwards 
[. . .], reveal clearly that there could have been no ignorance of the 
detentions[.]  [I]ndeed, the events reveal that they took place 
precisely because they were included as a necessary part of the plans 
to attack the constitutional system.  
[. . .]  
Chapter XII: Kidnapping of Samuel Edward Dyer Ampudia  
[. . .]  
§4. Comprehensive assessment of the evidence produced.  
568. [. . .] The use of agencies that did not have the power to make 
arrests—which is the case of the intelligence bodies or secret 
services of the State—and the clear abuse of power that it signified, 
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points to the existence of an unlawful institutional mechanism guided 
by provisions other than the ones that corresponded to it legally. 
[. . .]  
571. The intervention of the State intelligence bodies [. . .]; the 
failure to conduct a disciplinary investigation, in light of a model of 
official conduct, of the exercise of power that was so clearly harmful 
to the internal institutional system governing the SINA and the Army 
[. . .]; the fact that government authorities through other agencies, in 
this case the National Tax Authority [SUNAT], would pursue a 
criminal prosecution against the victim [. . .]; the seriousness of the 
events; the persistence of the harm done to the victim; and the 
obvious persecution—unreasonable by any reckoning—against an 
individual, could not go unnoticed at the highest levels of national 
authority. What happened to the victim is not an isolated act [. . .]; it 
involves a number of connected events, a chain of events, to negate 
an individual in his social relations. Therefore, it is impossible to 
analyze them in an isolated manner.   
572. [. . .]Fujimori’s knowledge [. . .] can also be inferred, 
concurrently, from what took place after the events [. . .]. The 
defendant himself [. . .] publicly approved tax and criminal 
persecution [. . .] without ordering the appropriate investigative, 
disciplinary and criminal measures, and justified implicitly what 
happened to [the victim], and approved the arbitrary persecutions 
that the State implemented under his leadership.  
[. . .] 
574. The defense has questioned the evidentiary rules that support 
the analysis of the circumstantial evidence, asserting that the hearsay 
testimony lacks effective probative value [. . .].  The questioning is 
based on the subsidiary nature of the hearsay testimony, on the fact 
that the direct witness could have testified but did not, and on the 
absence of additional information, duly proven, to corroborate the 
account of such witnesses.  
On this point, it is appropriate to specify the following:  
1.  A hearsay witness, in principle, is not prohibited under our 
laws of criminal procedure.  The law, as a consequence of the 
principle of the free weighing of the evidence, or the use of 
the court’s best judgment, does not exclude its validity and 
effectiveness [knowledge of the facts may have been obtained 
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by verbal communication, by means of information 
technology, by having heard a conversation between other 
persons to which the witness is not a party, and so on]. There 
is no cause for inadmissibility based on the origin of the 
testimony he may provide, and there are no limitations with 
respect to the proceedings in which they can be used. The 
problem, essentially, is the veracity and credibility of his 
testimony. It must be made clear, however, that hearsay 
testimony on its own cannot be considered indirect or 
circumstantial evidence or indicia, let alone be limited 
exclusively to identifying the person who actually has direct 
knowledge of the facts about which he is testifying, nor used 
simply to confirm the statement of the main witness. The 
scope of such testimony is defined according to what he 
knew, the circumstances of the source of such knowledge, the 
personal characteristics of the hearsay witness and of the 
eyewitness, and so on.  
2.  It is obvious, however, that if the testimony of a hearsay 
witness is unique or singular, in the sense that there is no 
direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence, it cannot be 
considered by the adjudicating court in order to justify a 
conviction. Such testimony is considered “inadvisable” as 
evidence; that is, it involves serious risks, as its indirect 
nature can mean a significant loss of reliability. Additional 
criteria of reliability of the testimony in question are required 
beforehand, and to favor the principle of immediacy, to wit: 
(i) it must be, preferably, primary information heard by the 
witness himself—which is part of what is required in the 
absence of the witness’s direct perception of the facts; and (ii) 
the statement of the eyewitness—whose identification must 
be provided by the hearsay witness—must have been 
unobtainable for just cause. Eyewitnesses, therefore, have 
absolute preference [eyewitness testimony is accorded not 
exclusiveness, but preference, which is overcome when there 
is just cause for the absence of that witness]. In this case, due 
to the subordinate character of hearsay testimony, it is a 
matter of finding (a) the presence of a proven, exceptional 
situation of effective and actual impossibility or serious 
impossibility of obtaining the direct statement of the main 
witness (death, unknown whereabouts, residence abroad, 
minor witnesses requiring special protection, and so on); and 
(b) the assumption of the pursuit of serious and organized 
crime, which makes it difficult to obtain eyewitnesses. As 
such, it is necessary to acknowledge the reasons or grounds 
for the inadmissibility of such testimony when a proven 
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presumption of the unavailability of the eyewitness has not 
been established, in which all legal possibilities for obtaining 
his testimony have been exhausted.  
[. . .]  
4.  Beside the fact that before the examining court [. . .] the 
presumed source of knowledge did not support the assertions 
of the hearsay witness, it is relevant to note that this does not 
rule out flatly the value itself and the consequent positive 
assessment of the hearsay testimony, although greater care is 
required in its assessment. It is necessary to turn to other 
information or facts, to other means of proof, such as direct 
or circumstantial evidence, even if not testimonial in nature.  
The Court must turn to complementary sources that point in 
the same direction and lead unequivocally to an evidentiary 
result obtained through indirect or circumstantial evidence. 
The reasonable caution to which it is subjected is its 
particular characteristic; that is its nature of complementary 
evidence. From this point forward the solution is reached in 
each specific case based on the circumstances of the fact 
alleged and the evidence in that case.  
[. . .]  
Chapter XIII: Other crimes of the Colina Special Intelligence 
Detachment  
[. . .]  
¶2. Comprehensive assessment.  
[. . .]  
586. This plurality of criminal acts, the cover of the military and 
intelligence apparatus that necessarily had to have been provided for 
the perpetration of the crimes, and the subsequent cover-up and 
persecution of those who denounced the events, also convinces the 
Court that the crimes in question were not isolated acts; nor could 
they have been committed without, at least, the criminal intent of the 
highest military and intelligence authorities. As such, killing people 
was not a deviant act of subordinate Army officers or superiors. It 
was decidedly a strategic institutional mindset—in short, a specific 
policy of repression in order to confront terrorist subversion in 
certain spheres outside democratic and constitutional law. Of course, 
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it is not that the entire military and police apparatus was engaged in 
this criminal mission; rather, a very clearly defined sector of it, 
focused on some divisions and functions of the SINA, was geared 
toward this highly selective mission that concentrated on specific 
areas and individuals. It was neither massive nor rash, but rather 
selective and limited to particular individuals and to specific 
situations or triggering contexts.  
[. . .]  
588. The investigation of the TRC [was] conducted according to 
its own method, which certainly is not the investigative method 
inherent to the criminal case [focused on specific, individually 
identified acts, and meant to establish—confirm or rule out—the 
criminal involvement of specific individuals]; nor does it adopt the 
same requirements the court does in forming its opinion as to the 
degree of certainty when it discusses the operation and activities of 
the Colina Detachment [. . .].  
Chapter XIV: Acts subsequent to the crimes of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta  
[. . .]  
§3. General assessment.  
[. . .]  
625. The Constitutional Court, citing the United Nations Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity, defined impunity as “the de 
facto or de jure inexistence of the criminal responsibility of 
perpetrators of human rights violations, as well as of civil, 
administrative or disciplinary liability, because they escape all 
investigation that would lead to their accusation, arrest, prosecution 
and, in the case of conviction, the imposition of appropriate 
sentences, including compensation for the harm caused to their 
victims.”102 As follows from what has been set forth in this Chapter, 
that was what in fact happened in Peru. Real mechanisms were used, 
and various provisions were issued to hinder or impede the 
 
 102. STC No. 2488-2002-HC/TC, at Conclusion of Law No. 5, Constitutional 
Court, Mar. 18, 2004 (Peru). 
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establishment of the facts and, when the time came, to prevent the 
full enforcement of the punishment imposed. Moreover, as 
previously established, such a vast plan of action, one that was 
consistent over time, can only be explained by the involvement of the 
country’s leader.  
What occurred following the commission of the crimes only 
confirms one of the common features of a crime of state [. . .]. 
According to expert MARTÍN PALLÍN, [. . .] the common feature of 
a crime of state is the existence of a plan or design in which, as the 
case may be, law enforcement personnel and, in general, the top 
leaders of the State participate. This criminal plan not only provides 
for the execution of the crimes anticipated but also takes the 
measures necessary to prevent physical signs or traces of them and to 
erase the direct evidence. Should circumstantial evidence be 
discovered that points to the involvement of state agents, of the state 
apparatus, it provides for the obstruction of the investigation with 
every type of means within the State’s reach—deny its existence, 
deny public information, assert the confidentiality of government 
information, and so on—and if the investigation cannot be halted, it 
provides for interference in the punitive consequences, whether by 
turning to symbolic punishments or making use of amnesty.   
Chapter XV: The participation of Alberto Fujimori Fujimori  
[. . .]  
§3. The directive power of defendant Fujimori Fujimori  
633. The President of the Republic, as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, has broad military authority that emanates from the 
Constitution itself (both the prior Constitution and the one currently 
in force), which assigns him the power of  ultimate authority over all 
the executive bodies of the National Defense System. As such, (i) he 
presides over it; (ii) he organizes, distributes and stipulates the use of 
the Armed Forces and the PNP; (iii) he makes use, from a general 
executive level, of the Armed Forces—in short, he establishes 
defense policy and, more specifically, military policy, even as the 
military command in the strict sense of the word provides the 
pertinent information and advice (for which purpose suitable 
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agencies are formed); and (iv) he exercises effective command over 
them, he directs them, and his provisions or orders must be obeyed.  
The primacy of the republican principle leads to the subordination 
of the Armed Forces to the constitutional system, and in the 
presidentialist regimes command over them is incumbent upon the 
President of the Republic. If the national political model is that the 
President of the Republic is Head of State, Chief of Government, 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and, furthermore, the 
personifies the nation—a presidential model that has a strong 
Executive—it is inconsistent with the defense argument that the 
President of the Republic must limit himself solely to issuing general 
policies, being part of an advisory group without his own powers, 
and not giving specific orders to the Armed Forces. This role of 
presidential leadership, command and authority—as an expression of 
the principle of civilian supremacy—is confirmed by the key fact 
that the Armed Forces are not constitutionally autonomous bodies; 
they are part of the Executive Branch, which entails the exercise of 
its authority to order, coordinate and direct the actions of the Armed 
Forces, and to define the strategic objectives of defense and military 
policy. It also means that the president of the CCFFAA and the 
commanders general of the institutions of the armed forces are 
appointed and removed by the President of the Republic, and that in 
a state of emergency he can order that the Armed Forces assume 
control of national order—without that excluding, incidentally, the 
effective political leadership incumbent upon him as head of state—
which authorizes him to order specific measures that allow the 
restriction of rights by the Armed Forces.  
(i) One notable factor in this sphere of powers of the President of 
the Republic is the political factor, by virtue of which the strategies 
that define and shape the National Defense System—presided over 
by the head of state—are established by the top agencies. In turn, the 
executing bodies are the Armed Forces and the PNP, of which the 
President of the Republic is likewise the chief. 
(ii) Another relevant factor is the discretionary nature of such 
activity, based on which [the president] can choose the course of 
action that is appropriate to take, and define its content. This can be 
explained by the fact that this power of the Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces and the PNP, bearing in mind its inherent 
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characteristics, is not regulated or limited by law. This absence of 
regulation only enables greater political discretion in his military 
authority and in the field of national defense, although clearly it is 
not a matter of unlimited discretion that shields unlawful acts.  
[. . .]  
635. The military power that the Constitution confers upon the 
head of state is developed at the level of political command over the 
military. He represents the highest decision-making body, and the 
Armed Forces are subordinate to him in his capacity as commander 
in chief. The Head of State, as is evident, has effective authority with 
respect to the Armed Forces and therefore, they must obey the orders 
that he issues within the scope of ordinary and constitutional legality. 
The members of the armed forces obviously cannot question them or 
fail to carry them out, save, of course, in the case of exceptions 
derived from the constitutional system itself and from the clear 
illegality of an order.  
The defense insists upon asserting the differences between the 
political command and the effective or military command of the 
President of the Republic. The latter, as IGNACIO DE OTTO notes, 
is a requirement that is merely practical, not constitutional. It carries 
with it the understanding that the technical characteristics of military 
activity mean that it is normally entrusted to professional 
servicemen; it is seen, as is clear, in the practical relations between 
governments and the institution of the military. Aside from the 
manner in which the effective Armed Forces/Government relations 
were located within the regime presided over by the defendant, the 
word command and its derivatives, CASADO BURBANO alerts us, 
is used in a political sense, when, for example, talking about supreme 
command, high command, high commander or commander in chief, 
to refer to purely political duties. The president’s orders to the 
Armed Forces do not necessarily require specific formalities. 
Therefore, in the varied and broad scope of his presidential 
involvement, the orders he issues can be verbal or written, express or 
implied, publicly known or confidential—which was precisely the 
recurrent practice of the defendant.   
[. . .]  
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§6. Analysis of circumstantial evidence and determination of guilt  
658. As established from the beginning [Part Two, Chapter I, § 1], 
and as follows from all of the foregoing thus far in this judgment, the 
factual conclusions are based on CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE, 
which is used to establish the manner of occurrence of a fact not 
directly proven, based on another fact, known and proven in the case, 
using for this step the criteria of logic and experience. This is 
sufficient for the Court to begin performing its duty to weigh the 
evidence pursuant to Article 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
The correction of this method of proof, or, more specifically, the 
Court’s method of weighing specific facts or circumstances duly 
verified in the case, which is fully accepted by the Supreme Court 
[En Banc Decision No. 1–2006/ESV–22, of October 13th, 2006], 
which declares that Final Judgment No. 1912–2005/ Piura, of 
September [6th, 2005] is binding precedent], and which is no more 
uncertain or subsidiary in nature than direct evidence, must meet a 
set of substantive and procedural requirements. It highlights, on one 
hand, (i) the existence, as a general rule, of a plurality of predicate 
facts or circumstantial evidence, duly proven in accordance with the 
requirements of evidentiary law (the circumstantial evidence must be 
able to be considered procedurally accurate, which means that it is 
reliable); they must also be peripheral or concomitant with respect to 
the factual information to be proven, and be interrelated with the core 
fact, which is the requirement of relevance. The probative quality of 
the circumstantial evidence is fundamental, must be well established 
in the case, and its power of indication must be such that it leads 
straight to the fact that is meant to be established. This analysis also 
highlights (ii) the rationality of the inference obtained—between the 
circumstantial fact and the consequent or criminal fact there has to be 
a natural connection, or a logical or causal link, an absolute harmony, 
that enables the inference to be made without any other possible 
reasonable alternative. It is appropriate, therefore, to identify the 
different indicia or incriminating pieces of information pursuant to 
the requirements of reliability and relevance, which entails the 
determination of the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence 
selected based on the probative activity undertaken. This in turn will 
shape the Court’s opinion with regard to an inference, the 
reasonableness of which must be supported general principles of 
experience, rules of logic or scientific principles. As a procedural 
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requirement, both elements or requirements must be stated clearly in 
the judgment.  
659. Two precautions must be taken into consideration:  
1. The weighing of the circumstantial evidence, obviously, must 
not be done by isolating the incriminating indicia individually. They 
must be weighed as a whole, and the logical inference must be based 
on them. Naturally, an additional requirement is the absence or 
insufficiency of contrary circumstantial evidence (predicate facts that 
support evidence to the contrary, the occurrence of which—if 
proven—prevents logically accepting that the fact in question 
actually occurred).  
2. The validity of the general principles of experience, which tie 
the predicate fact to the consequential fact and lead to the 
understanding that the conclusion is derived from the evidence 
examined: (i) must be based on general knowledge or scientific 
knowledge; (ii) there must be no applicable general principles of 
experience that are equally well-founded, that is, it must not be 
possible to reach alternative conclusions that enjoy the same degree 
of probability; and, (iii) the conclusion arrived at through the 
circumstantial reasoning must not contradict other facts declared 
proven. If the conclusion regarding the existence of the fact and the 
culpability of the defendant is unequivocal—or objectively 
unequivocal, which excludes an interpretation of the circumstantial 
evidence that leads to the understanding that the events may have 
occurred differently from the main fact—then it must be understood 
that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome, 
and therefore that the conviction is justified substantially with full 
respect for the principle of the prohibition against arbitrariness. 
PART TWO: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Chapter I: Crimes committed 
§1. The crime of aggravated kidnapping: Gorriti Ellenbogen – Dyer 
Ampudia.  
[. . .]  
680. The criminal offense of kidnapping violates the legally 
protected right of freedom of movement, which is nothing more than 
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the victim’s ability to be able to fix freely his position in space, 
moving or staying in a desired place.  
The basic elements of the offense, in terms of an objective 
statutory definition, requires the perpetrator to deprive the victim of 
his individual freedom without a justified right, reason or authority to 
do so. 
1.  The perpetrator can be any person, including a government 
employee.  
2.  With respect to the substantive definition of the offense in 
question, it is required that a person be deprived of his ability 
to move from one place to another—to decide the place he is 
going to be or not be located—even when the victim is 
allowed a certain area of movement that he cannot physically 
overstep, the offense is constituted precisely due to the 
existence of such preventive limits. The Court has ruled in 
similar terms in Final Judgment of June [9th, 2004], No. 975–
2004/San Martín. Deprivation of liberty may arise, 
indistinctly, by different means, and can materialize in 
different forms. It is necessary, of course, that the agent act 
unlawfully—which includes all those cases of excess in the 
exercise of a right, authority or position—and that the act in 
question is performed without the consent of the victim.  
3.  The normative element of the legal definition is the 
intrinsic illegality of the deprivation of liberty; Article 152, 
paragraph one, of the Criminal Code states: “. . .without a 
justified right, reason or authority.” The victim must not have 
given his consent, and it must be an imposition that is 
unjustified in light of the general causes for justification, in 
factual or legal situations that determine their existence, or 
because such causes do exist, the perpetrator deprives another 
of his liberty in an abusive manner, beyond the  justified need 
or through procedures prohibited by law. 
[. . .]  
685.  
2.  [. . .] Under the Criminal Code of [1991], there is no 
independent legal definition of the criminal offense of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty committed by a government employee or 
public servant as mere de facto event occurring outside the course of 
a legal proceeding. The regulation contained in the Code does not  
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include a dual systematization that differentiates conduct relevant to 
the deprivation of liberty according to the status of the perpetrator. 
The status of the perpetrator as a public servant represents, in 
principle, neither a privilege nor a specific aggravation. 
Consequently, with the sole exception of unlawful or arbitrary 
detention by a judge, justified by virtue of being within the 
framework of a legal proceeding—external de facto circumstances—
the Criminal Code currently in force has left the regulation of all 
deprivations of liberty exclusively to Article 152, whether carried out 
by private individuals or public servants.   
3.  The legal definition of general abuse of authority, first of all, 
does not protect an individual’s freedom of movement; rather, it is 
meant as a precaution to ensure the proper discharge of the public 
servant’s duties. Second, it does so subsidiarily, only with respect to 
crimes committed by public servants. Kidnapping is legally 
classified as a common crime—its perpetrator could be anyone—
insofar as there is no criminal law concept that considers the 
deprivation of freedom of movement (potential and individual 
freedom of movement) committed by a public official. Accordingly, 
it is not possible to maintain, as it was under the previous Criminal 
Code, that it is classified as an offense that can be committed only by 
private citizens. It should be emphasized that the subsidiary nature of 
the offense of general abuse of authority stems from the fact that all 
crimes against government and its administration committed by 
public servants always presuppose the violation of an official duty; 
they assume an abuse of authority. In addition, the offense defined as 
abuse of authority is formed by the violation of the duty to adhere to 
the law to which the public servant is bound, in the specific sphere of 
his activity. It does not require that the arbitrary act adversely affect 
private interests, as would be the case of the freedom of movement 
of citizens; that circumstance, in any case, is an additional harm not 
covered by the offense of abuse of authority. It must be taken into 
account that an act that infringes upon freedom of movement 
comprises all acts committed by the perpetrator “without a right,” 
which is at the core of the crime of kidnapping. Therefore, the 
implementation of Article 376 of the Criminal Code would, by any 
reckoning, be insufficient to encompass that criminal conduct, as it 
covers an area that goes beyond mere abuse of office. Such “abuse of 
authority” more properly should be assessed as a constituent element 
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of a kidnapping offense committed by means of the violation of 
institutional powers.  
[. . .]  
687. 
2.  [. . .] Individual freedom, which entails the fundamental 
right not to be detained by the police except where there is a 
well-founded court order or an in flagrante delicto arrest, was 
specifically suspended, and not repealed, when the state of 
emergency was declared (or, strictly speaking, extended) 
[. . .]. Under those conditions, it is not that the state of 
emergency does away with the legally protected interest of 
individual freedom; there is only a type of authorization so 
that under certain conditions an individual’s freedom may be 
restricted, for which there would be some grounds of 
justification pursuant to law (Article 20(8) of the Criminal 
Code). Therefore, the legally protected interest remains in 
force and must continue to be respected, except where proper 
within the legally authorized limits. However, the legal 
guarantee of habeas corpus cannot be suspended, as 
emphatically held by the IACtHR in Advisory Opinions No. 
8/87 [. . .] and 9/87 [. . .]. From this same perspective, it 
should be noted that the powers arising from the control 
measure under the state of emergency were limited to the 
control of terrorist actions, to all those persons who 
reasonably could be linked to these criminal acts and to the 
organizations that promoted and supported them.  
3.  A state of emergency, by its very nature, is declared for the 
defense of the constitutional government and the system of 
values it recognizes and protects, to deal with emergency 
situations and thereby to preserve the highest values of a 
democratic society, as stated in paragraph 20 of Advisory 
Opinion No. 8/87. A state of emergency cannot be invoked 
for purposes of a coup d’état—in order to establish and 
consolidate it, which in itself amounts to the denial of 
Constitutional government—let alone with respect to citizens 
who are not linked to terrorist subversion. 
[. . .]  
689. [. . .]  
1.  As held by the Supreme Court in Final Judgment No. 3840 
97/Ayacucho, of October 9, 1997, a perpetrator by means 
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must be held responsible to the degree that the main act 
coincides with his intent; he must not be responsible for the 
excess committed by the agents he used, as he does not have 
power or control over the act. [. . .]  
[. . .]  
691.[. . .]  
1.  The understanding of what cruelty is must not be formed 
based on the classification of manslaughter as murder. In 
each case [. . .] it must start with the basic criminal concept 
and, thus, it is possible to determine when the criminal goes 
beyond the discomfort that the perpetrator “normally” causes 
to commit the basic crime in question. Cruelty is a 
circumstance (physical/psychological or emotional) that must 
be assessed normatively. Its reference is always the conduct 
of the perpetrator, in its objective and subjective aspects—
that is, the addition of other harm, strictly unnecessary, to the 
victim, outside the harm of the kidnapping: the absolute 
restriction of freedom of movement; the perpetrator’s 
assumption of the unnecessariness of his action; and the 
deliberate nature of the excess, of causing unnecessary 
suffering to the victim.  
2.  The endangerment of the life or health of the victim 
requires the performance of acts—à propos of  the act of 
kidnapping or of the conditions in which the victim is held—
with sufficient magnitude or relevance to cause a specific risk 
to his physical safety or health. Subjectively, the key is the 
perpetrator’s awareness of the danger to the victim brought 
on by the acts carried out to kidnap him or keep him detained. 
The intent of the perpetrator must encompass not only the act 
itself of kidnapping and holding the victim, but also the 
understanding that the actions carried out are creating a 
situation that entails real risks to the victim; that is, the 
perpetrator must be aware of the danger.  
[. . .]  
694.[. . .]  
1.  Cruel treatment, as previously described, is not only an 
attack on the physical safety of the individual; it also 
diminishes his mental or emotional welfare—understood as 
the freedom of self-determination and of action according to 
one’s decision, which rejects all conduct that entails a feeling 
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of degradation or humiliation, ridicule or indignity. It is, 
under our criminal law, a specific aggravating circumstance 
that, as such, requires something additional in view of all 
conduct that involves the illegal deprivation of a person’s 
liberty, of his possible and individual freedom of movement.  
2.  International human rights law prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.103 If torture 
is excluded, which is considered an aggravated and deliberate 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(United Nations Declaration against Torture of 1975), in that 
it is impossible to draw a precise dividing line between such 
categories of acts, it is clear that cruel treatment, inasmuch as 
it is inflicted by a public official or other person in the 
exercise of public duties, at his instigation, or with his 
consent or acquiescence—a “qualified” perpetrator—can be 
defined as such an act that deliberately causes pain and 
suffering but which, due to its level of intensity, is not 
sufficiently severe to be classified as torture or bodily harm. 
In international case law, as REMOTTI CARBONELL 
explains, the use of criteria of seriousness and harmfulness 
have been imposed, qualified by endogenous and exogenous 
factors, all of which must be evaluated in each specific 
case.104 However, those references to international law must 
 
 103. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N. 
GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (adopted by 
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Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 
16, 1966) (adopted by Executive Order No. 22128, of Mar. 28, 1978 and ratified 
by the Constitution of 1979); and Organization of American States, American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S 123 (adopted by Executive Order No. 22231, and ratified by the 
Constitution of 1979). The following have been added to these general provisions: 
United Nations Convention against Torture, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 
(Dec. 10, 1984) (adopted by Legislative Resolution No. 241815, of May 24, 1988); 
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 104. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 162 (1978) 
(criterion adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of  Ireland 
v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR Judgment of January 18, 1978, which also 
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¶ 167 (Sep. 17, 1997) (the IACtHR adopted the same standard, in discussing the 
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be defined according to the normative requirements of the 
legal definition of  aggravated kidnapping, and the set of 
circumstances they include. Accordingly, they establish the 
necessary normative level or magnitude for a particular act to 
be classified as “cruel treatment.”  
3. In this case it is necessary to bear in mind that the people 
who deprived and kept the victims deprived of their liberty 
were State agents carrying out superior orders [. . .]. The 
victims were taken to illegal detention centers [. . .]. No 
legally provided, regular procedure was followed—especially 
with regard to notice of charges and official, public 
information as to their whereabouts, and legal status—and 
those measures were taken in the context of an altered 
constitutional order or in the exercise of power of an 
authoritarian government [. . .].  
4. The State agents involved acted with glaring illegality and 
arrogance. They used their authority in a manner that was 
contrary to their obligations as State agents [. . .]. It took 
place in the context of an authoritarian regime, in which the 
victims could not expect treatment that was predictable or 
formally protected by the pre-existing legal standards, 
especially since they were taken to and held at an improper 
institution, which belonged to the secret services of the 
State— profoundly intimidating in and of itself—which made 
them even fear for their fate. It is obvious, as the IACtHR 
noted, that the victims’ feelings of fear, of fear for their fate, 
was aggravated not only by the very illegality of the  
deprivation of liberty or act of kidnapping—which deepened 
its intrinsic vulnerability—but also due to the circumstances 
in which it was carried out, derived from the place of 
detention, the people who kept the victims in custody, and 
from the characteristics of the political regime that supported 
them.105  
The cruel behavior of those who ordered and carried out the act of 
kidnapping and the authorities and custodians who maintained the 
kidnapping—this additional aggressive conduct, perfectly known to 
the perpetrators and assumed by the victims, the intensity and 
 
various degrees of treatment, the physical and psychological effects of which vary 
in intensity according to the endogenous and exogenous factors that must be 
proven in each specific situation). 
 105. Loayza-Tomayo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33, ¶ 57. 
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seriousness of the harmful action, the multiplicity of participants in 
the commission of the acts—was  expressed (i) in the form of the 
detention carried out by State agents—dramatic in the first case and 
with an absence of reasonable and well-founded explanations in both 
cases; (ii) in the characteristics of the transfer of the victims to the 
SIE—the cocking of weapons, concealment of the identity of the 
captors, prevention of recognition of the detainee by other members 
of the military; and (iii) in the language used, in the initial isolation 
and in the warnings as to the severity of the consequences that the 
victims’ alleged conduct would have on them, and in the absence of 
any determination of their legal status, in spite of it being—which 
was obvious—an operation conducted by State agents, and therefore, 
one with an abusive or arbitrary aspect that made clear to the victims 
that there was a  lack of judicial protection and of personal safety and 
calm. In the case of the victim Dyer Ampudia, the persistence of the 
deprivation of liberty coincided with an exceptional fact: he 
remained deprived of his liberty in spite of a negative conclusion of 
the police authority, which shows clearly an intimidating intention to 
break him mentally. From a subjective perspective, the totality of the 
factual characteristics enumerated reveals that the State agents who 
physically carried out the kidnapping—and those who ordered it—
proceeded without the least basic sense of humanity or respect for 
the individual; they sought deliberately to intensify the suffering of 
the kidnapping victim (the means, context and objectives were 
themselves meant to intensify the suffering of the victim) in a way 
that was unnecessary relative to a simple kidnapping, to keep him 
anxious about what was going to be done with him, even excluding 
him from his daily activities (which were taken into account to 
kidnap him) and in that way, simultaneously, negate them in his 
social function temporarily, for the political benefit of the regime in 
power.   
Not only, as has been set forth previously, are there differences 
between treating a kidnapping victim with cruelty and killing a 
person with great cruelty; it is also necessary to understand the scope 
of cruel treatment in kidnapping. Taking on a dogmatic, traditional, 
and fundamentally objective interpretation, appropriate to the 
obviously cruel manner of killing a person—which is what murder 
requires under our laws—is not consistent with the different criminal 
and political meaning assigned by law to each aggravating factor.  
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To this is added an internal analysis of the aggravating 
circumstances provided for the offense of kidnapping. The analysis 
of cruel treatment is framed by two circumstances:  
(i) A second degree aggravating circumstance is the one 
embodied in Law No. 26222 of August 21, 1993, without 
modification to the first degree aggravating circumstance of cruel 
treatment. In this scenario, the perpetrator must cause serious bodily 
harm to the victim, or seriously harm his mental or physical health, 
or cause the victim’s death [. . .] [C]ruel treatment cannot be 
identified by acts of torture that speak to the seriousness of the acts 
and the detrimental consequences to the victim. Serious bodily harm 
and, obviously, death, do not fall within the circumstance of “cruel 
treatment,” as when they occur they form part of this especially 
aggravating circumstance, which represents a lesser objective 
magnitude. 
(ii)  The circumstance of cruel treatment has always been an 
alternative aggravating factor to abusing, corrupting, or 
“. . .endangering [. . .] the health of the victim.” The perpetrator 
must cause, in addition to the kidnapping itself, specific suffering in 
relation to the victim’s physical or mental well-being, but from 
which no well-founded risk to his health is derived—obviously, to 
his life, either—let alone, as has been set forth previously, grievous 
bodily harm or death (the consistency with slight bodily injury, then, 
is obvious). Therefore, cruel treatment is equivalent to all objective 
or subjective mistreatment (threats, ideological pressure, causing 
anxiety or unease) sustained by the victim, but which do not lead to 
death, serious harm to his body or physical or mental health, or 
significant risk to his health.   
[. . .]  
§2. The crime of murder: extreme violence and malice aforethought.  
697. The subject of the Court’s analysis is the crime of murder, 
under the circumstances of extreme violence and malice 
aforethought. Murder with extreme violence means to kill another for 
an inhumane or futile motive or reason. It is a circumstance that lies 
within the framework of culpability, as a category that encompasses 
the formation of the perpetrator’s criminal intent [. . .]; it reflects an 
intent that belongs to the subjective and personal sphere of the 
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perpetrator. Murder with malice aforethought stresses a specific 
circumstance of execution, by virtue of which the perpetrator ensures 
the execution of the crime and prevents the risk of self-defense on 
the part of the victim (strictly speaking, it is a circumstance that 
entails greater cowardice of action, and the greater objective 
dangerousness of the perpetrator’s conduct) without ignoring the 
subjective aspect of the perpetrator, who uses the victim’s 
defenselessness or takes advantage of it in the commission of the act. 
The Final Judgment of July 6, 2004, No. 999–2004/Tacna, concurred 
that it is a circumstance that is mixed in nature.  
698. An important element of the circumstance of extreme 
violence in a homicide has is that the motive or the cause of death is 
despicable (absence of defined objective) or contemptible (brutal, 
extreme violence in its determination). The motive in question is not 
valid or significant. The case law of the Supreme Court refers to a 
criminal act carried out without any apparent explicable reason or 
motive, with a perverse instinct or for the mere pleasure of killing 
[Final Judgments of May 27, 1999, No. 2343–99/Ancash, and 
January [22nd, 1999], No. 4406– 98/Lima]. It also states that the 
reason or motive is insignificant, futile or inhumane, 
disproportionate, despicable and base [Final Judgments of January 
12, 2004, No.  2804–2003/Lima Norte; January [21st, 2005], No.  
3904–2004/ La Libertad; and September 9 2004, No. 1488–2004]. 
There is, based on what has been set forth above, disproportion 
between the motivating reason and the seriousness of the homicidal 
reaction, which can be identified in homicides perpetrated for 
perverse amusement, bloodlust, criminal vanity, out of a prideful or 
arrogant nature, and so on.  
It is not a question—as HURTADO POZO explains—of simple 
clumsy, cruel or brutal execution; in the assertion of ARIAS, it is 
necessary to assess the motive with which the perpetrator acts, his 
bloodthirsty instinct, aside from which it must be disproportionate, 
despicable and base, which reveals in the perpetrator an inhumane 
attitude, contrary to the basic sentiments of social solidarity. The 
latter is called brutal perversity of determination.  
699. The circumstance of malice aforethought, taken from the 
Hispanic source, has four requisite elements: a) Normative, only 
applicable to crimes committed against persons; b) Objective, based 
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in the modus operandi and referring to the use of means, modes or 
manners of execution designed to ensure them, eliminating any 
possible defense of the victim; c) Subjective, whereby the perpetrator 
has to have sought deliberately, or at least taken the opportunity 
consciously, to try to eliminate all resistance on the part of the 
victim; and d) Teleological, whereby it must be proven whether in 
fact, in the specific case, a situation of total defenselessness was 
effectively created.   
The relevant point is, first of all, the use of means or modes that 
tend to ensure the execution of the homicide; second, the certainty of 
its execution and the absence of risk to the perpetrator; and, finally, 
the perpetrator’s awareness of the defenselessness of the victim and 
the choice of means and manners of ensuring the homicide.   
This has been established in the case law of the Criminal Chamber 
of the Supreme Court [Final Judgments of May 27, 1999, No. 1425–
99–Cusco; and May 25, 2004, No. 880–2004/Arequipa]. The crucial 
point with regard to malice aforethought is the assurance of the 
execution of the act and the absence of risk in terms of any defense 
the victim might offer.   
[. . .]  
701. In these terms, it is indisputable that the crime was committed 
with malice aforethought. That is how it was planned, and that is 
how it was carried out. At the same time, its execution involved the 
military training of the perpetrators. The victims were caught by 
surprise in order to immobilize them, care was taken to ensure that 
they were unarmed, they were overpowered and, later, they were 
attacked with weapons of war, preventing any defensive maneuver 
on their part and ensuring their death. The victims were defenseless 
and the lethal results were ensured, without risk to those who carried 
out the act. All of the above, furthermore, was sought deliberately.  
The use of special circumstances of time and place, the 
unexpected attack on the victims (rapid and by surprise in the Barrios 
Altos Case), the procedure used by the physical perpetrators of the 
crime, which left the victims without the ability to react and was 
meant to facilitate the execution of the crime, the helpless state of the 
victims—who were unarmed, and subject to the power of their 
attackers, which meant their total defenselessness—only confirm the 
malice aforethought of the conduct of their attackers. 
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There are no grounds, on the other hand, to consider that the 
homicide was motivated by extreme violence. Not only did the 
perpetrators act on the basis of a defined objective, but also the 
motive—in spite of its intrinsic unlawfulness and obvious ethical 
reproach, unjustifiable from any point of view—was not futile or 
insignificant. The antiterrorist consideration or alibi, besides being 
subject to repudiation given what is required of government 
employees in their conduct in dealing with persons understood to be 
terrorist criminals, does not express a disproportionate, despicable or 
base motive. The killing was done according to a previously devised 
plan, and the execution of the crime followed, at least externally, 
guidelines typical of the performance of military operations, albeit 
outside of and counter to military regulations. The notion that was 
assumed was based, undoubtedly, on disregard for human life and in 
open rebellion against the basic rules of a civilized society, and 
against the very essence of military honor and the guidelines that 
govern confrontations with and treatment of a defeated or unarmed 
enemy. The latter, in spite of its dramatic and shocking illegality, 
cannot be considered action based on a motive of extreme violence. 
Consequently, homicide with malice aforethought is admitted, and 
homicide with extreme violence is rejected.  
§3.The crime of grievous bodily harm  
[. . .]  
705. The crime of grievous bodily harm—as a crime that has 
physical effects—requires, as set forth in the previously cited 
provision, that the perpetrator by improper act or omission cause, 
produce or bring about serious harm to the bodily integrity or health 
of the victim.  
However, when Article 121 of the Criminal Code refers to the 
existence of a harm to body or health, it requires the performance of 
conduct—by act or omission—that, on one hand, causes any change, 
more or less lasting, to the victim’s body (which is apparent in the 
body) or, on the other hand,  causes or accentuates a pathological 
state of certain intensity, altering physiology (the functional 
equilibrium of the organism) or causing mental changes of a certain 
magnitude, whether lasting or relatively fleeting. The harm to the 
body—bodily integrity—or to psycho-physiological health, must be 
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serious. The legislature defines the seriousness of the injury, 
incorporating precise mandatory qualifying circumstances. Among 
them, and for purposes of this case, there are: a) injuries that present 
an imminent danger to life; b) those that cause permanent disability; 
and c) those that require thirty or more days of assistance or rest, 
according to a doctor’s orders.   
706. In the case of “imminent danger to life,” the injury—by its 
characteristics and significance of the wound, as well as the 
conditions or constitution of the victim—must cause a specific, real, 
effective, active danger of seriously jeopardizing the life of the 
victim. That is, the injury inflicted must entail a certain likelihood of 
complications, which generally arise when mainly internal tissues 
and organs are damaged. The victim must actually have been at 
death’s door.   
707. In the case of “injuries that cause permanent disability,” the 
normal physical means that the victim used to enjoy in his daily life, 
such as his ability to move, are seriously diminished as a result of the 
injury, in such a manner that, as a consequence, he will need the 
assistance of third parties or the assistance of some mechanical, 
electromechanical or other means in order to get by normally. 
Incidentally, there is no need for the disability to be incurable; rather, 
it must persist for a considerable length of time. 
708. In the case of “causation of any other harm that requires 
thirty or more days of assistance or rest,” the time periods are used 
with the understanding that the seriousness of harm is in part 
measurable by the period of time required for the victim’s recovery 
[. . .]. It facilitates the inclusion of an entire range of injuries not 
provided for specifically, the only limitation being the requirement of 
disability lasting more than twenty-nine days that necessitates a 
doctor’s care or leave from work. 
709. SUBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. The 
perpetrator must act with  animus vulnerandi or laedendi at the time 
of causing serious harm to his victim; that is, criminal intent to 
injure, to diminish the bodily integrity or the physical or mental 
health of the victim, with knowledge of the specific danger of the 
injury caused by his action. [. . .]  
It should be noted that, as the Supreme Court has specified, 
“. . .from the external and purely objective perspective, the offense of 
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causing bodily harm and an attempted murder are completely alike, 
the sole and only difference being the perpetrator’s state of mind; 
one merely has the intent to injure, while the other has the intent to 
kill” [Final Judgment of September [24th, 1997], Motion for Nullity 
No. 2493–97/Amazonas].  
§4. Crimes Against Humanity: Barrios Altos and La Cantuta.  
[. . .]  
712. Thus, according to the development or evolution of this 
internationally defined criminal offense, it is possible to define 
crimes against humanity, in general terms, as does GIL GIL, as any 
attack on fundamental individual legally protected interests (life, 
physical safety and health, freedom. . .) committed in times of peace 
as well as during wartime, as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack carried out with the participation or tolerance of the de jure or 
de facto political authority.106  
713. Murder was always considered a type of crime against 
humanity [. . .].  
An initial clarification, however, has to do with the term “murder.” 
This clarification begins with two necessary considerations. First, the 
term “murder” cannot be identified under  Article 108 of the 
Criminal Code, but rather with the act of killing or causing death; 
and, second, by virtue of the recognition of the principle of 
individual culpability, the conduct, whether by act or omission, must 
be intentional; the criminal intent—of any kind—must extend to all 
of the elements of the crime, basically to know that the death is part 
 
 106. Alicia Gil Gil, Los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio en el 
Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional a la luz de “Los elementos de los 
Crímenes,” in La nueva justicia penal supranacional, 94 (Kai Ambos Ed., 2002); 
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 565-568 
(Sept. 2, 1998) points in this same direction from a general perspective. The Court 
noted that the essential elements of crimes against humanity are those acts that are 
inhumane in nature and character that cause great suffering or serious harm to 
physical or mental health, in addition to being committed as part of a widespread 
and systematic attack against the civilian population. Prosecutor v. Drazen 
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Oct. 7, 1997) 
(“…serious acts of violence which harm human beings by striking what is most 
essential to them: their lives, liberty, physical welfare, health and/or dignity. They 
are inhumane acts that by their extent and gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to 
the international community…”) 
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of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian 
population.  
714. If it is understood, in accordance with international 
jurisprudence, that a crime against humanity is of a special nature, 
with a higher degree of immorality in its commission as compared to 
common crimes, then the following must be verified:  
1.  From the objective or substantive aspect, certain elements 
must be present that have been shaped and recognized based 
on the positive or customary law of human rights protection. 
Specifically, the requirements imposed by the international 
instruments and courts have referred always to (i) the status 
of the perpetrator (as part of a government entity or a 
criminal organization that assumes de facto control of a 
territory);107 (ii) the nature of the violation (organized, and 
widespread or systematic acts—the term “widespread,” 
quantitatively, refers to the number of victims, while the 
adjective “systematic” encompasses the idea of a methodical 
plan);108 (iii) the timing of the execution of the crime 
(situation of internal or external armed conflict),109 and (iv) 
the qualities and status of the victims (civilian population, 
state of defenselessness).110 
 
 107. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupesckic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 654-55 
(June 14, 2000). In the same vein, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 659 (May 7, 1997). 
 108. Mireille Delmas-Marty, ¿pueden los crímenes internacionales contribuir al 
debate entre universalismo y relativismo de los valores?, Gil Gil, supra note 106 at 
83. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment (May 7, 1997) (the attack 
must be widespread or systematic, that is, it is not necessary for both criteria to be 
met. In both cases it is required that the act be perpetrated in accordance with a 
policy, which excludes situations in which inhumane acts are committed on the 
perpetrator’s own initiative or in furtherance of his own criminal plan, without the 
encouragement or direction of a government or organized group). See Prosecutor 
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Sep. 2, 1998).  Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgement, ¶ 428 (Feb. 22, 2001) (the 
“widespread” nature of the attack shall be determined, principally, based on the 
number of victims); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Appeals Court 
Judgement, ¶ 94 (June 12, 2002) (the classification of the attack as “systematic” 
referred to the organized nature of the acts of violence and the unlikelihood of their 
occurring by mere coincidence). 
 109. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber Decision, ¶ 141 
(Oct. 2, 1995) (customary international law no longer required a nexus between 
crimes against humanity and an international armed conflict; therefore, such 
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2.  From the subjective perspective, it is required that the 
agent or perpetrator have knowledge of the broad and general 
context in which the act occurs, and that the conduct is or will 
be part of a widespread or systematized attack—organized 
violence—against the civilian population in furtherance of a 
plan or policy. It is clear that customary international law has 
never recognized any commission of an isolated inhumane 
act as a crime against humanity; the act has to be part of a 
greater campaign of atrocities committed against civilians. 
Accordingly, murder has been characterized as a crime 
against humanity,111 with the specification that it be the 
consequence or expression of a systematic assault, coming 
from the State or its institutions of power, which is promoted 
or supported by official or quasi-official policies and 
directives, and brought to bear on the civilian population in a 
situation of social or military conflict. There is likewise no 
impediment to including grievous bodily harm in these 
considerations. 
715. Based on this established standard, the writings of legal 
scholars have underscored the structured, political and systematic 
level of the acts of aggression that constitute crimes against 
humanity. On this point, AMBOS has stated: “The common 
denominator of a systematic attack is that it is carried out according 
to a preconceived plan or policy, emphasizing the organized nature 
of the attack. The attack is systematic if it is based on a policy or a 
plan that provides guidance to the individual perpetrators with 
regard to the target of the attack, i.e., the specific victims. . . This is, 
in fact, the international element of crimes against humanity, since it 
is what makes criminal acts that would be common crimes under 
 
crimes could be committed in times of peace). Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), art. 1(b), U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 
18, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) (refers to crimes against humanity “whether 
committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg [...].”) 
 110. [...]Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 644 (May 7, 
1997) (civilian population means those persons that are not part of the organized 
power that is the source of the violence [...]). 
 111. [...].Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Judgment, (Nov. 29, 
1996) (the Tribunal states that, unlike under ordinary law, the attack is no longer 
directed at the physical welfare of the victim alone but at humanity as a whole. 
Those crimes also transcend the individual because when the individual is 
assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated). 
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other circumstances acquire the character of crimes against 
humanity. In essence, the political factor only requires the exclusion 
of the casual acts of individuals acting on their own, in an isolated 
manner and without anyone coordinating them. . . Such common 
criminal acts, even if committed on a widespread scale, are not 
crimes against humanity if they are not tolerated, at least by some 
State or organization. . . Thus, in order to be crimes against 
humanity, crimes committed on a widespread scale must be linked to 
some form or another of state or organized authority: they must at 
least be tolerated by such authority.”112  
716. For its part, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in the case of PROSECUTOR V. BLASKIC recognized 
an attack as systematic based on the following indicators, which can 
always be inferred from the context: “a) the existence of a political 
objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated, or an 
ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to destroy, persecute 
or weaken a community; b) the perpetration of a criminal act on a 
very large scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and 
continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; c) 
the preparation and use of significant public or private resources, 
whether military or other; d) the implication of high-level political 
and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the 
methodical plan.”113 [. . .] Only the attack—not the specific acts of 
which the defendant is accused—must be widespread or systematic. 
In addition, as held by the IACtHR in the Case of ALMONACID 
ARELLANO V. CHILE (Judgment September 26, 2006, para. 96), 
even a single act, committed in the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack, is sufficient to give rise to a crime against 
humanity.  
717. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the acts of murder and 
grievous bodily harm at issue in this case go beyond a strictly 
common or individual scope and are fully consistent with the 
identifying criteria of crimes against humanity. The murders and 
grievous bodily harm committed in the cases of Barrios Altos and La 
 
 112. KAI AMBOS, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 133-35 
(IDEMSA 2007). 
 113. Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 94 (Mar. 
3, 2000) cited in Scilingo, SAN, Apr. 19, 2005 (No. 16/2005) “Caso Scilingo” 
[Scilingo Case] [...]. 
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Cantuta are also crimes against humanity, fundamentally, because 
they were committed within the framework of a state policy of 
selective but systematic elimination of alleged members of 
subversive groups. This policy, on one hand, was designed, planned 
and controlled at the highest levels of State power, and carried out by 
state agents—members of military intelligence—who used the 
military apparatus to do so; in addition, in accordance with their 
objectives, it affected a significant number of defenseless members 
of the civilian population.  
This conclusion is absolutely compatible with what was set forth 
in Part II of this Judgment. It has been proven that it was either a 
state ordered decision, or approved by the head of state, that it was 
carried out by the military intelligence bodies (the Colina Special 
Intelligence Detachment and the DINTE), directed ultimately by the 
SIN, that it had all of the official support imaginable, and that its 
final objective was the forced disappearance and/or arbitrary or 
extrajudicial execution of alleged subversives, of which two 
important events—but not the only ones—were specifically Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta.  
The foregoing coincides absolutely, based on the totality of the 
evidence examined, with the decisions of the IACtHR and the 
Constitutional Court, which also classified these acts as crimes 
against humanity under international criminal law.  
Chapter II: Perpetration by means of control over an organized 
apparatus of power  
§3. Perpetration by means of control over an organized apparatus of 
power  
¶1. Background and evolution of the criminal doctrine.  
724. The emergence of this approach began with the analysis of 
the Eichmann and Staschynski cases. The assessment of those cases 
demonstrated that it was not possible to link the defendants to the 
classic options of perpetration by means. However, ROXIN proved 
that both of the accused were part of an organized apparatus of 
power and that the crimes attributed to them in fact reflected plans 
and orders from the central bodies of those structures, which 
controlled and directed their execution. Accordingly, it was possible 
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to conclude that the immediate perpetrator of the crime, the mid-
level commanders and the central body of the power structure that 
ordered its execution all had different ways of controlling the act, but 
were not mutually exclusive.  
Thus, while the first had control over the action—that is, the 
physical execution of the punishable act—the second and third had 
control over the organization, meaning the ability to influence and 
control the realization of the criminal event, from their respective 
functional level, through the power structure that was at their 
disposal. This made the latter true indirect perpetrators, since “the 
control over the event exercised by the ‘person in the background’ is 
based on the fact that he can, through the apparatus at his disposal, 
bring about the effect with greater certainty than even in the case of 
control through coercion and error, which are recognized almost 
unanimously as cases of perpetration by means.”  
Therefore, it is a question of specific control that the principal 
exercises over the organization, and not one of a person to person 
relationship or direct control over the immediate perpetrator. As 
such, the basis of this form of perpetration by means cannot rest on 
control or dominance over the “intervening person,” since that 
person ultimately “is a free and responsible person in the 
performance of his own actions.” The control exercised by the 
perpetrator by means is exercised over the apparatus and its 
structure, into which the person who carries out the act is included 
and incorporated.  
725. THE COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF ROXIN’S THEORY. 
ROXIN’s concept was invoked judicially for the first time in 1985 
and 1986, in the judgments handed down by the Argentine Tribunals 
tasked with trying and reviewing the conviction of the Military 
Juntas that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 (Judgment of 
December 9, 1985 issued by the National Court of Appeals for 
Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters of the Federal Capital, 
and the December 30, 1986 Judgment of the Supreme Court, 
respectively). The judges in the court of first instance arrived at the 
conclusion that the senior members of the military were criminally 
responsible as perpetrators by means. Thus, in point VII.6 of their 
decision, under the subtitle “The path to be followed,” they 
emphasized that the defendants had at all times maintained control 
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over the people who carried out the acts and, therefore, had to be 
held responsible as indirect perpetrators of the crimes committed. 
That decision was later reviewed by the Supreme Court, and in a 
split decision the majority also applied the theory of perpetration by 
means of control over the organization.  
Subsequently, it was the German Federal Supreme Court, in its 
Judgment of July 26, 1994(BGHSt, Vol. 40, pp. 218-240) that turned 
to the concept of perpetration by means of control over an organized 
apparatus of power to hold the members of the National Defense 
Council of the former German Democratic Republic criminally liable 
for the murders committed by shootings or through the placement of 
deadly landmines in the vicinity of the Berlin Wall. In that case, the 
three members of the National Defense Council were found to be 
indirect perpetrators of those deaths. In this manner, the Court 
modified the lower court’s decision, which had only considered them 
instigators of those crimes. In our case law, this type of perpetration 
by means has also been attributed to the leader of the terrorist group 
Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. The judgment of the 
National Criminal Court of October 13, 2006, as well as the Final 
Judgment of the Second Temporary Criminal Chamber of the 
Supreme Court (the majority opinion) of December 14, 2007, held 
him responsible for the homicides and attacks carried out by the 
operational levels of that outlaw organization. In these national court 
decisions, the individuals who physically executed the crimes were 
considered direct perpetrators of those abominable acts, while those 
crimes were attributed to Guzmán Reynoso by virtue of the fact that 
he controlled the organization, by exercising political and military 
control over Shining Path from his position and rank in the Central 
Committee.  
[. . .]  
¶2. The General Assumption: The existence of the 
organization.  
726. STRUCTURED ORGANIZATION. CHARACTERISTICS. 
The theory of  perpetration by means of control over organized 
apparatuses of power is based fundamentally on the “prior existence 
of a structured organization.” Such organization has a solid 
hierarchical line that will make its highest strategic level responsible 
for the criminal decisions and plans made therein, which, will be 
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later assigned to the immediate perpetrator through the vertical 
channel provided by its structural design.  
Accordingly, an important characteristic of this type of 
hierarchically organized structure that highlights its strict verticality, 
is (i) the “assignment of roles.” This phrase is more ideographic than 
those commonly used in contemporary penal doctrine to explain the 
relationship between the strategic level and the physical perpetrator 
of the act, and that refer to a division of labor or distribution of 
duties. Furthermore, such references could confuse ‘perpetration by 
means’ with cases of co-perpetration. In this respect, ROXIN has 
specified that, “it is also not possible to speak of a ‘division of labor’ 
–which currently is considered generally to be a central element of 
co-perpetration—when the holder of power leaves it completely to 
the executing bodies to carry out his order.”  
It is important also to stress, as another characteristic of these 
power apparatuses with organized hierarchical structures, that (ii) 
they develop a functional life that is independent of their members. 
They are grounded not in a special state of mind of the highest 
strategic level, but rather in the “functional machinery of the 
apparatus,” that is, their “automatism” or development of a self-
propelled process or operation. Consequently, the “person in the 
background” can always be confident that his criminal order or plan 
will be followed without the need to know the immediate perpetrator. 
It is, then, the “automatic operation of the apparatus” that actually 
guarantees compliance with the order. Therefore, it is not essential 
for there to be an express order, contained in a document, whereby 
the strategic superior directly orders the immediate executor to carry 
out a specific function. However, that does not mean that the 
superior is completely removed from the specific action of the 
organization; rather, his presence is noted in the configuration or 
operating capacity of a series of mechanisms that interact from inside 
and outside the power structure and which enable the apparatus to 
remain active and carry out its criminal plans.  
¶3. The Specific Elements and their Requirements.  
727. ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. The 
identification of the hierarchical organizations that constitute 
organized apparatuses of power, which are the basis of the form of 
perpetration by means under examination, also requires proof of the 
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presence of what the German Federal Supreme Court has called the 
“framework conditions.” That is, the functional requirements and 
elements. They are as follows: 1) command authority; 2) the 
deviation of the organization from the legal system; 3) the fungibility 
of the immediate perpetrator; and 4) the elevated willingness of the 
executor to commit the act.  
[. . .]  
¶4. Objective Elements and Requirements.  
4.1. Command authority.  
729. CONCEPT. As indicated, command authority is a 
fundamental condition to  charge perpetration by means in the 
context of an organized power structure. Command authority is the 
capacity of the strategic superior—of the “person in the 
background”—to give orders or assign roles to the part of the 
organization that is subordinate to him. He acquires this capacity, or 
it may be conferred upon him, by virtue of a position of authority, 
leadership or influence derived from political, ideological, social, 
religious, cultural, economic, or other similar factors.   
[. . .]  
730. FORMS OF COMMAND AUTHORITY. In this context, a 
distinction can be made between command authority, which is 
exercised at the superior strategic level and that which is realized at 
the intermediate levels. It is important to distinguish that command 
authority can be expressed in two ways: first, from the superior 
strategic level down to the intermediate tactical or operational levels; 
and second, from the intermediate levels to the direct executors. In 
both cases, such command authority will always be manifested 
vertically. The latter will be decisive for the attribution of 
perpetration by means to all of the commanders in the chain of the 
power structure, as it is not possible to equate the manner and scope 
with which the superior strategic level gives or transmits its decisions 
with those given by the mid-level commanders to the direct 
executors, precisely because of the different position that each level 
occupies inside the criminal organization. The control over the 
organization that is exercised from the superior strategic level will be 
different from that held by the intermediate commander, since 
whomever is at the apex of the hierarchical structure has total 
domination of the apparatus, while whomever is in the intermediate 
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position only has the potential to give orders in the sector of the 
organization in which he is authorized to do so. 
This view of the organization and its functional hierarchies has 
been applied in the national courts to interpret the design of the 
Shining Path. Indeed, the National Criminal Court specified that the 
so-called Central Leadership exercised the “real power of control 
over the entire organization,” since it was in charge of presiding 
over and directing meetings held with the intermediate bodies, and at 
the same time controlled the proper operation of the criminal 
apparatus. For their part, those “intermediary bodies” were made up 
of the so-called Regional Committees and Zone Committees. Then, 
on a lower rung, there were Sub-Zone Committees and Cell 
Committees. The National Criminal Court found that when this 
terrorist group became militarized, all of the structures worked in 
terms of conducting armed operations. In that sense, when they 
formed the so-called People’s Army, those individuals who had been 
the Political Secretary and Undersecretary of a Committee became 
the Political Commander and the Military Commander, respectively.  
[. . .]  
732. COMMAND AUTHORITY AND ORDERS. 
CLASSIFICATION. 
1.  As stated previously, the most typical manifestation of 
command authority is an order. This must be understood as 
an order that provides for the performance of an act or 
mission that the subordinate must carry out in view of the 
functional position and hierarchy of the one issuing the order. 
It can be verbal or written. However, it can also be expressed 
through signs or gestures. As such, two levels can be 
differentiated with respect to orders.  
At the first level, there are the formal orders that acquire such 
status according to mandates, directives and orders. On the 
other hand, at the second level there are orders given for their 
substantive effectiveness, that is, the signals, expressions, 
gesticulations, specific actions or similar expressions of 
another kind.  
[. . .]  
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2.  The first-level orders are frequent in those organizations 
that, removing themselves from the formal and legitimate 
system that governs their structure, deviate toward the 
fulfillment of criminal objectives.  
3.  The case of the Military Juntas of the Argentine 
government evidenced this type of conduct.  
[. . .]  
4.  The orders at the second level are used, generally, by 
organized apparatuses of power that have been structured 
from their inception completely outside of the legal order. 
Such is the case of terrorist organizations that pursue the 
violent takeover of political power.  
5.  According to national case law, this occurred within the 
Shining Path organization through the decision-making 
power held by its Central Leadership. Indeed, as established 
by the National Criminal Court, many of the orders that were 
issued consisted of a series of codified gestures and practices 
that only the members of the organization, especially its 
leaders, would use and interpret. Thus, it was a procedure 
regulated by the top leaders that prior to committing an 
assassination, it was necessary to “unmask the victim,” 
whether that person was a public servant or a businessman. 
This was done by putting up posters, distributing flyers, 
publishing in newspapers or other media, or through specific 
criticism that the Leadership would make against a specific 
public figure during Central Committee sessions or other 
events in which the murder of certain individuals was 
proposed. Those individuals would be eliminated shortly 
thereafter, and later, the Central Leadership would hold up 
the event expressly as a success of the organization. 
According to the judgment of the National Criminal Court, 
said procedure was adopted by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso 
against retired Vice Admiral Gerónimo Cafferata Marazzi, 
during the so-called IV National Conference held in 1986.  
4.2. Deviation from the Law. Types and Characteristics.  
733. DEFINITION. Another objective element of perpetration by 
means of control over an organized apparatus of power is 
“detachment” from or “deviation” from the law. “The law” is 
identified as a legal system or order represented by a coordinated set 
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of general and positive norms that regulate social life. The State, as a 
community, defines its normative order. This normative order can 
only be a legal order, meaning that which is commonly referred to as 
the “law of the State” or “national law.” Nevertheless, this national 
law is closely linked and integrated with international law, forming a 
single unit. As such, international law forms part of the national legal 
system, insofar as the standards created in the international context 
are incorporated into the national law of the State. Consequently, the 
detachment or deviation from the law means that the organization is 
structured, operated and remains outside the national and 
international legal order.   
734. SCOPE OF DEVIATION FROM THE LAW. 
PRESUMPTIONS. As ROXIN notes, in these cases, “the apparatus 
functions as a whole outside the legal order.” That is, it causes its 
illegal effects as a complete whole that acts totally outside the law. In 
his analysis of the Eichmann and Staschynski cases, he found that 
state power was operating outside the law since the very guarantees 
that it regulated were ineffective. However, that did not mean, 
necessarily, that those holding such power were not ultimately 
governed by that same legal order, especially in its international 
aspect. In ROXIN’s opinion, deviation from the law refers not only 
to disregard for the national legal system of each State but also, and 
very specifically, to disregard for international law: “only because 
all peoples of the world are tied to certain values is it possible for us 
to consider criminal and punishable the conduct of superior State 
entities that clearly violate human rights.”  
Another presumption of perpetration by means of control over an 
organized apparatus of power, recognized by ROXIN, arises in the 
case of crimes committed by clandestine movements, secret 
organizations and similar associations that clash with the domestic 
laws of the State. That is, they operate as “a kind of State within the 
State that has freed itself from the community order in general, or in 
specific dealings with the community.” In short, in ROXIN’s 
opinion, deviation from the law would arise not only in crimes 
committed by State entities or apparatuses of state power but also 
would be applicable to cases of “non-state organized crime” and in 
many “forms of the emergence of terrorism.” Only cases of 
corporate criminality should be excluded. Consequently, all 
conceptualization and understanding of detachment or deviation 
810 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [25:657 
from the law must begin by identifying whether the issue deals with 
state criminality or nonstate criminality. That will be fundamental in 
being able to observe, in each criminal structure and expression, the 
presence of perpetration by means of control over organized 
apparatuses of power.  
735. PERPETRATION BY MEANS AND STATE 
CRIMINALITY. Given the characteristics and content of the 
accusation in the case at hand, it is relevant to evaluate the specific 
expressions and manifestations of perpetration by means that are 
shaped and operate as state criminality.   
[. . .]  
2.  It is important to note that an important peculiarity of this type 
of crime lies in the fact that the strategic superior level of the State, 
that is, its central authority, uses the structures of the state apparatus 
in the exercise of its position for the systematic commission of 
crimes that acquire international relevance due to their seriousness 
and the risk of impunity. This form of criminality attacks the legal 
order in force, marginalizing the legally enacted laws in their 
national as well as supranational aspects. Therefore, a State regime 
that from its superior strategic level orders the commission of these 
serious crimes cannot be considered a State of laws; indeed, it is 
completely outside the law.   
[. . .]  
736. DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS AND DEVIATION FROM 
THE LAW. In this context, it is relevant, particularly to the case at 
hand, to evaluate the status of so-called de facto governments that 
become de facto by reasons of the manner in which power is 
exercised. That is, those that are originally instituted pursuant to the 
legal procedures stipulated in the Constitution, but later begin to 
express, manifest and conduct themselves outside or in violation of 
the law.  
¶5. Subjective Elements and Requirements.  
1. Fungibility. Types. 
737. CONCEPT. Fungibility is the first subjective element on 
which a charge of perpetration by means of control over an 
organized apparatus of power is based. It has been understood, 
generally, as the direct executor’s capacity to be exchanged or 
2010] JUDGMENT AGAINST FUJIMORI 811 
substituted by the strategic superior in making his criminal plan 
operational and in executing it. In that regard, FERNÁNDEZ 
IBÁÑEZ, paraphrasing the position of JOECKS, indicates that the 
power of substitution held by the person in the background is a 
central element of this form of imposing his dominant will.  
[. . .]  
738. TYPES OF FUNGIBILITY. Based on the foregoing, two 
types of fungibility can be identified: negative and positive.  
1. Negative fungibility. This corresponds to the traditional 
concept conferred upon it by ROXIN, which means, above 
all, that: “The perpetrator does not represent a free and 
responsible individual, but an anonymous, interchangeable 
figure.”  
[. . .]  
2.  In order to illustrate this fungible mode, ROXIN referred 
to the arguments asserted by  Eichmann’s defense counsel 
before the Jerusalem Tribunal. In his opinion, it was 
irrelevant if the Nazi officer failed to carry out the order to 
execute the Jews, since the order, even in such case, would 
have been carried out. In this manner it was clear that the 
crime was not the work of an individual person, but rather of 
the State itself. National case law has also referred to this 
position of negative fungibility. Indeed, the National 
Criminal Court in its judgment against Shining Path leader 
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, held: “The person in the 
background did not control the will of the executor directly, 
but rather only indirectly through the criminal apparatus.” 
This was due to the coincidence of two independent factors: 
first, because of the decisive nature of the management of the 
apparatus; and second, due to the link, membership and 
subordination of the executor to the hierarchy of this 
apparatus. 
3.  Positive fungibility. This arises and is seen, precisely, 
where there is a plurality of potential executors in the 
structure of the apparatus of power.  
[. . .]  
739. FUNGIBILITY AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION. A 
minority sector of legal scholars have questioned the condition that 
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fungibility be an essential element of the offense of perpetration by 
means of control over an organized apparatus of power.  
[. . .]  
2.  In the national jurisprudence and legal scholarship, 
SCHROEDER’s theory has been echoed by MEINI 
MÉNDEZ and by the National Criminal Court in the Guzmán 
Reynoso Judgment. In the opinion of the former, the 
possibility of substitution is an expectation of criminal 
conduct and it becomes a simple piece of statistical 
information on the likelihood of the success of the criminal 
plan, and therefore it is unnecessary to mention the possibility 
of substituting the executor as a decisive element of control 
over the organization. For the latter, control lies in the “use of 
the predisposition of the executor” to carry out the order. The 
possibility of substituting the direct perpetrators represents 
solely a greater likelihood that the criminal conduct will 
materialize, but it does not support any control.   
[. . .]  
2. Predisposition to commit the unlawful act.  
740. NECESSITY OF ITS INCLUSION. The three criteria 
examined up to this point: command authority, deviation from the 
law and fungibility, were for a long time the three basic pillars of 
ROXIN’s theory of perpetration by means of control over organized 
apparatuses of power. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, in his 
latest studies this author has considered the inclusion and integration 
of a fourth element called the considerably high willingness of the 
executor to perform the act.  
[. . .]  
Its jurisprudential usefulness in deciding cases of perpetration by 
means in cases of State crimes was made clear in the mid-[1990s] by 
the German Federal Supreme Court in its judgment against the 
members of National Defense Council of the German Democratic 
Republic. In that judgment, the responsibility of the perpetrator by 
means was based on showing that the “person in the background” 
had taken advantage of the “unconditional willingness of the 
immediate perpetrator to execute the crime.”  
[. . .]  
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§4. Perpetration by means and superior responsibility in 
international criminal law  
742. BACKGROUND. It is important to distinguish between 
perpetration by means of control over an organized apparatus of 
power and other means of accusation developed in international 
criminal law to attribute criminal responsibility to strategic levels of 
State or State-based power structures. Specifically, we refer here to 
the theory of superior responsibility. This is a criterion of accusation 
that arose and was developed at the end of WWII and which was 
implemented at the Nüremberg and Tokyo trials.114 According to 
those who have studied these cases, “In those trials, the idea was 
made clear that the commanders not only had the duty to respect the 
laws of war but also the obligation to make their subordinates 
respected them.”115 Later, around the mid-[1990s], the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also used this theory to 
convict the military commanders of the Army of the Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who failed to prevent their 
subordinate troops from perpetrating crimes against humanity, and 
those who omitted to investigate or punish the direct perpetrators of 
those criminal acts.116  
743. CHARACTERISTIC ELEMENTS OF SUPERIOR 
RESPONSIBILITY.  
Superior responsibility, as interpreted in scholarly opinions and 
regulated under international criminal law, establishes the liability by 
omission of the person who exercises command over the direct 
 
 114. Eduardo Bertoni, Autoría mediata por aparatos organizados de poder: 
Antecedentes y Aplicación Práctica in LOS CAMINOS DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL Y LOS 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 4 (IDEHPUCP 2007). 
 115. Id. at 29. 
 116. MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ¿PUEDEN LOS CRÍMENES INTERNACIONALES 
CONTRIBUIR AL DEBATE ENTRE UNIVERSALISMO Y RELATIVISMO DE LOS VALORES? 
CRÍMENES INTERNACIONALES Y JURISDICCIONES INTERNACIONALES 83 (Editorial 
Norma 2004) provides important clarification with regard to the fact that although 
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
[unlike the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] seemed to 
require the existence of an armed conflict for the commission of crimes against 
humanity, “in practice, however, the autonomy of the ICTY was strengthened with 
the Tadic judgment, in which the Appeals Chamber held that customary 
international law no longer required a link between crimes against humanity and 
an international armed conflict. In other words, it is clear that a crime against 
humanity can be committed in peace time.” 
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perpetrator of the crime.117 In such cases, it is generally stated that 
the superior fails to comply with his duty of prevention, supervision 
and punishment of all crimes that are, or may be, committed by his 
subordinates. This means, then, that there is a legal obligation on the 
part of the superior, which he omits. According to AMBOS, “The 
concept of command, or better, superior responsibility, makes the 
superior liable for a failure to act to prevent criminal misconduct of 
his or her subordinates. The superior is punished for a lack of 
control and supervision of his or her subordinates who commit 
crimes. Thus, the superior is punished both for his or her own failure 
to intervene and for the crimes of others. As a result, the concept 
seems to create, on the one hand, direct liability for the lack of 
supervision, and, on the other, indirect liability for the criminal acts 
of others. [. . .] Superior responsibility has a double character: it is a 
genuine offence of omission [. . .] and an offence which creates 
danger. . .”118   
744. DEFINITION. It is clear, then, that in view of its 
characteristics and assumptions this mode of assigning responsibility 
is different from perpetration by means of control over an organized 
apparatus of power. The latter, essentially, will always be an act of 
commission, but one that travels from the issuance of the order by 
the strategic superior to its specific execution by the intervening 
 
 117. KAI AMBOS, LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 79 
(Temis 2005) (this doctrine presupposes that the perpetrator holds a specific 
position of military or political power. It is, furthermore, intimately related to a 
punishable act of omission. The perpetrator’s position as a commander places him 
in a position of guarantor, which results in the emergence of specific duties of 
control, protection or oversight (duties of the guarantor), noncompliance with 
which makes him guilty by omission). 
 118. KAI AMBOS, EL NUEVO DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 375 (ARA 
Editores 2004). The concept of “superior responsibility” has a dual aspect: it is a 
crime of omission and a crime that creates danger. The superior is punished, from 
the objective perspective, for failing to supervise the subordinates and for not 
“preventing” or “suppressing” the commission of their atrocities. The crimes 
committed by the subordinates are neither an element of the crime nor a simple 
objective condition for the liability of the superior; they are only the point of 
reference of the superior’s failure to supervise. From the subjective perspective, 
the criminal intent of the superior is not limited solely to the failure to supervise, 
which creates the risk or the danger that the subordinates will commit crimes, but 
also to those derivative crimes themselves. Kai Ambos, La responsabilidad del 
superior en el derecho penal internacional in AA.VV.: La nueva justicia penal 
supranacional 159, 197, 198 (Editorial Tirant lo Blanch 2002). 
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person.119 The difference is also developed normatively in the Rome 
Statute, which regulates precisely both types as two distinct levels of 
involvement and punishability of the strategic bodies linked to the 
commission of crimes that violate human rights. Indeed, Article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute identifies perpetration by means fairly clearly 
(“Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with 
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other 
person is criminally responsible”).120 On the other hand, Article 28 
defines in detail the conditions of omission that constitute superior 
responsibility (“. . .as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly. . .”).121  
 
 119. For a discussion of the differences, see GERHARD WERLE, TRATADO DE 
DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 217-18, 225-25 (Editorial Tirant lo Blanch 
2005). The author indicates (1) that perpetration by means is recognized in the 
major legal systems of the world; however, prior to the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute it was neither regulated in international law nor had it been 
implemented in its case law; (2) that in international criminal law perpetration by 
means is relevant, above all, in the form of control over an organization; (3) that 
the regulation by the Rome Statute, in terms of the punishability of  the perpetrator 
by means is independent of whether the immediate perpetrator is himself 
criminally liable. Article 25(3)(a) has an explanatory effect in two regards [one is 
underscored], by virtue of which the concept of the “perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator” acquires a basis in international criminal law, as the responsibility of 
the person who acts as the direct or immediate perpetrator is not excluded 
expressly. On the other hand, regarding the concept of superior responsibility, he 
notes (4) that is a legal creation of international criminal law, under the aegis of 
which the military leader or civilian superior can be held responsible for crimes 
against international law committed by the subordinates, when they are to blame 
for the violation of their duties of control; and, (5) that from the theoretical point of 
view, this concept can be placed between responsibility by omission and the theory 
of criminal participation, which presents complicated issues of definition and of 
concurrence with the general principles of the theory of participation. 
 120. Dino Carlos Caro Coria, La tipificación de los crímenes consagrados en el 
Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional in AAVV LA CORTE PENAL 
INTERNACIONAL Y LAS MEDIDAS DE SU IMPLEMENTACIÓN EN EL PERU 145 
(Elizabeth Salmón ed. 2001) (this formulation, as DINO CARLOS CARO CORIA 
emphasizes, incorporates ROXIN’s theory of perpetration by means through 
“organized power structures”). 
 121. In this respect, see also Brief for Allard K. Lowenstein International 
Human Rights Clinic of Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae, at 27. It states as 
follows: 
In this way, unlike perpetration by means or co-perpetration, superior 
responsibility attributes responsibility to superiors for their omissions—that 
is, their inaction when it comes to taking the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent the criminal act or to punish the crimes committed by 
their subordinates. In comparison, perpetration by means and co-perpetration 
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§5. Defendant Fujimori Fujimori as perpetrator by means  
745. The defendant’s indirect perpetration of the acts of which he 
is accused, in accordance with Chapter II of Part III and what has 
been set out in the previous paragraphs of this Chapter, is sufficiently 
proven. The legal and factual elements, which as presumptions and 
requirements support such level and method of assigning criminal 
responsibility, have been satisfied conclusively. In that respect, the 
following information is relevant:  
1.  The defendant occupied the highest position at the 
strategic level of State power in general and of the National 
Defense System in particular. From that position he exercised 
clear command authority for the direct political and military 
leadership of strategies for confronting the subversive 
terrorist organizations that had been active in the country 
since the beginning of the [1980s].   
2.  In his formal role as central entity, that is, as shaper and 
developer of government policies, and as Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces and the National Police, the 
defendant abused his position of authority and perverted the 
legitimate use of his power; as of [1990] (together with his 
advisor Vladimiro Montesinos Torres and with the direct 
support of Army General Hermoza Ríos, who held the 
highest positions in the military hierarchy), he began to set up 
an organized apparatus of power based on the central and 
derivative units of the SINA, which were co-opted at their 
highest levels of command.   
3.  In this context, defendant Fujimori Fujimori started to 
devise, and simultaneously to define, special objectives and 
strategies to confront terrorist subversion, particularly the 
core groups that had begun to operate in the country’s urban 
areas, most notably in the capital and surrounding areas. He 
did this with his advisory milieu and the support of the State, 
using the secret intelligence services, which because of their 
function were characterized by the compartmentalization of 
their bodies or units, the hierarchical subordination if their 
structures, and the secrecy and complete clandestinity of their 
agents and actions. 
 
generally presume that the perpetrators perform some positive act to set in 
motion the events that lead to the crime. 
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4.  In this control, with the central government objective as 
the defined policy, the general strategies and the execution 
orders were issued or transmitted by the defendant and 
retransmitted by the other levels of the organized power 
structure in very diverse ways, fully consistent with the 
informal or quasi-formal systems that characterize the codes 
of communication and action manuals typical of the strategic 
or operational intelligence system.   
5.  In that context and practice, the underlying theme was the 
elimination of alleged terrorists and their organizations or 
bases of support. The specific strategy accorded to it was the 
identification, location, capture and physical elimination of 
members and sympathizers of the terrorist groups. At the 
tactical level, the operational pattern for the application of 
this strategy began with the gathering of information on the 
subversive core groups and their members, in order to later 
eliminate them with special intelligence operations under the 
responsibility of specialized SIE units that would be assigned 
and supervised by the SIN, with the logistical support and 
coordination of the Peruvian Army Headquarters. 
6.  The crimes of murder and grievous bodily harm that 
occurred in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta were acts 
committed in the execution of those objectives. They 
involved the strategy and tactical patterns of special 
intelligence operations against terrorist subversion, clearly 
illegal and clandestine in nature, that cannot be supported by 
the national and international legal systems that they 
subordinated systematically or from which they deviated 
completely. 
7.  The crimes of kidnapping against the victims Gorriti and 
Dyer also were in response to orders given and/or supported 
directly by the defendant for the unlawful control of political 
dissidence or criticism of his de facto regime, in a situation of 
democratic instability where fundamental rights and 
guarantees were disregarded by force.  
8.  Furthermore, in all of the crimes at issue in this case, the 
fungible status of the direct perpetrators as well as their 
willingness to execute the act and their lack of any direct or 
horizontal relationship to the defendant, confirm his status as 
a perpetrator by means, as the central entity with hierarchical 
control over the power structure, whose “automatism” he was 
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familiar with and could control through his mid-level 
commanders.  
746. The criminal activity and operations of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta, and in the basement of the SIE, carried out by the organized 
apparatus of power built and energized by the defendant from the 
SINA—whose basic executing core with regard to the control of 
subversive terrorist organizations was the Colina Special Intelligence 
Detachment—were an expression of State criminality against human 
rights in clear deviation from and continuous violation of national 
and international law. As stated by FARALDO CABANA: “The 
objectives of these state organizations that begin to act criminally 
coincide with those of the State, but the means used remain 
autonomous and differentiated from those provided in the legal 
system, as they are criminal in nature. Therefore, it can be asserted 
that the organized apparatus of power, which is no longer the State as 
a whole but rather a specific State organization (i.e., the State 
security forces and agencies, the Armed Forces, the intelligence 
services), acts outside the framework of the legal system; this is a 
necessary requirement, as we know, for the application of the theory 
of control over the organization.[“]  
747. Furthermore, in the field of criminology there is no current 
substantive inconsistency between the categories of Criminal State 
and Dirty War waged by state organizations as the defense asserted 
in its oral argument. Moreover, the defense has attempted to 
construct a fallacy surrounding the options set forth by FARALDO 
CABANA, whose classification with respect to the matter is a mere 
criminological option that is neither the sole nor the predominant one 
among contemporary approaches to the subject. It is even possible to 
observe a distortion of the author’s opinion by the defense counsel, 
since in no section of her monograph does the jurist affirm that 
Criminal States use the entire State apparatus for acts involving the 
extermination of persons.  
On the contrary, there is consensus in recognizing that both 
demonstrations of criminality and criminological categories stem 
from the same etiological source: State Criminality. That is, criminal 
behavior created, executed, supported, tolerated or justified at the 
highest spheres of state power. They are part of forms of criminality 
that, as understood by HASSEMER, materialize only with the 
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support of the State. Their features of criminality and neutralization 
or impunity, in a macro or micro sense, are the same, and have been 
summarized precisely by ZAFFARONI. This author underscores as 
such the denial of responsibility, the denial of the harm and the 
denial of the victims, the latter being “. . .the most common 
neutralization technique in State crimes. The victims were terrorists, 
traitors to the nation, they were the real aggressors, the crime of state 
was not a crime but rather legitimate and necessary defense, and so 
on.[”]  
Not in the most notable legal scholarship in the field of criminal 
law, nor in international criminal policy on the protection of human 
rights, are there qualitative differences between one or another 
criminal manifestation of the institutions of state power, as the 
defense has also asserted. On the contrary, the same concepts, 
characterizations and strategies of prevention and oversight are 
applied to them all.  
At the most, it has been maintained, in a strictly academic and not 
in a substantive or functional sense, that there are some variations of 
degree, whereby both expressions—Criminal State and Dirty War—
carried out by state organizations, can be considered quantitative 
modes of the same model of action or modus operandi for the 
realization of like objectives and policies that violate human rights 
through the murder, kidnapping or disappearance of groups of the 
defenseless civilian population. Thus, in the first, the spread of the 
criminal acts covers distinct spheres of the State. In the second, on 
the other hand, the selective and sector-based criminal activity of 
strategic bodies and special operations predominates. Nevertheless, 
the clandestine and illegal nature of the plans, the secrecy of the 
executors, the undercover control of the operations, the cruelty of the 
procedures, the tolerance of the supervisors, the justification of the 
means and the official use of mechanisms of impunity in the shaping 
of policies and for the communication or execution of the criminal 
decisions and orders, are shared and are common to both forms of 
state criminality. Accordingly, criminal responsibility is assigned to 
them under both national and international criminal law. FARALDO 
CABANA, in this respect, notes that “. . .these actions of State 
bodies that entail the perverse use of the state apparatus in the service 
of the systematic and organized violation of human rights are also 
the subject of international law and international criminal law when 
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they are consistent with crimes against humanity. This occurs when 
the commission of crimes against basic legally protected individual 
rights such as life, liberty, dignity or physical safety, is combined 
with the objective of destroying in an organized and systematic 
fashion an identifiable group within the population, with the 
tolerance or participation of the de jure or de facto political 
authority.[“] 
748. Therefore, if the murders of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, as 
well as the kidnappings in the SIE basement, were carried out with 
the imposition of the defendant’s dominant will upon the organized 
power structure, and with a modus operandi that is typical, at least, 
of the second of those previously described expressions of state 
criminality, the indirect perpetration of those acts is entirely 
attributable to defendant Fujimori Fujimori. This is recognized in the 
very same theoretical option invoked by the defense, that is, 
FARALDO CABANA: “Also admissible is perpetration by means of 
control of the organization in cases in which certain state 
organizations, following instructions that come from the highest 
institutions of the State, begin to use criminal means to achieve 
political objectives pursued by the State as a whole or by the group 
(political, military) that dominates it at the time, such as the 
elimination of terrorist guerrilla movements or political dissidence.” 
Furthermore, according to the same theoretical source, international 
experience, particularly in Latin America, demonstrates that: “it is 
characteristic of the operations of the state organizations that 
undertake a dirty war to cover up and conceal their criminal methods 
from third parties. We have seen how the Argentine tribunals 
highlighted the schizophrenic behavior of the State during the 
Argentine military dictatorship; while part of their organizations had 
begun to act criminally, carrying out a dirty war against political 
dissidence, the rest continued to conduct themselves normally and 
with respect for the law. The same occurred in Chile during the 
military dictatorship.[“]  
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Chapter IV: Civil Reparations. Determination. 
[. . .]  
§2. Court decisions and payments made to the victims in the Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta cases.  
774. On March [14th, 2001], the IACtHR issued its judgment on 
the merits in the Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. It held, pursuant to 
the terms of recognition of international responsibility made by the 
State, that the State had violated the right to life, the right to humane 
treatment, and the right to a fair trial and judicial protection. It also 
ordered, in pertinent part, that the reparations would be determined 
by mutual agreement among the respondent State, the Inter-
American Commission and the victims, their next of kin or their 
legal representatives.  
On November [30th, 2001], the IACtHR rendered its judgment on 
reparations, approving the agreement on reparations of August 
[22nd, 2001], entered into between the Peruvian State and the 
victims, their next of kin and their legal representatives. The 
agreement included the payment of one hundred and seventy-five 
thousand U.S. dollars (US $175,000.00) to each one of the surviving 
victims and for each one of the deceased victims (with the exception 
of Máximo León León, in which case the amount was two hundred 
and fifty thousand U.S. dollars (US $250,000.00)), as well as the 
payment of healthcare expenses. It also included the non-pecuniary 
reparations of publication of the judgment, a public expression of 
apology and the erection of a memorial monument.  
775. On November [29th, 2006], the IACtHR issued its judgment 
on the merits, costs and reparations in the Case of La Cantuta v. 
Peru. It should be noted that the judgment of November [30th, 
2007], which interpreted the judgment on the merits, reparations and 
costs, did not in essence modify the prior judgment. 
A. The IACtHR declared, in accordance with the admission 
of the Peruvian State, the international responsibility of the 
State for violations of the right to life, the right to humane 
treatment and individual liberty, and the right to a fair trial 
and judicial protection in relation to its obligation to respect 
the rights of the victims.  
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B. The decision also ordered the State to: i) take the 
necessary actions to effectively conduct and complete, within 
a reasonable time, the ongoing investigations and the criminal 
proceedings pending in the domestic courts; ii) search for and 
locate the mortal remains of specific victims; iii) publicly 
acknowledge its liability; iv) include the victims in the 
memorial monument named “El Ojo que Llora” (The Crying 
Eye); v) publish the partial acknowledgement; provide health 
care services and specialized treatment to the relatives of the 
victims; and vi) implement permanent human rights-oriented 
programs for the members of the security forces and judges. 
C. The Court further ordered [. . .].122  
[. . .]  
777. Consequent to the decisions of the IACtHR, the Peruvian 
State complied in paying the compensation to the victims in the 
Barrios Altos Case, as reflected in the information forwarded by the 
executive secretary of the National Human Rights Council at pages 
twenty-three thousand seventy-five to twenty-three thousand three 
hundred and twenty-eight and at page sixty-one thousand seven 
hundred and seventy-one  
With respect to the La Cantuta Case, the information on the 
record, contained in official letter No. 2007–2007–JUS/CNDH–SE 
of November [15th, 2007], does not reflect the State’s compliance 
with payment of the monetary sums, although it must be taken into 
account that pursuant to the IACtHR’s judgment in that case the 
Peruvian State stated that it had paid three million soles 
(S/3,000,000.00) between [1996 and 1998] [paragraph 197]. The last 
report of the executive secretary of the National Human Rights 
Council, contained in official letter No. 2096–2008–JUS/CNDH–SE, 
of last September twenty-second, stated that compliance with the 
monetary reparations was still pending. As far as the military 
criminal court judgment regarding the case of La Cantuta, the 
information in question confirms the payment of the civil 
reparations.  
 
 122. Refers to the payments to be made to the relatives of the victims. 
(Publisher’s note). 
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§3. Civil reparations at the national level and the decision of the 
international court—Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
778. The Court must decide whether it is proper to issue a 
judgment ordering civil reparations to the victims and their next of 
kin for the acts perpetrated against them when there is already an 
international judgment addressing this same issue [. . .].  
779. [. . .] The international responsibility of the State is direct and 
principal in nature, just as it arises in terms of the violation of the 
Convention rights attributed to the State, while in this case the direct 
civil liability for the commission of a crime is assigned to the 
perpetrator or participant in the crime, to the extent that he caused 
harm.123 In the first case, it is the State that is obligated to provide 
reparations; in the second case it is the direct responsibility of the 
perpetrator of the crime, as the person who committed it. In 
principle, the person who is criminally responsible is also civilly 
liable. 
780. The victims of the harm to be redressed are the same, the 
damages arose from a single unlawful event, and the judgments of 
the IACtHR have identified the victims and their relatives and also 
determined specific reparations for all of them. Bearing this in mind, 
it is not possible for them to receive additional, or double, 
compensation. For them to do so would give rise to the unjust 
enrichment of the victim, and the IACtHR maintains, with respect to 
this matter, that the enrichment or the impoverishment of the victim 
or his heirs is unacceptable124 [. . .].  
781. The principle that this case law doctrine conveys is clear. A 
double payment for damages arising from the commission of a single 
act, or rather, an unlawful result that gave rise to compensable 
damages, is not possible. Accordingly, it will only be possible to set 
monetary damages for those purposes not considered in a prior 
judgment, or with respect to individuals not included therein who 
deserve compensation. The only exception would be where, for those 
items already established—always or exclusively before the 
international court, which is at a higher level than the domestic 
 
 123. Final Judgment of March 29, 2001, Motion for Nullity No. 412-2001/Lima. 
 124. Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2006 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 202 (Nov. 29, 2006) (with precedent in the Goiburú, 
Montero Aranguren and Ximenes López judgments). 
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court—a lack of reasonableness and/or proportionality is noted in 
light of the facts proven.   
[. . .]  
786. In addition, and in accordance with the doctrine assumed in 
paragraph 781, it must be determined whether the civil parties, who 
represent twenty-one of the twenty-nine victims of the Barrios Altos 
and La Cantuta cases, are entitled to compensation for their activities 
conducted in this trial. This would be an issue that was, of course, 
not addressed in the international case.  
The doctrine established in the case law of the IACtHR (paragraph 
243 of the La Cantuta Case) has established—updating, according to 
CHIOVENDA, the idea derived from Roman Law—that what is 
called “costs and expenses” (which in the new Code of Criminal 
Procedure takes on its own importance, and which it is proper to 
determine independently) is included within the concept of 
reparation. This is because the activity undertaken by the victims for 
purposes of obtaining justice entails expenditures that must be 
compensated when responsibility is established by means of a 
conviction.  
[. . .] It is proper to assume this doctrine and therefore to 
determine, as part of the civil reparations, a sum of money for the 
expenditures that the civil parties have paid out in dealing with this 
case.   
787. [. . .] Therefore, as it must be established at a reasonable 
amount, the total estimated sum—divided proportionately among the 
number of victims included in the civil party—shall be twenty 
thousand U.S. dollars (US $20,000.00).  
788. It should be made clear that these payments must be made by 
defendant Fujimori Fujimori as the direct perpetrator of the crimes.125 
The State cannot be included because it has neither been served 
notice of summons nor been considered expressly as a liable civil 
party [Article 100 in fine of the Code of Criminal Procedure].126 It is 
 
 125. Final Judgment No. 834-2000/San Martín, of June 9, 2000. 
 126. It is consistent doctrine, accepted by the Supreme Court, that the civil third 
party or liable civil party that has not been summonsed cannot exercise its right of 
defense and, consequently, the judgment ordering that it pay civil reparations is 
non-binding. SeeDOMINGO GARCÍA RADA, MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL 
PENAL, OCTAVA EDICIÓN 106 (EDDILI 1984). 
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likewise necessary to bear in mind that the sums paid by the State at 
the international level, completely or partially, may be subject to 
repetition with respect to the defendant in an independent case, 
insofar as he is found to be the indirect perpetrator of the criminal 
attacks that were the basis for finding the international responsibility 
of the State.  
§4. Other reparations claims. The position of the civil party.  
789. The civil party [. . .] requested, in addition to the financial 
requests already made by the Office of the Attorney General, specific 
measures of satisfaction based on the Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on March [21st, 2006] in its 
Sixtieth Period of Sessions, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.” On this legal basis, it requested as 
a measure of satisfaction that an official statement or court decision 
be issued to restore the dignity, reputation and rights of the victims 
and those persons closely related to them.  
790 and 791127  
§5. Admissibility of the measures of satisfaction requested. 
[. . .]  
793. It is possible to assert, from a general perspective, that civil 
liability imposes upon the liable party the obligation to restore the 
wealth of the affected party to its state prior to the commission of the 
punishable offense. The purpose is always to make the most 
comprehensive reparation of the harm and to neutralize the effects of 
the criminal action, whether potential or actual. From this 
perspective, the national legislature has provided three options: 
restitution (which is preferred, and is a kind of assertion of the 
recovery claim in the criminal case), reparation and compensation.   
[. . .]  
The Criminal Code links restitution—as a form of restoring the 
legal status altered by the criminal act—to reparation when the latter 
 
 127. The civil party also requested other measures of satisfaction. (Publisher’s 
note). 
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is connected to the deprivation of an asset as a result of the criminal 
conduct and restitution is not possible. It includes, obviously, the 
payment of the damage and deterioration of the asset, which 
nevertheless typically constitute compensation; restitution is made in 
the payment of the value of the asset in question, and reflects the 
magnitude of the harm caused [. . .]  
Compensation, on the other hand, is established as a suitable 
means of financial compensation for harm to an individual’s rights 
regardless of whether the damaged good is a physical thing or 
another interest—restitution, in any case, does not prevent 
compensation if some detriment has arisen from the crime. Such 
damages must be derived directly from the punishable act 
(cause/effect relationship), and they must be compensated, except, 
clearly, harm to an individual’s rights and pain and suffering, insofar 
as they stem unequivocally from the events. There is reasonable 
discretion in the court’s decision, but, pursuant to Article 1984 of the 
Civil Code, it must correspond to its magnitude and to the harm 
caused to the victim or his family. Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
on which to establish suitable grounds for compensation in order to 
quantify the appropriate compensation with financial criteria, and 
therefore the description itself of the crime itself must be borne in 
mind. In that case, it is set reasonably based on criteria of equity 
[See: Civil Cassation No. 47–1–1998]; Article 1984 of the Civil 
Code stipulates that the assessment of non-pecuniary damages—
understood as harm to an individual’s rights and pain and suffering—
is according to their magnitude and the harm caused to the victim or 
his family. For this the court must take into account the nature of the 
interest harmed in terms of the non-pecuniary nature of the legally 
protected interest. Its determination will depend on each case and the 
personal conditions that warrant compensation; it should not be 
limited to purely mathematical calculations. 
Recoverable damages are pecuniary or property damages, and 
non-pecuniary damages: harm to an individual’s rights and pain and 
suffering. Pecuniary or property damages include damage to things 
and physical injuries, that is, the harm caused to economic rights, 
which must be redressed [the crime of bodily harm, for example, 
includes healthcare expenses, disability from employment, the 
discomfort, pain and inconveniences of the injury and curative 
treatment, and the consequences of the injuries]. Non-pecuniary 
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damages, subdivided into: i) harm to an individual’s rights, 
understood as the harm caused to the basic or non-monetary rights of 
persons—harm or damage to a right, a benefit or interest of the 
person as such; and  ii) pain and suffering, understood as the mental 
grief and suffering—which includes anxiety, distress and physical 
suffering—experienced by the victim and which is short-lived and 
not lasting, as defined by the Italian Constitutional Court in its 
Judgment No. 148 of July [14th, 1986].  
[. . .]  
Furthermore, indirect or consequential damages and lost wages 
must be included within pecuniary damages; strictly speaking, they 
are two categories of pecuniary damages. Consequential damages are 
understood as financial damage and physical or mental personal 
injury, with or without financial repercussions. Lost wages are 
understood as the absence of earnings that the victim reasonably 
would have produced; this, obviously, is hypothetical, that is, it 
assumes a probabilistic reading of how events would have unfolded 
but for the intervention of the crime at issue. With regard to the heirs 
(which is the case of most of the civil plaintiffs) the compensation 
can be broken down, following the Spanish case law, into three 
components: (1) healthcare and funeral costs, which provide a secure 
evidentiary base; (2) economic hardship, if they depended financially 
on the deceased,  determined based on support allowances and the 
loss of financial care; and (3) pain and suffering, which is intrinsic 
and need not be proven.  
794. In En Banc Decision No. 6–2006/CJ–116, of October [13th, 
2006] (paragraph eight), the Supreme Court, in this same vein, 
established that civil damages must be understood as those negative 
effects derived from the harm caused to a protected interest, which 
can give rise to (1) pecuniary damages, consisting of a harm to rights 
of an economic nature, which must be redressed, based on the 
reduction of the net assets of the victim and on the non-increase of 
the victim’s net assets or net worth of the earnings that he has 
stopped receiving (reduction of net assets); as well as to (2) non-
pecuniary damages, limited to harm caused to the (non-monetary) 
rights or legitimate basic interests of individuals as well as entities; 
this is where intangible assets of the victim’s, which do not have any 
financial implications, are affected.  
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795. The case law of the Criminal Chambers of the Supreme Court 
has consistently held that civil reparations have a scope of definition 
or extent that refers specifically to economic redress. The  request 
put forward in the civil claim in the national criminal case, in the vast 
majority of cases, asserts that a conviction must entail, among other 
things, certain positive obligations. Article 93 of the Criminal Code 
establishes specifically that the purpose of civil reparations is the 
restoration of the asset or, if that is not possible, the payment of its 
value, and the compensation of damages. In cases of crimes such as 
those in the instant case, which are not crimes against property, 
neither restitution nor reparation is admissible, insofar as they 
correlate only to a person’s net assets [the reparation of the harm 
consists of making a monetary payment in view of the asset that it is 
not possible to restore]; rather, it is compensation, which means to 
order the payment of an amount of money sufficient to cover all of 
the harm caused by the criminal offense. 
796. The civil party, however, without denying the validity of the 
compensation measures included in our domestic law, considers that 
the scope of the reparation includes other measures in addition to 
compensation and restitution: measures of satisfaction, rehabilitation 
and non-repetition, contained in international human rights law. To 
this end, as specified in paragraphs 784 to 786, the assertion is based 
on the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on March [21st, 2006] in its Sixtieth Period of Sessions, 128 
“Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law.”  
That Resolution, in its second whereas clause, recommends that 
the States take the Basic Principles and Guidelines into account, 
promote respect thereof and bring them to the attention of, among 
others, the members of the judiciary. The Preamble of the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines recalls various provisions found in 
international instruments that recognize the right to a remedy for 
 
 128. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006). 
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victims of violations of international human rights law, including 
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, as well as in regional international human rights 
provisions, such as Article 25 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. In addition, the Preamble affirms that the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines apply to gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian 
law which, by their very grave nature, constitute an affront to human 
dignity. It also underscores that the clauses it contains specify 
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the 
implementation of existing legal obligations under international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law.  
Section IX of the Basic Principles and Guidelines addresses 
“reparation for harm suffered.” Principle eighteen establishes that in 
accordance with domestic law and international law, victims shall be 
provided with full and effective reparation, as appropriate, in five 
forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition. Restitution, which has a broader 
meaning than that provided under domestic law, includes, as 
appropriate, restoration of liberty, enjoyment of human rights, 
identity, family life and citizenship, return to one’s place of 
residence, restoration of employment and return of property  
(principle nineteen). Compensation, which has an aspect that might 
be compared to our domestic law, includes any economically 
assessable damage (principle twenty). Rehabilitation includes 
medical and psychological care, as well as legal and social services 
(principle twenty-one). Satisfaction, not provided for under our 
national law, includes various measures such as verification of the 
facts and full and public disclosure of the truth, a judicial decision 
restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and 
of persons closely connected with the victim, and a public apology 
(principle twenty-three). Guarantees of non-repetition—also not 
part of our national law—should include, among other measures, 
reviewing and reforming laws, educating and training public 
servants, and strengthening the independence of the judiciary 
(principle twenty-three).  
[. . .]  
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798. The reparations measures ordered by the IACtHR are based 
on Article 63.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 
on the Court’s interpretation of the theory of international 
responsibility, whereby it establishes reparations measures that tend 
to erase the effects of the violations committed. Within this 
framework provided by the Convention, specific reparations 
measures are developed for the regional protection system; they seek 
to overcome obstacles to the effective reparation of damages 
sustained by the victims, as well as to address the need to provide an 
answer that facilitates the decision of the case at hand.129 The 
IACtHR, to the extent possible, orders full restitution to the situation 
that existed prior to the commission of the violation (restitutio in 
integrum);130 and if that is not feasible in whole or in part, other 
measures are taken to guarantee rights, redress the consequences and 
compensate the damages, as well as to ensure the non-repetition of 
harmful acts similar to the ones that occurred in the case.131 
799. In principle, the Court accepts the primacy of international 
human rights law as the basic support for its decision in this area. 
The standards found therein are binding, and are directly and 
immediately enforceable, insofar as they contain standards more 
favorable to the fundamental rights of the individual than those set 
forth in the Constitution.132 As such, it is proper to integrate these 
provisions—based on their own terms—into the domestic system, as 
well as to apply the case law of the IACtHR to decide, in pertinent 
part, the conflicts of interest expressed at the national level.133 The 
 
 129. Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, ¶ 221 (July 5, 2004). 
 130. Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, ¶ 236 (Nov. 25, 2003). 
 131. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99, ¶ 150 (June 7, 
2003).  Viviana Krsticevic, Reflexiones sobre la ejecución de las decisiones del 
sistema interamericano de protección de derechos humanos in CEJIL: 
IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LAS DECISIONES DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 24-25 (San Jose 2007). 
 132. César Landa Implementación de las decisiones del sistema interamericano 
de derechos humanos en el ordenamiento constitucional peruano in CEJIL: 
IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LAS DECISIONES DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 149 (San Jose 2007). 
 133. Case No. 25/26-2005/PI/TC, ¶ 26, 32, Tribunal Constitucional 
[Constitutional Court], Aug. 19, 2009 
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interpretive guidelines to the American Convention on Human 
Rights and the principles of jurisprudence that come from the 
IACtHR, in addition to being an inevitable guide for interpreting the 
rights recognized in the Convention, are binding upon this Court. 
This doctrine, furthermore, has been noted by the Constitutional 
Court in Judgment No. 0217–2002–HC/TC, of April [7th, 2002], and 
reaffirmed in Judgment No. 2730–2006– PA/ TC, of July [21st, 
2006], paragraph twelve; it has also been emphasized in particular by 
the Supreme Court in Binding Final Judgment No. 18–2004, of 
November [17th, 2004].  
[. . .]  
800. Consequently, to the extent that the facts at issue in this case 
can be classified as “. . .gross violations of international human rights 
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law 
constituting crimes under international law. . .” (principle four), the 
provisions contained in the Basic Principles and Guidelines shall be 
applicable in the national court, especially since they have been 
included consistently in the case law of the IACtHR. 
§6. Ruling on the merit of the non-pecuniary measures requested by 
the civil party.  
[. . .]  
804. As noted from the comparative analysis of the judgments of 
the IACtHR and the previously cited requests for relief, three of 
those requests have already been admitted by the IACtHR: 
healthcare benefits, the search for the remains of the victims of La 
Cantuta and changes in the law—which in the case of the 
international decisions are specific, and therefore, controllable. 
Furthermore, every judgment that is issued on the scope and 
magnitude of the facts, declares them proven and specifies the 
 
established that international human rights treaties not only form part of our legal 
system but also have the status of constitutional law. See also Luis Huerta, La 
aplicación de jurisprudencia constitucional para el juzgamiento de violaciones de 
derechos humanos in LOS CAMINOS DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL Y LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS, INSTITUTO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LA PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD 
CATÓLICA DEL PERU 109 (Francisco Macedo ed. 2007) (it is up to legal 
practitioners to assert the prevalence of the Constitution and human rights treaties 
over any other provision of lower hierarchical ranking that is inconsistent with 
their meaning). 
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harmful result to the victims, in and of itself, is a measure of 
reparation. Consequently, the requests concerning the necessity of a 
statement that the victims were attacked as a result of the defendant’s 
conduct and that there are other indirect victims, in accordance with 
the law of damages, are already included. The petition for relief at 
page twenty-three thousand four hundred and ninety-three, in general 
terms, requests a court decision to restore the dignity, reputation and 
rights of the victims and the people closely connected to them. 
However, it does not specify the measure and the sense of the 
corresponding court decision. It is sufficient, nevertheless, for those 
purposes, and as a consequence of the statement of facts proven, to 
affirm that there is no evidence whatsoever, beyond an insinuation 
made by one of the participants in the events—without any 
supporting circumstantial evidence to justify it—that can even 
remotely lead to the suspicion that the victims were linked to the 
PCP–SL and involved in specific attacks with terrorist objectives.134  
 
 134. There is no consistent information whatsoever from police agencies, 
intelligence agencies or the Office of the Attorney General—let alone court 
judgments—that in any way supports an assertion, even at the level of reasonable 
suspicion, that any of the victims of Barrios Altos or La Cantuta were involved in 
the two large attacks preceding the acts perpetrated against them, or that they were 
members or were linked to the PCP-SL. The statements of the student named 
Espinoza Ochoa (tenth session) [which link some of the murdered students to PCP-
SL proselytizing activities at La Cantuta University, but do not clearly establish 
their membership in that terrorist organization] and Army Major Martin Rivas’s 
very vague remarks against the victims (at pp. 139 and 165 of the book Ojo por 
Ojo by the journalist Jara Flores) to justify the response of the military intelligence 
forces to the attack against the Húsares de Junín and the Tarata attack—accusing 
them of being part of the PCP-SL apparatus, alleging that the tenement house on 
Jirón Huanta and the University Residence were refuges for the activists and 
perpetrators of the attacks, and of their modes of criminal operation—have no solid 
basis whatsoever. In the eighty-ninth session, PNP Colonel Jiménez Baca not only 
questioned the grounds for the reasoning of military intelligence to link the victims 
to the PCP-SL but also reported, with respect to the crime of La Cantuta, that a 
student from La Cantuta linked to the PCP-SL was arrested some time later and 
stated that the victims neither belonged to a Shining Path detachment, nor were 
they leaders of that organization. He added that the PCP-SL’s organizational logic 
and manner of acting made it infeasible for there to be an open meeting of leaders 
and top officials, and also of politically active members of the bodies that were 
created, as they were all informed by compartmentalization. 
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§7. Civil reparations to the victims Gorriti Ellenbogen and Dyer 
Ampudia.  
[. . .]  
806. [. . .] As far as the non-pecuniary damages (harm to 
individual rights and pain and suffering) are concerned, every 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty—a legally protected right of the 
highest order and of maximum constitutional importance and 
protection—of course, caused suffering, anxiety, terror, uncertainty 
and helplessness of particular significance, especially in the context 
of the interruption of constitutional order or the abusive exercise of 
government authority, and carried out by military and intelligence 
forces (the victims having been confined at an SIE facility). Clearly, 
it is not necessary that the pain and suffering be materialized in 
specific pathological or psychological disturbances. That harm, in 
view of the proof of the facts, has been sufficiently established. It is 
not possible for it to be established through specific evidence, and 
therefore it must be inferred from the severity of the fact proven or 
from its mental and emotional connotations. The quantification of 
such damages, in sum, must be established in accordance with 
criteria of equity, bearing in mind the circumstances in which the 
facts occurred and unfolded and the personal charcteristics of the 
victims [. . .].  
In conclusion, for non-pecuniary or non-monetary damages only, 
it is proper to set the amount at fifteen thousand U.S. dollars (US 
$15,000.00) for each victim. 
§8. Specification of the amounts to be paid by the defendant for civil 
reparations.  
807. [. . .] “Interest shall accrue on the amount of the 
compensation from the date on which the harm was caused.” The 
interest in question shall accrue from the date of the commission of 
the crime (the acts that gave rise to the damage or harm) to the date 
of this judgment; it must not be confused with default interest that 
runs from the start of a lawsuit. Moreover, as this item is stipulated 
as a necessary consequence, the parties need not have referred to it 
expressly.  
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PART THREE: DECISION 
821. Based on these legal grounds, administering justice on behalf 
of the Nation and in its best judgment as authorized by Law, having 
stated, argued and voted on the issues of fact in a separate section, 
the Special Division of the Supreme Court of the Republic  
RULES:  
822. That the evidentiary issues raised by the defense counsel of 
defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori under subheadings two 
(evidentiary issues), three (video and audio evidence) and four (other 
evidentiary arguments) of Chapter I of Part Two of this judgment, 
are UNFOUNDED, except for:  
I.  The objection to the statement of military expert José Luis 
García regarding Manual MFA–110–1–EMC, as established in 
paragraph 70, is partially admissible.  
II.  The assessment of the evidentiary issues pertaining to the 
pretrial statements specified in paragraphs 72 and 73, which are ruled 
inadmissible as evidence in this case; and the audio recording 
entitled “Fujimori–Montesinos Dialogue,” consistent with paragraph 
153, which is excluded form the evidence.  
823. TO CONVICT ALBERTO FUJIMORI FUJIMORI or 
KENYA FUJIMORI, whose particulars were specified paragraph 4, 
as the indirect perpetrator of the offenses of:  
I. Aggravated murder, with the aggravating circumstance of 
malice aforethought, against:  
1. Luis Antonio León Borja.  
2. Luis Alberto Díaz Ascovilca.  
3. Alejandro Rosales Alejandro.  
4. Máximo León León.  
5. Placentina Marcela Chumbipuma Aguirre.  
6. Octavio Benigno Huamanyauri Nolasco.  
7. Filomeno León León.  
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8. Lucio Quispe Huanaco.   
9. Tito Ricardo Ramírez Alberto.  
10. Teobaldo Ríos Lira.  
11. Manuel Isaías Ríos Pérez.  
12. Nelly María Rubina Arquiñigo.  
13. Odar Mender Sifuentes Núñez.  
14. Benedicta Yanque Churo  
15. Javier Manuel Ríos Rojas. (BARRIOS ALTOS CASE)  
16. Juan Gabriel Mariño Figueroa.  
17. Bertila Lozano Torres.  
18. Dora Oyague Fierro.  
19. Robert Teodoro Espinoza.  
20. Marcelino Rosales Cárdenas.  
21. Felipe Flores Chipana.  
22. Luis Enrique Ortiz Perea.  
23. Richard Armando Amaro Cóndor.  
24. Heráclides Pablo Meza.  
25. Hugo Muñoz Sánchez. (LA CANTUTA CASE)  
II. Grievous bodily harm, against:  
1. Natividad Condorcahuana Chicaña.  
2. Felipe León León.  
3. Tomás Livias Ortega.  
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4. Alfonso Rodas Alvitres. (BARRIOS ALTOS CASE)  
The aforementioned offenses of aggravated murder and 
grievous bodily harm are crimes against humanity under 
international criminal law.  
III. Aggravated kidnapping, with the aggravating 
circumstance of cruel treatment, against: 
1. Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen.  
2. Samuel Edward Dyer Ampudia. (SIE BASEMENT 
CASE)  
824. Accordingly, A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT OF 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IS IMPOSED, to be calculated from 
November [7th, 2005], on which date the defendant was arrested in 
Chile with a view to extradition, to June [18th, 2006], on which date 
he was released on bond, and from September [22nd, 2007], on 
which date he was brought before this Court, to its expiration on 
February [10th, 2032]. 
825. The Court ORDERED the following measures in benefit of 
the victims, in accordance with the determination set forth in Part 
Three, Chapter IV, subheadings 3 to 8 of this judgment:  
A. It SET, for purposes of non-pecuniary damages to be paid 
to Marcelino Marcos Pablo Meza and Carmen Juana Mariños 
Figueroa, siblings of deceased victims Heráclides Pablo Meza 
and Juan Gabriel Muñoz Figueroa, respectively, the amount 
of sixty-two thousand and four hundred nuevos soles 
(S/.62,400.00) each.   
B. It ESTABLISHED, for purposes of compensatory 
payment the amount of twenty thousand dollars (US 
$20,000.00) to the legal heirs of: 1. Luis Antonio León Borja, 
2. Alejandro Rosales Alejandro, 3. Máximo León León, 4. 
Placentina Marcela Chumbipuma Aguirre, 5. Octavio 
Benigno Huamanyauri Nolasco, 6. Manuel Isaías Ríos Pérez, 
7. Benedicta Yanque Churo, 8. Javier Manuel Ríos Rojas, 9. 
Juan Gabriel Mariño Figueroa. 10. Bertila Lozano Torres, 11. 
Dora Oyague Fierro, 12. Robert Teodoro Espinoza, 13. Felipe 
Flores Chipana, 14. Luis Enrique Ortiz Perea. 15. Richard 
Armando Amaro Cóndor, 16. Heráclides Pablo Meza, and 17. 
Hugo Muñoz Sánchez. Likewise, to: 18. Natividad 
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Condorcahuana Chicaña, 19. Felipe León León, 20. Tomás 
Livias Ortega, and 21. Alfonso Rodas Alvitres. The amount 
of sixty-two thousand four hundred nuevos soles 
(S/.62,400.00) shall be divided proportionately among the 
victims; that is, two thousand nine hundred and seventy-one 
nuevos soles and forty-three céntimos (S/.2971.43) to each of 
them.   
C. It DETERMINED, for purposes of compensation for non-
pecuniary damages the amount of forty-six thousand and 
eight hundred nuevos soles (S/.46,800.00) to each of the 
victims Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen and Samuel 
Edward Dyer Ampudia.  
D. It SPECIFIED that the three monetary sums shall be paid 
by defendant Alberto Fujimori Fujimori personally. Interest 
shall accrue on these sums from the date on which the harm 
occurred.  
826. THE COURT RESOLVED that it is not proper:  
1. TO GRANT the twenty-nine victims from the Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta cases—with the exception set forth in 
clause (a) of the previous paragraph—compensation for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, because the issue was 
already decided at the international level, and must be 
enforced in the legally provided manner and venue.  
2. TO ORDER compliance with measures of satisfaction, 
rehabilitation and non-repetition requested by the civil party, 
because they have already been ordered by the international 
court (the IACtHR ordered seven measures in each case in 
the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases).  
827. Bearing in mind what was established in paragraph 764 of 
this judgment, the Court STATES ON RECORD, categorically, that 
the twenty-nine victims identified in the Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta cases—whose names are listed in paragraph 783, I and II, of 
the judgment—were neither linked to the terrorist actions of the 
PCP–SL, nor were they members of that criminal organization. 
828. It is ORDERED that charges be brought: (i) against Alberto 
Augusto Pinto Cárdenas, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres and Nicolás 
de Bari Hermoza Ríos for the offense of aggravated kidnapping 
committed against Gustavo Andrés Gorriti Ellenbogen; (ii) against 
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Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos for the offense of rebellion against the 
State; and (iii) against Willy Chirinos Chirinos for the offense of 
perjury against the State. Consequently, IT IS ORDERED that the 
respective case file be opened with copies of this judgment and the 
case records cited in Part Three, Chapter V, subheadings 2 and 3, and 
that they be sent to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor with 
proper jurisdiction for the appropriate legal purposes.  
829. The Court has ISSUED the respective investigation request 
to the Office of the Attorney General in order for it to take the 
appropriate steps to follow up on the DNA analysis sent to London to 
determine the identity of the victims in the La Cantuta case. 
830. It is ORDERED that once this judgment has become final, it 
shall be recorded in the respective Registry; the notarial certified 
copies and notices of conviction shall be forwarded, and, thereafter, 
the case record shall be sent back to the original court for the 
appropriate legal purposes. Notice shall be given at a public hearing 
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